

KOREA *forum*

2015

*SPECIAL
NO. 3*

NATIONS AND IDENTITIES IN ARTICLES AND IDENTITIES

Exchange Program for Regional Integration
in East Asia and Europe

EPRIE 2015

Supported by

Robert Bosch **Stiftung**

MEMORANDUM

by 2015 EPRIE Participants, 2015

NATIONS + IDENTITIES + (MUCH MORE) = EPRIE 2015

Eleven Days in July offered us a most memorable experience and unique opportunity for dialogue at the Exchange Program for Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe (EPRIE) 2015. This year, 19 young professionals from China, South Korea, Japan, France, Germany and Poland joined the program to discuss regional cooperation in a globalizing world in the context of nation and identity. Given the program venues in Tokyo and Seoul, our main regional focus was East Asia, with some reflections on the current challenges in Europe. The neighboring countries in this region share a common historical line but see history, in particular of World War II and preceding decades, from different perspectives. Consequently, our brainstorming and conversations at EPRIE were diverse and enriched our various views.

During the program, we had an opportunity visit sites closely related to matters of East Asian history and politics which were intensely discussed, including museums in Japan and South Korea that presented conflicting historical narratives. These differing interpretations of a common history contributed greatly to both inputs and outcomes of our own discourse among the participants. We also met with an artist whose work showed a practical dimension of the more abstract ideas we discussed.

EPRIE 2015 started with several intercultural training sessions. Through these activities, we quickly became familiar with each other and experienced first-hand identity-related concepts at the core of the program. Following these introductory sessions, seminars by relevant experts from East Asia and Europe shed light on the status quo of regional relations in East Asia. After grasping the main concepts of the topic and current situation of the nations involved, we split into groups with different academic backgrounds, careers and nationalities to share our own ideas on nation, nationalism, and national identity in a globalizing world.

A crucial part of the EPRIE experience has been our interaction with the experts, which made the exchange within our group even more meaningful. We would like to express our gratitude to all these academics and practitioners who shared their insights and thoughts with us. Their presentations covered a wide range of issues, including collective memory, reconciliation, victimhood, and regional cooperation. They provided substantial input for discussions among us and helped sharpen our understanding of the complexity of East Asia as well as commonalities with and differences to the situation in Europe.

REFLECTING ON EAST ASIA = OUR STARTING POINT

We found that East Asia today can be understood in terms of several aspects, the difficult historical heritage being one of the most prominent. As close neighbors, China, Korea and Japan share a long history of cultural, economic and diplomatic exchanges as well as a number of recent conflicts, the most traumatic being World War II. Japanese wartime aggression and colonial rule, including the forced prostitution of so-called »comfort women” and later the enshrinement of Japanese war criminals in Yasukuni Shrine, have provided major points of contention in the framing of East Asian history of the 20th century....

NATIONS AND IDENTITIES

... was the topic of this year's Exchange Program for Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe (EPRIE) which took place in Tokyo and Seoul. It was developed as the logical consequence of the past programs addressing the themes "concept of nations", "inspiration" and "challenges for neighborly cooperation". This series examines "nations" and nationalism against the backdrop of regional integration. This year focused primarily on the creation of national identities. What factors influence one's own identity? Where does the consciousness of being part of a specific nation arise from? And to what extent is (the formation of) one's own identity influenced by nationality? What images, metaphors and stereotypes are tied to it? And how can they be changed? Above all, we asked whether a regional identity exists alongside the national identity. Moreover, it was discussed what a national or regional identity can even mean in times of globalization.

The present issue contains a selection of articles from the seminar and offers a variety of ongoing research by alumni. Two reports from the EPRIE participants Park Soyoun* and Agnieszka Batko serve as an introduction to this year's EPRIE seminar.

Gudrun Wacker from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs presents regional cooperation in East Asia and the gap between security and economy.

Tobias Söldner addresses the creation and role of cultural stereotypes. He shows characteristic differences between cultures that are important for how people perceive relationships between themselves and their social environment, using the categories of individualism and collectivism.

Under the heading "Historical Education" we include two contributions which discuss the transfer of history knowledge in high-school as well as in special peace education programs. Ingild Bode investigates in her study with Heo Seunghoon Emilia how German and Japanese students score their previous history education and what narratives they use to report on the Second World War. On the other hand, Oaku Yuko (EPRIE 2014) gives us three practical examples of peace education programs in Northeast Asia.

Meri Joyce describes the activities of the civil society for regional peacebuilding and dialogue in Northeast Asia, presenting her experiences with Peaceboat, a Japanese NGO.

As "Special" we introduce the video production "International Radio Exercise" created by the Taiwanese artist Chen Chin Yao. Through parody, he examines the colonial origins of physical exercises that were meant to contribute to discipline.

In their Memorandum, the EPRIE 2015 participants summarize their thoughts, which they jointly carved out from their reflection on the seminar, and translated it into their own languages.

We are particularly pleased that participants and alumni increasingly share with us their continued thoughts on the topics explored at EPRIE. In doing so, they not only maintain the exchange, they also stimulate additional discussion and stay in contact with one another. In "Views of EPRIE Alumni" we present these contributions: Yann Prell gives a brief overview of the Alumni Association which he understands as a bridge between East Asia and Europe. Katarzyna Zielony reflects on her experience with EPRIE as a path to promote intercultural competence. Joanna Urbanek and Romain Su explore how the collective memory is formed in Poland and they explain why it can be compared with the Korean experiences of war and occupation during the 20th century. The role of victimhood that Korea frequently assumes is reversed when it comes to Vietnamese "comfort women" which Peter Kesselburg explores in his contribution. Katsumata Yu analyzes global streams of money when he asks whether the nation state is a permanent system or – as Keith Hart suggests – is merely a transition phase. Finally, Marta Jaworska gives us a brief summary of the conference and the alumni meeting in Seoul in 2015.

The Korea-Forum Special EPRIE continues, beyond the seminar framework, to explore the various topics touched upon. It represents a platform for the continuous exchange of opinions and as such offers the opportunity to continue the dialogue that has been started. We are very happy that more and more participants make use of it.

Han Nataly Jung-Hwa & Rita Zobel

*Note:

Conventional Chinese, Japanese, Korean name order is generally followed: family name first.

NATIONS AND IDENTITIES AND IDENTITIES

1 Editorial

INTRODUCTION

4 **EPRIE 2015 - Report** *PARK Soyoun*

6 **Rethinking regional identity in the age of globalization – experiences from EPRIE 2015** *Agnieszka BATKO*

REGIONAL COOPERATION

8 **Regional cooperation in (North-) East Asia: The gap between security and economy** *Gudrun WACKER*

NATIONAL IDENTITY

12 **National identities in a globalized world: An overview of major topics in Cross-Cultural Psychology** *Tobias SÖLDNER*

HISTORICAL EDUCATION

16 **The dynamics of narratives: What German and Japanese university students tell us about World War II today** *Ingvild BODE & HEO Seunghoon Emilia*

21 **Overview and case studies of peace education for reconciliation in Northeast Asia** *OAKU Yuko (EPRIE 2014)*

ACTIVITIES ON CIVIL SOCIETY LEVEL

26 **Civil Society Initiatives for Regional Peace Building and Dialogue in Northeast Asia: The Experiences of Peace Boat and the GPPAC (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict in Northeast Asia)** *Meri JOYCE*

PROGRAM

29 EPRIE 2015 on Nations and Identities

SPECIAL

34 **International radio exercise: a video production by CHEN Ching Yao**
HAN Nataly Jung-Hwa & Rita ZOBEL

MEMORANDUM

36 English, German, Polish, Chinese, Japanese, Korean

VIEWS OF EPRIE ALUMNI

50 **Building bridges between East Asia and Europe – The EPRIE Alumni Association**
Yann PRELL (EPRIE 2013)

51 **Language, concept of nation and diversity –
the EPRIE exchange program as a way to foster intercultural competence**
Katarzyna ZIELONY (EPRIE 2014)

58 **Gloria victis. How Poles shape their collective memory and why it can be compared to the Korean experience
of war and occupation in the 20th Century**
Joanna URBANEK (EPRIE 2013) & SU Romain (EPRIE 2014)

61 **Negotiating identities and reconciliation between South Korea and Vietnam:
The “Vietnamese comfort women” issue**
Peter KESSELBURG (EPRIE 2014)

66 **An analysis on the global flows of money:
Is the nation state a permanent system or a transitional phase to Hart’s world society?**
KATSUMATA Yu (EPRIE 2014)

69 **Report from the alumni meeting**
Marta JAWORSKA (EPRIE 2014)

72 **Imprint**

EPRIE 2015: REPORT

PARK Soyoun

Once Confucius said, “Study the past if you would define the future”. Very few people agree with this, but I do. As a South Korean student who is willing to work for international organizations to create a better future, I have always been motivated to learn East Asian foreign affairs and its historical background but had no opportunity to do so. This is the reason why I applied for EPRIE, the Exchange Program for Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe. Indeed, the program fulfilled my wish to learn about some historically sensitive issues in association with World War II and its aftermath in East Asia, and have sincere dialogues about it with young professionals my age from the countries involved. Pleased and satisfied with what I have had for half a month, I would like to share my experiences and personal thoughts on EPRIE.

Feeling grateful to seize an opportunity to be a part of EPRIE 2015, I landed at the Haneda Airport. Due to the annual rainy season in Japan which did not seem over yet, Tokyo was humid and even damp. In spite of the muggy weather, everyone seemed excited when I met them for the first time in a tatami room at a Japanese-style hotel near Ueno, which is known as the home of Japan's finest cultural site in Tokyo. Some looked calm and some looked nervous but Rita and Nataly, our passionate program coordinators, along with the local coordinators helped us to break the ice and get to know each other by

initiating some intercultural activities including several introductory sessions. For sure, all of the participants including two coordinators were eager to listen, talk and learn about the topic and socialize with an open heart. We all were ready to enjoy the well-organized yet potentially intense program and expect noticeable outcomes.

After getting close to each other and recovering from the trip, we visited the Women's Active Museum on War and Peace and Yushukan Museum on the second and third days of the program to start our journey. To discover our own idea about regional integration in the context of nations and identities, our very first conversation started out with what 'they' say and what we know. We found that 'they,' the interested parties of the historical issues, activists and politicians, have claimed and even glorified victimhood according to their need, and this has been sensationalized by the media. The seminar conducted by Dr. Tobias Söldner on national stereotypes and identity building helped us to understand how this happens, in other words, why one history is written in two different ways. Based on the understanding of the current situation and main concepts of the given topic, we moved on to the next stage of regional integration in East Asia.

The tatami room embellished with Japanese traditional ornaments made me feel that I was somewhere different from where I used to be. It was to my liking but to develop our idea a bit more easily with the aid of technology, we changed the seminar venue on the first day of a new week. At a seminar hotel, the second stage proceeded in a friendly yet academic atmosphere, led by Gudrun Wacker from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. She first outlined the status quo of East Asia and its degree of regional integration, mentioning what initiatives and obstacles China, Japan and South Korea have attempted and faced.

Then four professors from Japan and South Korea, who are known for their research on our topic, delivered lectures. Following the lectures, the floor was open, and we could freely raise questions. Haba Kumiko, a professor of International Politics at Aoyama Gakuin University, shared her ideas on the importance of Asian regional cooperation, arguing 'donutization,' meaning that the cooperation of three East Asian countries has no core shared values, which resembles the inside of a donut. Takenaka Chiharu from Rikkyo University delivered her views on shifting nationalism in the globalizing Asia, and Oguma Eiji from Keio University explained his comparative and theoretical analysis on nationalism, focusing on modern and postmodern eras in Japan. Finally, Lim Jie-Hyun from Sogang University in Seoul shared his thoughts on victimhood nationalism and history reconciliation in East Asia by reflecting on the reconciliation process between Germany and Poland.





While the first stage with group work helped us to sprout our ideas, the second stage with the experts' lectures raised our awareness that the concepts presented to us are evolving, thus deepening our discussions. In addition to the academic and theoretical seminars, several sessions showed us how the abstract concepts we discussed are actually realized which helped us comprehend the subject. We watched "Letters of Iwo Jima", a movie which narrates the battle of Iwo Jima from the Japanese perspective, directed by Clint Eastwood, and the performance "International Radio Exercise" by the Taiwanese artist Chen Ching Yao, which conveys his opinions and personal experiences on individuals' identity influenced by the remains of the Japanese colonialism in Taiwan. We also went to Peace Boat, a non-governmental organization established to promote regional cooperation in East Asia and headquartered in Japan. Meri Joyce, the international coordinator of the NGO, informed us what projects they have carried out that could be an exemplary model we could take into consideration when we need to put the theoretical concepts into practice.

The more time we spent together, the closer we got and the more we talked. Consequently, the range of the subject grew more diverse and our conversation more in-depth, complex and confusing. As the weather got hotter, our thoughts ripened enough to generate our own results. Successfully, we presented our output that you can see in our memorandum to the Polish Ambassador and German Ambassador to Japan, H. E. Caryl Kozaczewski and H. E. Dr. Hans Carl von Werthern at the Polish Embassy in Tokyo. Just to see my new EPRIE mates dressed up was refreshing but to have a chance to share our ideas after the long discussion with the high diplomats was quite unforgettable and even made me feel responsible on the path of young people like me working for a better future. With a sense of accomplishment, we freely strode down the streets of Shinjuku and prepared ourselves to say farewell to Tokyo and for the final session with the alumni in Seoul.

Seoul after the EPRIE session in Tokyo was no longer the Seoul I used to know. This year marks South Korea's 70th anniversary of liberation from the Colonial Empire of Japan. Naturally, the city was flooded with patriotic slogans and banners, more than ever before. Seeing those dismal remarks recklessly written by some extremist groups which could arouse anti-Japanese sentiments, I had so many thoughts going through my mind about what could be understood and what should be criticized and so did the other participants. Plus, I believe not only the current participants but also the alumni have reached the point where they can soundly criticize what needs to be corrected for a better tomorrow for everyone, after the final session which included professor Moon Chung-In's remarks on reconciliation in East Asia and Europe and a guided tour to two history museums in Seoul led by Mr. Park Han Yong from the Center for Justice and Truth.

Yes, I know and we know that not all people would agree with our ideas. Some might say we are too progressive to argue for regional 'integration' at a time when even the already established regional institutions rarely seem functional. Some would say we are too naive to stem the power of the mainstream in the three neighboring countries. However, we are already the fourth year of EPRIE and the network has been broadened each year thanks to the passionate coordinators, active alumni, and support of the Robert Bosch Foundation. As long as the program continues, our efforts to improve our future will not be that difficult. Again, I am pleased to become a part of EPRIE where I could learn and comprehend the subject from multiple perspectives. We generated our own results at the end with young professionals from different career and academic backgrounds and experts who are well-known for their research on the topic. Already missing the candid talks we had, I am looking forward to attending the next EPRIE, this time as an alumna on the opposite side of East Asia.



PARK Soyoun is an Erasmus Mundus master student in Journalism, Media and Globalization at Aarhus University (Denmark) and University of Hamburg (Germany). She holds a B.A. in Communication from the College of Social Sciences at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, South Korea. She participated in EPRIE 2015 to fulfill her aspiration to become a young professional who can build bridges between Asia and Europe.

RETHINKING REGIONAL IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION – EXPERIENCES FROM EPRIE 2015

Agnieszka BATKO

INTRODUCTION

The Exchange Program for Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe (EPRIE) is a concept aiming to bring together young scholars and professionals from three Asian and three European countries, respectively: China, Japan, South Korea and France, Germany and Poland. The idea seems even more ambitious when one realizes that one is going to be placed in a conference room among complete strangers who sometimes come from entirely different backgrounds and have a clear, strong vision of fundamental issues. Yet at EPRIE, despite numerous long and vigorous discussions, it somehow worked.

The structure of the program was divided into four parts, though each one was very much linked to the others. The first part concerned intercultural training that allowed participants to become acquainted with each other and consequently facilitated further discussion. The second one was related to visiting places complementary to the program's objective, such as Yushukan Museum at Yasukuni Shrine, Seoul Museum of History, the Women's Active Museum on War and Peace and a non-government organization Peaceboat based in Tokyo. The third part, which covered a broad scheme of both the theoretical and practical dimensions of international relations in East Asia and Europe, focused on the conference and working groups. The last part involved meeting with EPRIE's alumni¹. This essay, focusing essentially on the academic component of the program, will attempt to summarize the theoretical aspects that appeared throughout the discussions during the panels and within working groups.

THE IDEAS AND THE REALITY

This year's EPRIE participants were challenged by many complex, abstract ideas. What should be mentioned is the interdisciplinary approach of the speakers and comparative studies that allowed the

participants to gain a much broader view than perhaps initially anticipated. With regards to the interdisciplinarity, the scholars provided many different perspectives on the issue of cooperation in East Asia. Dr. Tobias Söldner, by referring to cross-cultural psychology, explained in depth the outwardly elementary concept of national stereotypes. Prof. Haba Kumiko from Aoyama Gakuin University, in turn, brought attention to economic aspects, while Prof. Oguma Eiji from Keio University focused on the history of early and late modern nationalism. Even the linguistics in its contextual aspect became a factor, when the discussions on the museums' narratives started. Regarding the comparative approach, Prof. Takenaka Chiharu from Rikkyo University gave an interesting presentation on post-colonial India and how this Asian country has been adapting to changes in the regional system caused by globalization. In addition, Prof. Lim Jie-Hyun from Sogang University, speaking on the important concepts of transnational memory and victimization among nations in East Asia, explored the comparison of historical reconciliation between Germany and Poland after the end of World War II. Such complicated and ambiguous notions also had a very practical dimension. This crucial aspect was essentially delivered by Dr. Gudrun Wacker from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs who provided an overview of current institutional and political perspectives, drawing attention specifically to state-to-state security alliances.

With such broad perspectives introduced by scholars and researchers, the aim of achieving a consensus on the definitions of nationalism or, above all, regional identity has certainly become demanding.

ASIAN AND EUROPEAN IDENTITIES IN THE REALM OF GLOBALIZATION

Initial thoughts on regionalism seem to be leading to the assumption of a certain territory and basic common features (whether we talk about history, philosophy, language, customs or even food) to which people living in that territory can relate. Therefore, it is quite clear that the discussions among EPRIE participants circled around the notion of European and Asian identity. With regards to Europe's integrity, the modern fundament of this concept has been provided by the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community which

¹

Although the four parts mentioned above seemed to cover the vast majority of the program, events such as the visit at the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tokyo and the meeting with both Polish and German Ambassadors to Japan as well as the presentation given by a Taiwanese artist should be mentioned as they also contributed to the overall results of EPRIE.

evolved into the European Union (EU) that we know today. With the common laws established by the treaties and closer cooperation on first economic and now political issues, twenty-eight countries, along with other European states aspiring to become a member of the EU, can be seen as parts of a larger unit, despite disagreements on a number of policies.

What became more of a challenge was to reach a common understanding as to what constitutes an Asian identity. Could it be the Confucius's legacy, similar language or food? After vigorous discussions, the majority of the participants seemed to come to the conclusion that there is no such thing as Asian identity, at least in the sense that we think of the European one. What is worth noting is that this conclusion came especially from Chinese, Japanese and Korean partners who stated that they do not feel as integrated as most Europeans do. After some consideration, such conviction does not seem so surprising. After all, the European Union is a highly complex and hybrid organization that has a strong impact on its citizens' everyday lives. East Asia lacks such a mechanism, but that does not mean it necessarily needs to duplicate it. China, Japan and South Korea are, in fact, expanding their cooperation, not only with regards to economic area but also in other fields such as education. This is happening, although it's not happening as fast as advocates of closer cooperation would perhaps wish for. The reasons for such progress (or for some, the lack of it) were very accurately summarized by Prof. Moon Chung In of Yonsei University during his lecture for EPRIE participants and alumni in Seoul. Prof. Moon pointed out that reconciliation is a long-lasting process that combines apology, acceptance, forgiveness, healing, harmonization, cooperation and even further integration that may lead to becoming one. In order to step into this path, there must be some kind of consensus of truth, which in Asia, contrary to crucial history issues in Europe, seems to be problematic. What is more, Prof. Moon also highlighted a significant psychological difference between people in Asia and those in Europe: This comes down to the impression that despite existing bitterness, there is a sense of healing a process going on in Europe, as in the case of relations between Poland and Germany. The strong national historiography has generally weakened there, whereas it remains in Asia. The most appropriate way to facilitate closer collaboration among East Asian nations has yet to be decided, and I believe that most of EPRIE's participants agree that it should be decided by the Asian people themselves.

Last but not least, the process of the globalization and its impact on regional identity was also brought up in the discussions. Initially, perception of a globalized world seems to be leading to an increased importance of regions. After all, the ongoing process of globalization has made the world more interconnected by establishing countless

networks that should potentially facilitate cooperation on the regional level and far beyond it. However, recalling the panelists' conclusions as well as participants' analyses, the case is not that simplistic. Whereas globalization has certainly provided space for creating regional as well as global mechanisms and institutions that help to foster the development of shared norms and mutual trust, it has also brought about many concerns. Both Prof. Haba and Prof. Oguma pointed out that globalization, in many cases, has resulted in a resurgence of nationalist spirit, so in fact it caused the situation of going back below the regional level in order to secure national unity.

SUMMARY

Looking at all that was discussed during the program, reaching a conclusion that each and every participant could relate to was not easily achievable. However, the common point that we all seemed to agree on, concerned the practical aspect of this complexity that we've been put in. In other words, what can be done by us, young researchers, journalists, scholars, diplomats, activists, and what role this generation has, regardless of the region that its representatives originate from. Globalization and the push towards closer cooperation on regional levels have created opportunities like the EPRIE program itself. Participants of such events will certainly not resolve the world's problems by bringing in all their experience and by sitting and debating in one room for several days. What they did, though, was to familiarize each other with different, sometimes contradictory perceptions, that all partners respected and they established a network. This thread, being one among many others, seems to be one of the more realistic ways of bringing nations together. Based on people-to-people relations, such programs provide an excellent opportunity for an actual cooperation on a regional and a global level. Thanks to EPRIE, a next channel and a next chance have been created.



Agnieszka BATKO is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations at Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland. She has received scholarships to Griffith University in Australia and The University of Hull in England. She is a participant of EPRIE 2015.

REGIONAL COOPERATION IN (NORTH-)EAST ASIA: THE GAP BETWEEN SECURITY AND ECONOMY

Gudrun WACKER

INTRODUCTION

East Asia is characterized by its diversity in every area: political systems range from established democracies (Japan, South Korea) to autocratic (Singapore, Vietnam, China) and even totalitarian (North Korea) systems. In terms of development stage, we find everything from very poor developing countries (Laos) to highly industrialized countries (Japan, Korea), and there is a wide spectrum of religions and cultural traditions at play.

The region is also characterized by a gap between growing economic integration on the one hand and a plethora of security issues mainly territorial and maritime conflicts on the other. Ms. Park Geun-hye, the Korean president, has coined the term “Asian paradox” to describe this asynchrony or imbalance. Animosities and mistrust in the region are rooted in history (colonial, semi-colonial, wars since the late 19th century), but they are also kept alive by education, mass media and memorial days.

In terms of security cooperation, five countries in the region (South Korea, Japan, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand) maintain a defense alliance with the United States. Others, like Singapore and Taiwan, have a very close military cooperation with the US. The alliance system is called “hub and spokes,” with the US as the central element or “hub”. The rest of the countries have no formal alliance partners or, like China, even criticize the US military alliance system as a relic of the Cold War. While growing economic

integration and interdependencies have without doubt raised the cost of a potential military conflict, they are not a guarantee for lasting peace. Conversely, sometimes political conflicts and tensions have negative spill-over effects into the economic realm.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN EAST ASIA

All organizations existing in the region are consensus-based and only weakly institutionalized, moving at a pace “comfortable to all”, which is usually very slow. There is no equivalent to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in East Asia. Moreover, many of the formats in East Asia overlap in terms of membership as well as in terms of agenda. Regional organizations have mostly been built around the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)¹. ASEAN+3 (3= China, Japan and South Korea), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit² and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting+ (ADMM+) have all been formed around the group Southeast Asian States (see graph 1). Several of these formats address exclusively security issues (ARF, ADMM+), while some have a more comprehensive agenda (East

¹
The ten member states of ASEAN are Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.

²
Members of the East Asia Summit are the ten ASEAN states, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Russia.

Asia Summit). Yet even the security-related forums only deal with non-traditional security challenges such as piracy, terrorism, disaster management, etc. It is not their task to address hard security issues, namely territorial and maritime conflicts. China has so far not shown any willingness to discuss these conflicts in a multilateral setting and insists on bilateral solutions.

Unlike Europe, economic integration in East Asia has not been the result of a deliberate political effort, and it is not based on a common market. Instead, it stems from a “natural” division of labor, first under Japanese economic leadership (“flying geese” formation) in the 1970s and ’80s, then with China as the center of economic gravity. Economic integration here means integration of manufacturing processes and production chains. China has become the biggest trading partner for almost all countries in the region – a fact that also gives Beijing considerable political clout.


THE SITUATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA

All three Northeast Asian countries (China, Japan and South Korea) are members of the expanded ASEAN-centered organizations

(ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit, ARF...). In Northeast Asia itself, there is no real regional organization: The Six-Party-Talks (comprising both Koreas, US, China, Japan and Russia) were originally an ad hoc grouping focused on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. While there were hopes that this formation could develop into a permanent security structure, the 6PT were discontinued in 2009 without having solved the nuclear issue.

Another format in Northeast Asia is the “Plus Three” constellation consisting of China, Japan and South Korea. It was formed initially in response to the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, focusing on the main issues of economic and financial cooperation between the Three (see graph 2). In recent years and especially since Shinzo Abe returned to the post of Prime Minister in Japan in 2012, this grouping has been hampered by the difficult relationship and negative political atmosphere between China and South Korea on the one hand and Japan on the other. The last summit meeting took place in May 2012. Around that time the atmosphere, especially between China and Japan, began to deteriorate, mainly due to the conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea which are under Japan’s control but claimed by China (and Taiwan).

Graph 1: Regional Organizations and Forums in East Asia
Built Around ASEAN





However, there have been some signs of improvement – Xi Jinping and Abe shaking hands at the APEC summit in Beijing late in 2014 and holding a meeting on the sidelines of the Asian-African Conference in Jakarta in April 2015. There have been reports that a trilateral summit could be held at the end of 2015 in Korea.

Economic and trade relations between China, Japan and Korea are very strong. China has become the biggest trading partner of Korea and Japan, and both countries have made major investments in the People's Republic of China. After three years of negotiations, China and Korea concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in late 2014. This could be a building block for a trilateral FTA including Japan.

In the absence of a regional organization, two new initiatives have been launched below the level of high politics by Mongolia ("Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security" since 2013) and by South Korea ("Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative", NAPCI, also initiated 2013). Both aim at building trust in the region.

THE ROLE OF THE US

With its system of "allies and friends" the US has been the backbone of hard security in the Asia-Pacific region. The US has been the predominant military power in the Western Pacific since World War II and has no intention to lose its military supremacy. This was

underlined when President Obama announced the US policy of "rebalancing" to Asia or the "pivot" to Asia in 2011. The US considers itself a "resident power" in the Asia-Pacific – a notion not shared by all countries in the region, especially not by China.


China is the most likely (and only) challenger of the US position in the Asia-Pacific. Despite very close economic ties, the relationship between the US and China is characterized by strategic mistrust – both, the established and the rising power, deeply mistrust the other's long-term ambi-

tions. While Washington sees China's ongoing military modernization, especially of their navy and missile arsenals, as an effort to limit or even deny the US access to the waters surrounding China ("anti-access and area denial" A2/AD), Beijing is convinced that the US is pursuing a containment strategy vis-à-vis China, ultimately trying to prevent China's rise to great power status.

No country in the region (maybe with the exception of Japan and the Philippines) wants to have to choose between the US and China. While they benefit from the economic opportunities that have accompanied China's economic reform and opening up process, they also want to see a strong and sustained US presence in the region. They expect the US to provide a safety net should China's constantly declared "peaceful rise" take an un-peaceful turn. However, there are also concerns in the region with respect to the reliability of the US and the sustainability of the "rebalance". The US and China might head for great power rivalry in the region (and beyond) – although neither side is interested in an escalating confrontation. Both are striving to lower the risk by improving military-to-military contacts and negotiating confidence building measures and mechanisms to avoid incidents such as collisions in the air or at sea.

In the meantime, countries in the region have started to strengthen security cooperation and military exchanges in bilateral and trilateral formats. Japan under Abe has been particularly active in this respect and has reached out in the region to Australia, India, the Philippines and Vietnam and also beyond, signing agreements with the UK

Graph 2: Regional Formats in East Asia and Their Overlaps



and France. The emergence and growth of such bi- and trilateral formats is a sign for the relative weakness of the existing regional organizations.

THE ROLE OF THE EU AND EUROPE

The EU and Europe have played a rather marginal role in the security issues in East Asia. They are engaged in some of the regional organizations, but with hardly any military assets in the region, their security interests mainly derive from strong economic relations, and also from Europe's conceptions of regional and global order.

With the Euro crisis still ongoing, the rise of Euro-skeptic forces in European societies, "Grexit", "Brexit", the inflow of refugees and Europe's inability to successfully resolve crises in its own neighborhood (Syria/Iraq, Ukraine/Russia), the attractiveness of the European Union in East Asia has certainly not increased over the last few years. At the same time, the many acute crises which the European Union is presently facing within and from outside make it difficult to give East Asia the attention it deserves.



Dr. Gudrun WACKER is at present Senior Fellow in the Asia Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, a think tank providing political advice to the German government and parliament. Her research focuses on Chinese foreign and security policy, especially EU-China relations, China and the Asia-Pacific region and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. She has published on these topics as well as on China's regional and global role and on domestic developments such as minority policy and internet censorship in China. She has organized the "Berlin Conference on Asian Security" (BCAS), held annually at SWP in Berlin and she has co-organized an annual track-two dialogue between the EU and China on cross-strait relations with the Shanghai Institutes for International Relations. She is currently a member of the Steering Committee of CSCAP EU (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific).

NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: AN OVERVIEW OF MAJOR TOPICS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

Tobias SÖLDNER

I clearly remember a time when Germans considered Italy an exotic travel destination and Japanese Animation on TV was limited to Vicky the Viking and Maya the Bee. Belonging to the last birth cohort before the spread of the internet, the primary ingredients of daily life in my youth (with the possible exception of Hollywood movies) were gathered locally and in virtual oblivion of the outside world. So when I tried to talk my parents into buying me a PC around the turn of the millennium, I had a hard time convincing them that my wish was not (only) the result of a developing computer game addiction, but (also) a worthwhile investment in the academic future of their son. Luckily, I succeeded.

Since then, the world has changed dramatically. In the wake of the internet revolution, the advent of social networking services brought with it unprecedented opportunities for the free, and sometimes anarchic, exchange of information, trends, and opinions across national borders. Even pioneers of the fledgling online community were taken aback by the speed at which national and linguistic barriers in the virtual world started to crumble under the combined assault of countless 56k modems. Parallel to the digital globalization, the number of real-world migrants who – deliberately or not – contributed to an increasingly mixed cultural environment in highly industrialized nations skyrocketed to unprecedented heights.

Naturally, this development was (and is) not always met with unbridled enthusiasm; from the very beginnings of history, foreign cultures and their inhabitants were often perceived as a potential threat to local customs and traditions because of their “otherness”. While medieval beliefs in headless man-eating giants and deceptive lycanthropes living just outside the borders of Christian civilization

fortunately are a thing of the past, the questions how different people from different cultures really are and how these differences can be bridged in order to foster peaceful coexistence have become all the more pressing.



*Alleged inhabitants of sub-Saharan Africa
(copperplate engraving, European Medieval Era).*

CULTURAL STEREOTYPES

It is tempting to address the first of these questions by looking at the countless depictions of foreign cultures as readily available in travel guides, TV reportages, and eyewitness accounts. The main problem with this approach is that all of these sources tend to exclusively focus on the most salient differences and overlook communalities. More often than not, the result thus tends to fall somewhere between naïve exoticism and blatant stereotyping. From a psychological perspective, such stereotypical depictions of other cultures fulfil several desirable functions. On the one hand, they undoubtedly satisfy a basic human need for stimulation and novelty by providing

fascinating and unheard-of tales from an alien world that is usually out of reach for personal exploration. Moreover, clear-cut stereotypes of an out-group (e.g., inhabitants of a foreign country) also provide a convenient base for favorable self-comparison, especially in cases when they depict outgroup-members as inferior in terms of desirable traits (e.g., intelligence or development). Finally, like all heuristics, stereotypes are very appealing from a resource-conscious perspective on information processing, because they help to reduce the complex task of understanding another human being to a short, condensed list of explicit statements about its dispositional nature, thus elegantly bypassing the inconvenience of having to take ecological or situational explanations for its behavior into consideration. Depending on the viability of reducing first-hand interaction with the unfortunate targets of such stereotypes to a minimum, the associated drop in predictive accuracy is often considered acceptable.

Curiously, and despite all these obvious shortcomings, this does not mean that stereotypes are necessarily wrong, at least not in a statistical sense. Quite the contrary: A recent meta-analysis (an analysis that aggregates the results of a large number of scientific studies) clearly indicates that even layman stereotypes about cultural groups in fact tend to be more right than wrong in the sense that estimates of the differences between the inhabitants of two cultures based on common stereotypes are, on the average, more accurate than estimates made by people who try to avoid a reliance on stereotypes altogether.¹ One of my own studies with German, Japanese and US participants also revealed that there is a considerable overlap between mutual stereotypes, that is, stereotypes members of one cultural group hold about members of another, and vice versa. For example, how Japanese estimate differences between the personalities, values and beliefs of average Japanese and average Germans aligns surprisingly well with how these differences are estimated by Germans. In other words, both groups not only agree that they differ in a systematic way, but also how.


Does this mean that cultural stereotypes allow for the accurate prediction of differences between two individuals? Certainly not, the simple reason being that for most psychological traits the variance observed within cultural groups tends to be much larger than the variance between them. Or, to use a more tangible example: Two randomly selected Germans tend to be more different in their personality traits than a typical German and a typical Korean whose

personality traits represent exactly the average trait levels of their respective cultural groups.

INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM

There are, however, a few characteristic differences between cultures which are stable and large enough to warrant a certain degree of generalization. As readers of this magazine are most likely aware, one of these remarkable differences is the relative prevalence of collectivism in “Eastern” cultures like Korea, Japan or China in contrast with a stronger orientation towards individualism in highly industrialized “Western” cultures like Germany or the US. Again, this is only a very rough generalization, as the actual distribution of collectivist and individualist cultures around the globe is much more complex due to a combination of historical, economical, and ecological reasons. For the time being, however, let us embrace the joys of reduced complexity and take a closer look at what collectivism and individualism actually mean from a psychological standpoint.


One of the most remarkable differences between people socialized in individualist and collectivist cultures appears to concern the way they perceive the relationship between the self and the social environment. Whereas the former group tends to (cognitively) draw a clear line between themselves and even their closest associates, the latter tend to place a much greater emphasis on the distinction between in-group members (e.g., close friends, or family) and the out-group of unrelated strangers.



Independent self-schema typical for a person socialized in an individualist culture (adapted from Heine, 2008)²


¹ Jussim, L., Cain, T. R., Crawford, J. T., Harber, K., & Cohen, F. (2009). The unbearable accuracy of stereotypes. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), *Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination*. (pp. 199–227). New York: Psychology Press.

² Heine, S. J., Buchtel, E. E., & Norenzayan, A. (2008). What do cross-national comparisons of personality traits tell us? The case of conscientiousness. *Psychological Science*, 19(4), 309–313.



Interdependent self-schema typical of a person socialized in a collectivist culture (same source).

In a famous experiment,¹ researchers asked two groups of participants (one high in collectivism, the other high in individualism) to describe what the fish in this picture were doing (I advise you to do the same before you continue reading).



This different perception of social boundaries in turn leads to a veritable cascade of secondary effects. Take, for example, the following picture.

The results were remarkable: while most participants in the collectivist group provided descriptions along the lines of “yellow fish chase a green fish”, the location of the acting agent was reversed in descriptions from the individualist group. Here the majority of participants insisted that the “green fish is leading a group of yellow fish”, or something to a similar effect. The conclusion drawn by the researchers (which was largely confirmed in a series of follow-up

studies) was that collectivists first search for cues in the environment when trying to make sense of ambiguous social situations, while individualists first focus on outstanding characteristics of a single actor that clearly differ from the rest of the group.

There are many more such differences between people with a collectivist versus an individualist mindset. However, since it is impossible to provide a comprehensive list of all related research that has been done over several decades here, it must suffice to mention that people born and raised in collectivist cultures tend to place a much stronger emphasis on harmony within the social group they belong to, are more ready to sacrifice personal goals, ambitions and opinions in favor of goals, ambitions and opinions of the group, and prefer majority-based conflict resolutions even if these resolutions result in sub-optimal outcomes for themselves. At the same time, they tend to be more flexible in their behavior depending on situational cues, more aware of the relational costs of independent action, and faster in their discovery of interdependencies between elements belonging to a larger system. Individualists, on the other hand, tend to place a much higher value on autonomy and independence, give priority to their own goals and agendas over the goals of their in-groups, and behave more in line with their own attitudes and beliefs than the norms of their in-groups. Their perception is more exclusively focused on single elements of interest in their environment, and on the analysis of their exact properties.

It should not be assumed, however, that everyone in individualist cultures has all the characteristics of individualism and that everyone in collectivist cultures is a pure collectivist. Rather, it means that people from these two types of cultures will sample from the associated cognitive frameworks (ways of thinking) with different frequencies. As always with cultural differences, there is no definite black and white, just different shades of grey.

ACCULTURATION AND MULTICULTURALISM

As we can see, culture has a very powerful influence on the way humans perceive the world around them and the way they think and act. In this age of ever-increasing international mobility, this directly leads to another interesting question: What happens to the minds of people who, born, raised and socialized in one culture, come to live in another? If the way we think really reflects our socialization in a cultural environment, what happens once that environment is replaced by a fundamentally different one?

Fortunately, humans are masters of adaption, and thus it is no wonder that, given enough time, many of those who live abroad will adapt not only to the behavioral customs of their host nations, but also

¹ Hong, Y.-Y., Morris, M. W., Chiu, C.-Y., & Benet-Martínez, V. (2000). Multicultural minds: A dynamic constructivist approach to culture and cognition. *American Psychologist*, 55(7), 709–720.

integrate elements of this new culture into their cognitive repertoire. One might come to wonder what the most desirable end state of this process called “acculturation” is, both from the perspective of the acculturating individual and its hosts. A full replacement of origin culture customs and mindsets by those of the host country population? A retention of core values from the origin country? A mix of both? Currently, the majority consensus among cross-cultural psychologists is that the most favorable outcomes for both the acculturating individual and the host culture members it interacts with are not achieved if migrants are simply expected to discard their origin culture at the turnpike. Not only is this radical demand too taxing, as it temporarily strips the incomers of important sources of solace and support by compatriots. It also completely devaluates their past existence; a prospect which is usually met with fierce resistance.

On the other hand, immigrants who do not try to accommodate to their host cultures at all generally fail to reap the benefits of full societal membership, remain confined to the microcosm of origin culture enclaves, and ultimately suffer both economically and psychologically. The “silver bullet” of successful integration thus seems to be to allow migrants to practice their own cultural customs to a degree that is in accordance with important host culture norms, while actively fostering participation in the local mainstream culture. Success rates and speed of cross-cultural adaption then depend on several secondary factors, some of which lie within the individual and others which are more descriptive of its environment. On the side of the acculturating individual, (cultural) intelligence, stress tolerance, motivation, and a mixed network of social relations with both home and host culture members appear to be decisive facilitators for a smooth transition. Complementary factors on the side of the culture of reception also include the motivation to really integrate new members, the provision of guidance and tangible social support, and a respectful but insistent encouragement to accept them.

CLOSING REMARKS

The final paragraph of this eclectic and cursory crash-course in Cross-Cultural Psychology is dedicated to those of us who have managed to not only survive, but actually live and thrive abroad for several years, develop long-lasting friendships with foreigners, or even found a mixed-culture family. Rejoice! A long line of psychological studies around the globe shows that people who actually learn to see the world from different (and often contradictory) cultural angles tend to fare better in many tasks that require creativity, an understanding of complex interdependencies, and perspective taking. Hopefully some of you will use these skills to help others make sense of a world that is becoming both wider and smaller every day.



Dr. Tobias SÖLDNER is a Senior Research Fellow at the German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) in Tokyo, Japan. Following a research visit to Tokyo University, he received his PhD in Psychology from Humboldt University Berlin. His academic interests center on acculturation processes and the interplay between culture, personality, and personal values in group interactions, with a special focus on the German, Japanese, and US contexts. His recent relocation to East Asia provided him with a unique embedded perspective for the re-examination of several theories about human nature, most of which were originally developed and tested only in the so-called “western” context. While continuing his inquiries into the relationship between human universals and cultural specifics, he contributes to the DIJ’s manifold research projects with expertise in statistical research methods.



THE DYNAMICS OF NARRATIVES: WHAT GERMAN AND JAPANESE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS TELL US ABOUT WORLD WAR II TODAY

Ingvild BODE & HEO Emilia Seunghoon

As of 2015, 70 years have passed since World War II came to an end across Europe and Asia. How the war's two main aggressors, Germany and Japan, have faced their past has been a constant source of comparison in reconciliation studies.¹ While much research has analyzed school curricula and textbooks, little is known about how these official versions of history are retained or challenged by university students. Our project explores what kind of narratives students in Germany and Japan tell about World War II and how these characterize their home countries.

Focusing on narratives underlines the nature of historical knowledge as the outcome of social construction. Moreover, our engagement with that knowledge is also part of an interpretative process. To get access to student narratives, we devised an online survey with 19 open or multiple choice questions, sub-divided into three thematic parts: World War II knowledge, World War II narratives, and international reconciliation issues. We shared this survey among our professional networks from May to August 2015, which led to 133 and 155 responses from German and Japanese students, respectively.

In this contribution, we present initial findings focusing on three aspects: first, depth and sources of students' World War II knowledge; second, whether their narratives include reflective or non-reflective characterizations of their home countries; and third, whether and how students would change their history education.²




Figure 1: Student self-assessment of their World War II knowledge

1

See, for instance, Berger, Thomas. 2012. *War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II*. Cambridge: CUP; Feldman, Lily Gardner. 2012. *Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield; He, Yanan. 2009. *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II*. Cambridge: CUP; Heo, Seunghoon Emilia. 2012. *Reconciling Enemy States in Europe and Asia*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

2

We aim to publish a detailed examination of our findings in a longer article: Ingvild Bode and Seunghoon Emilia Heo (forthcoming) *Choosing Ways of Remembering: Comparing Student Narratives about World War II in Germany and Japan*.

Q1: HOW WOULD YOU RATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE ABOUT WORLD WAR II?

(On a scale from 1 – very poor to 5 – very deep.)

Student assessment regarding how much they know about World War II differs greatly across the two survey groups (c. figure 1). A clear majority of German respondents (75%) rate their knowledge as either “deep”/“very deep”. The “poor”/“very poor” ratings of knowledge are statistically insignificant (5%), while 20% rate their knowledge as average. Half of the Japanese respondents (53%) rate

their knowledge as “average”, while another 37% rate their knowledge as “poor” or “very poor”. In other words, 90% of Japanese respondents do not think that they have developed sufficient knowledge about World War II. These responses illustrate a gap between German and Japanese students when it comes to their self-assessment of World War II knowledge.

Q2: WHAT HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT SOURCES OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE ABOUT WORLD WAR II?

(This was a multiple choice question with eight possible answers as depicted in figure 2. Students were also asked to provide examples for each source they ticked).

Both German and Japanese students chose high school education as the most important source of their knowledge (93.2% to 88.3% respectively), while there were major differences between the groups with regard to two aspects: First, how much time students actually spent learning about World War II at school, and second, how this relates to other sources of knowledge students have (c. figure 2).

Teaching about World War II figured prominently in most of the German students’ school careers: 31.7% spent more than 100 hours learning about World War II and another 19% stated that they find it difficult to estimate the exact number of hours as there were so many. Another 18.2% answered having spent 50-100 hours learning about World War II. A further 14% also highlighted that aspects of World War II are not only covered in history classes but in other subjects such as literature and religion as well. In comparison, 34.2% of Japanese respondents said they spent about eleven to twenty hours learning about World War II, while about half (52.5%) answered less than ten hours. Among those who answered “less than ten hours”, more than half noted that they spent around three to four hours during their entire high school careers. Further, 98% of Japanese students stated that they learned about World War II in history class only, either Japanese history class or world history class, a course that often remains optional in the Japanese high school system. Student knowledge in Germany and Japan also differs remarkably when it comes to the variety of knowledge sources. More than 2/3 of the German respondents checked various knowledge sources such as “visits to memorials” (85%), “media” (82.7%), “books” (64.7%), and

“oral stories” (63.9%), while 10% of German students came up with other sources beyond the list, e.g. student exchange. Less than half of the Japanese students checked sources such as “media” (48.3%), “oral stories” (43.3%), or “visits to memorials” (42.5%) and only a few (3.8%) provided sources beyond the options given, e.g. anime.




Figure 2: Sources of German and Japanese student knowledge about World War II

Q3: HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE JAPAN'S/GERMANY'S ROLE IN WORLD WAR II?

Answers to this question provide the most substantive assessment of how German and Japanese students perceive of their country's role in World War II. We have come up with labels referring to various kinds of reflection in terms of how Germany and Japan are characterized.

Labels attached to German student narratives range from "highly reflective, including substantive value judgments" to "non-reflective/positive elements" (see table 1). There are three main results: first, a clear majority of German student narratives include some form

of reflective characterization of Germany (107 out of 120). Second, looking at the different types of reflection within this group, many narratives can be found in the "reflective" category. Most of these (48) were one-word responses, such as "perpetrator". 33 narratives were labeled as "highly reflective" because of explicit references to German war crimes and/or value judgments. Third, only few narratives included some relativization of Germany's role (5), or blended reflective assessments with relativizing (3) or positive references (4). These three labels account for twelve out of 120 narratives, which

LABEL RANGE	NUMBER OF NARRATIVES	EXAMPLES
Highly reflective, including substantive value judgements	33 (27%)	<p>"Started the war, imperialist campaign, totalitarian methods, racist deluded ideals and unbelievable war crimes, as well as crimes against humanity."</p> <p>"Germany is the cause of World War II and responsible for indescribable suffering."</p>
Reflective	48 (39.9%)	"aggressor"; "war monger"; "responsible"; "guilty"
Reflective with attempts towards a balanced portrayal	9 (7.4%)	"Aggressor. Responsible for unbelievable suffering brought upon those that NS ideology characterized as inferior, the European countries that Germany invaded, and the Germans themselves."
Low level reflective	10 (8.2%)	"I consider Germany as the main initiator of World War II and a role model for other aggressors."
Neutral ³	8 (6.5%)	"leading"; "at first offensive, then defensive"
Mixed reflective/relativizing	3 (2.4%)	"Aggressor, victim of World War I"
Relativizing	5 (4.1%)	"Not only Germany is guilty of having caused World War II. The events of World War I almost automatically led to World War II. This country's racism that continues until today is, however, insufferable."
Mixed reflective/positive	4 (3.3%)	"Initially very superior. The main cause, in hit-and-run style, overreached itself."
Table 1: German student narratives per label		

³
The label "neutral" was attached to narratives if they do not contain substantial value judgements pertaining to the characterisation of Germany and Japan but simply stated "facts". To note that Germany played a "leading role" in World War II or that Japan had a "huge influence" on World War II cannot be contested but does not include reflective characterisation.

all still contain some reflective characterization of Germany's role.

While German students' answers displayed various ways of understanding their past, Japanese students' responses were strongly homogeneous (c. table 2). There are three key results: first, many narratives included a highly positive/non-reflective characterization of Japan's role during World War II (47 out of 119), often Japan is portrayed as the "savior" of Southeast Asian countries through assisting in liberating themselves from Western colonialism.

Second, a victimized view of Japan was also prevalent in student narratives, most often connected to the atomic bombings. Overall, these narratives clearly show that many students' understanding in the context of World War II focuses on how Japan was bombed, lost the war and lost lives rather than on the harm inflicted by Japan on others. Third, only few (9) responses clearly mentioned Japan as an aggressor, while more characterized Japan in a "neutral" way, i.e. with one-word answers such as "big role".

LABEL RANGE	NUMBER OF NARRATIVES	EXAMPLES
positive / non-reflective	47 (39.4%)	<p>"Japan helped Asian countries to become independent from European countries..."</p> <p>"Asian countries hope because Japan tried to fight again big countries such as the US."</p>
victimized / focus on victimhood	29 (24.3%)	<p>"Japan was instrumental in WWII. We were attacked and we are the only victim of atomic bombs. We are a symbol for peace, I guess."</p> <p>"Atomic bombs dropped on Japan was the reason why the war ended. So Japan had a very sad but important role in the war."</p>
mixed reflective / positive	11 (9.2%)	<p>"Japan wanted to be the strongest country by invading other East Asian countries but eventually failed and the atomic bombs were dropped. I think Japan's role was to show you must not think it is good to invade others to become the center of the world."</p>
reflective	9 (7.5%)	<p>"Japan was aggressor just like Italy and Germany"</p> <p>"Japan started the Second World War because of overconfidence in its own power."</p>
neutral	16 (13.4%)	<p>"Japan was one of the most important countries during World War II"; "World War II leading country"</p>

Table 2: Japanese student narratives per label in response to question 5

Q4: SHOULD WORLD WAR II HISTORY BE TAUGHT DIFFERENTLY? IF YES, HOW?

Answers to this question across both groups indicate critical engagement with how World War II history is taught at school (compare figure 3).

More than half of the German respondents (58.7%) came up with various suggestions regarding different approaches that education about World War II history could take. Although most students in this group supported the current reflective treatment of German

history, about half (48.4%) encourage the usage of different materials to enable more emphatic understanding, such as autobiographical accounts of Holocaust survivors, more interactive engagement through visiting memorials or a greater emphasis on World War II's historical relevance for understanding today's Germany and combating racism. Another sub-group (26.6%) criticized content-related choices, e.g. advocating a less German and Eurocentric approach to learning about World War II. 10.9% discussed how early teaching of traumatic topics such as the Holocaust should start at school and noted the psychological challenges of coming to terms with German historical guilt. Moreover, 22% of German students are satisfied with the way World War II history is being taught, while 12% suggest a less intensive treatment. Most students in this group do not dispute its general importance but criticize how the sheer volume of WWII-related topics covered may lead to oversaturation and boredom or leave less time for covering other historical epochs. These answers show a high level of support for current German history teaching, but include a substantial number of critical suggestions for improving it.

Half of the Japanese students (54.3%) think that World War II should be taught differently in Japanese schools. Many students

noted that their history lessons lacked the time to think and learn about the “why” and “how” of the war, e.g.: “At school, history was generally taught for the purpose of remembering dates and events for the entrance exam. I believe that the history of World War II should be taught as a story combining issues that countries are facing today. In this way, we can learn the connection between the past and the present.” Some students who studied abroad shared their comparative perspective, stating that history classes in the US or in European countries provided them with many opportunities to think critically, which was not the case in Japan. 14 students noted that they think Japanese history education focuses too much on a victimized image of Japan and does not really help them to learn the “real story”, the “hidden story”, or “why we were bombed”. Some said that they would like to hear the voices of comfort women, the victims of the Nanjing massacre, or any other colonized countries’ stories through primary material. Two students encouraged a new way of teaching but think it is impossible for a country to teach how “aggressive” or “criminal” they were in the past.

Based on these findings, we reach three concluding arguments on Japanese and German student narratives about World War II. First, there is a knowledge gap when it comes to World War II history among German and Japanese students, both in terms of depth and sources of knowledge. Second, exposure to diverse sources of knowledge appears to lead to more varying characterizations of their home country, especially when it comes to reflecting on roles in World War II. Explanations for this finding can go in two directions: first, when encountering diverse sources of knowledge and attempting to integrate these, students are more likely to come




Figure 3: German and Japanese student answers to question 4

across inconsistencies. This may lead to reflection on this knowledge, as well as a more reflective narrative characterization of their home country. Following this, Japanese students may often share homogeneous and non-reflective characterizations of Japan in WWII, as their more limited exposure to diverse knowledge sources allows them less creative space to construct their own narratives. A second argument would be to interpret the different numbers of reflective characterizations in student narratives as expressions of the countries' diverging World War II remembrance discourses and their inclusion in school curricula. This would suggest high retention of official narratives in student narratives. Our third argument challenges this unidirectional view: When asked whether they would change how World War II history is taught at school, respondents across Germany and Japan put forward a wide range of suggestions. This points to highly reflective engagement with World War II history and knowledge, as well as student awareness for its continued relevance.



Dr. Ingvild BODE is lecturer in International Relations at the University of Kent in Canterbury, focusing on the human element in international relations. Previously, Ingvild was a JSPS postdoctoral fellow with joined affiliation at United Nations University and the University of Tokyo (2013-2015).



Dr. HEO Emilia Seunghoon is Assistant Professor in International Relations at Sophia University in Tokyo, with a special research focus on actors in processes of inter-state reconciliation. She has a career background in the diplomatic service and regularly lectures at the Korean Parliament.

OVERVIEW AND CASE STUDIES OF PEACE EDUCATION FOR RECONCILIATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA

OAKU Yuko

Northeast Asian countries, particularly Japan, China, and Korea, have followed a troubled path toward reconciliation in the wake of the region's bitter shared history of invasion and colonization by Japan. In this article, an overview of history education in Japan, China, and South Korea presents a possible impediment to the advancement of reconciliation between the three countries. Subsequently, three case studies of peace education programs in Northeast Asia are introduced and analyzed to offer recommendations for further development of similar programs to promote mutual understanding and reconciliation in the region.

OVERVIEW OF HISTORY EDUCATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA

In each region, history textbooks and education initiatives “have been fashioned to nurture a sense of national identity” (Duus, in Sneider, 2012). As a result, the primary function of history education

has been to promote national pride and identity in the Northeast Asian countries (Ibid). Increasing pressure to demand patriotism, especially through the stories of victimhood during the war times, remains an obstacle to the advancement of reconciliation through history education in Northeast Asia. This common phenomenon can be observed in Japan, China, and South Korea.

JAPAN

For Japanese students, Japanese history classes are only mandatory as part of social studies during elementary and junior high school (MEXT, 2015). During high school years, Japanese history classes are offered merely as an elective in most public schools (Nikkei, 2014). The obvious shortage of time spent on learning about national history consequently leads to disinterest and a lack of knowledge amongst Japanese students. Moreover, a rigorous screening process for

textbooks makes them ineffective and uninteresting to the students. Elaborate descriptions of historical accounts are prohibited under severe restrictions to omit assertive descriptions of uncertain incidents.

Furthermore, imparting patriotism has been reemphasized after the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education in 2006. According to Article 9 of this law, the purpose of history education is to teach students “to love our nation which has developed them” (Takeuchi, 2011). In line with the revision, Prime Minister Abe has instructed the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) to “only approve textbooks that promote patriotism” and further directed them to downplay historically sensitive issues like comfort women and the Nanjing Massacre (New York Times, 2014). These changes consequently caused reactive tensions in the region.

CHINA

Unlike their Japanese counterparts, Chinese students receive extensive history education from their early school years. In Chinese schools, history is taught for six years during junior and senior high school using six textbooks. Despite revisions to the education law in the 1980s to initiate the process of screening and pluralization of textbooks in China, the publisher directly managed by the Ministry of Education, People’s Education Publishers, produces 60-70% of the total textbooks used (Kikuchi, 2013).

Their history education places a special focus on modern history, characterized by a hundred years of humiliation from the mid-19th to 20th century when China was “attacked, bullied, and torn asunder by imperialists” (Wang, 2008, p.1). The students are taught the historical accounts of the Sino-Japanese War, the Manchurian Incident, and the history of the “Anti-Japanese War,” including its period of brutal colonial rule and the Nanjing Massacre (Liu et al., 2006). In 2006, Shanghai tried to create region-specific versions of the textbooks to compensate for the lack of diversity (Kikuchi, 2013). This new version soon faced resistance from the central government for toning down the social idealism and has been blocked from usage since 2009 (Shanghaiist, in Gries, Zhang, Masui and Lee, 2009). Despite progressive developments in the past decade, textbooks remain a primary means of promoting patriotism in Chinese youth.

SOUTH KOREA

Generally, South Korean students begin learning their national history in social studies classes in middle school. In high-school, students are offered specialized courses in science and social science where Korean history classes are optional for those in the social sciences track (NECC, 2015). Similar to Japan, South Korea’s

Ministry of Education (MOE) requires the textbooks to undergo a strict screening process (Shin and Sneider, 2013).

As in China, history education in South Korea emphasizes the history of oppression, against Japanese colonial rule (Sneider, 2012). Textbooks attempt to nurture national pride, often through the resistance of the Koreans to their Japanese overlords (Ibid). Reacting to Prime Minister Abe’s instruction to only approve textbooks promoting patriotism, President Park undertook reactive measures and pushed the MOE to approve textbooks that state “those who worked with the Japanese did so under coercion” during the military regime in South Korea, attempting to further instill patriotism in the country (New York Times, 2014).



CASE STUDIES OF PEACE EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

In spite of the differences in history education in China, Korea, and Japan, many organizations in the region, especially academic and civil society organizations, have developed peace education programs to foster mutual understanding and reconciliation, and to offer alternate viewpoints to their students. Although many of these programs are limited to being short summer programs offered to a small group of participants, they have been successful at making meaningful changes in the lives of their participants. To illustrate that success, it is useful to examine the key characteristics of three such peace education programs, primarily targeted towards youth.

SERVICE LEARNING PROGRAM AT INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY

International Christian University is known as a pioneer amongst Japanese universities, incorporating service learning into undergraduate course work. Service learning is commonly known as an educational program in which students undertake social work

without remuneration for a certain period of time in exchange for the opportunities gained by learning outside of the classroom (ICU Service Learning Center, 2015). Offered as an option through the Service Learning Program, ICU sends a small group (typically two to three per year) of undergraduate students to Nanjing, China and reciprocally receives students from Nanjing to Tokyo, Japan for a one-month-long service learning in the respective countries.

Although the main focus of the program is service, the Japanese students inevitably have to pay attention to shared history as they travel to one of the most historically sensitive places in the modern history of the region. In 2013, the objective of the program was for the students from both sides to understand the society and culture of the neighboring countries through service learning activity for a mutual understanding, reconciliation, and peacebuilding for the future of Japan and China. In order to achieve this goal, the programs were designed for the students to have direct exposure and interaction with those who are involved in the work of history and reconciliation. One of the service sites in Nanjing was the John Rabe Museum, a historical site where German businessman John Rabe had set up an International Safety Zone to protect the local people from slaughter during the Nanjing Massacre. The Chinese students accompanied the Japanese students to the service learning sites and other activities to help their Japanese counterparts gain insight into the realities of Chinese youth. Throughout the program, students were able to not only develop perspective on the 'official history' by visits to museums such as the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, but also to understand 'people's history' by having casual interactions with the students and researchers about the history between the two nations.

NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE CAMP

Hosted by the NGOs of the respective countries, Northeast Asia Peace Camp convenes middle and high school students (ages 12-17) from South Korea, Japan, and China for a week-long summer camp every year at alternate locations in the three countries. As the camp is aimed at a younger age group, the focus of the activities are less academic and concentrate on forging friendship among the participants, fostering the contact theory principles. Throughout the camp, students partake in many team-based outdoor activities to learn to trust and depend on each other. Most activities are simple and do not necessarily directly address the issues of peacebuilding and mutual understanding. However, the activities help see others as fellow human beings and friends, and to actively work against deep-rooted, negative assumptions and stereotypes instigated by education and media by living together in a camp setting for a week.

NORTHEAST ASIA REGIONAL PEACEBUILDING INSTITUTE (NARPI)

Unlike the Service Learning Program and Peace Camp, NARPI is a program where the participants receive training and build relationships with other peace builders from the region. NARPI is organized and coordinated by a steering committee of over seven organizations which help promote the program to the participants, comprised of community leaders, students, NGO activists, professionals, scholars, religious leaders, and government officials. Aiming to address the militaristic and nationalistic tensions in Northeast Asia, the training aims to equip the participants with practical skills in peacebuilding to be utilized in their local community. Although the courses offered change each year, some of the popular courses include, "Theory and Practice of Peace Education," "Restorative Justice: Aiming for Healing and Reconciliation," and "Non-violent Communication and Facilitation." Similar to Peace Camp, the training location alternates within Northeast Asia every year to offer interesting field work opportunities to learn from local history. In short, NARPI serves to build capacity and networks for young peacebuilders in Northeast Asia.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PEACE EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN NORTHEAST ASIA — KEY REALIZATIONS ABOUT NATIONAL IDENTITY AND EMPOWERMENT

As participants are seen as delegates of their country during these programs, they become aware of their national identities and see themselves more critically. The increased national awareness was observed clearly by the ICU students' stay in Nanjing. Many of them expressed their fear of disclosing their nationality, especially when visiting places like the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall. At the end of the program, the fear had transformed to confidence in building a trusting friendship between the two nations. Encountering many Chinese locals expressing their sincere interest in Japan and themselves, the Japanese students gained a positive perspective on Sino-Japan relations not portrayed through the mainstream media and education.

Another overarching realization was the empowerment of the participants to believe in bottom-up solutions. As one service learning participant wrote, "a nation is a collection of people and if person-to-person friendship flourishes, nation-to-nation relations should follow (Oaku, 2013, p.56)." As the participants do not hold grudges built upon direct experiences like some of the older generations, these programs strengthen their confidence in changing the nature of their relationship with regional neighbors of the same generation. Exposure and interaction with the program participants of other nations promote trust and friendship between each other, forging



optimism in addressing the troubling relationships between their countries. With that victory alone, these peace education programs are successful at meeting their objective and should be encouraged to continue and expand in the future.

NUANCED VIEW OF HISTORY AND CULTURE

While participation in peace education programs helped enhance participants' views of history and culture, the scope for such change was greater for the younger participants with less prior exposure to people from other nations. For Peace Camp participants with barely any experience travelling outside of their own country, the students tended to associate neighboring countries with negative stereotypes cast by mainstream media and national education. For instance, a majority of the Chinese students described Japan using adverse words like 'bad' and 'daioyu islands,' referring to the contested territorial issue between the two nations. However, in the post-program surveys, these unfavorable impressions saw the greatest perceived changes. The Chinese students saw their Japanese counterparts as friends and came to a hopeful realization that they could also 'live in harmony' (Oaku, 2014).

Similarly, these programs provided students with a more-nuanced historical perspective. During their stay in Nanjing, the Peace Camp participants had a unique opportunity to visit the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall with their fellow campers from China, Korea, and Japan. Although it is often perceived as one of the sites instigating patriotism and hatred toward the atrocities committed by Japan, the campers gave forward-looking feedback at the end of the tour. One of the Chinese students shared that she wished the exhibitions "had a section to show how people's ideas are different from their government's opinion," referring to her Japanese friends she met through the program (Oaku, 2014, p.46). In short, these peace education programs are valuable sources of history and culture,

helping to enrich and expand the participants' perspectives, which could have been narrowly constructed by the natural circumstances in their own countries.

FRUSTRATIONS TOWARDS THE RESOLUTION

Although most participants felt empowered to believe that they could be part of the solution for improved relations between each other's nations, many participants also felt frustrated by their lack of ability to make a difference. Even when the NARPI participants, who were often leaders in their communities, were asked whether they believed NARPI and similar programs can transform the culture of militarism in Northeast Asia in the long term, 45% of the respondents answered 'skeptical' (Oaku, 2014, p.79). Many of them commented that the current economic and political situations make it difficult for such a transformation to take place. Such frustrations were notably stronger with the Chinese participants, one of whom expressed that governments play the decisive roles in such events, stressing the restricting nature of their government (ibid).

Perhaps the expressions of such frustrations are a good sign of engagement: the participants now feel that they are part of the search for a solution, while they find existing structures like their governments impossibly difficult to influence. Although many program participants felt powerless over rigid political structures, many also expressed how they could also contribute to improve the negative political situation by building people-to-people relations at the grassroots level. Peace education programs may lack avenues to influence bilateral political issues from the top down, but they certainly help forge networking for a bottom-up citizen engagement to tackle these issues.



OAKU Yuko is a Peacebuilding Officer at UNDP-Sudan. She holds an MA in Peace Studies from the International Christian University in Tokyo. She has previously worked for Peace Boat, a Japan-based NGO focused on international exchange and peace education. She was a participant of EPRIE 2014.



Exchange Program for Regional Integration
in East Asia and Europe

EPRIE 2015

NATIONS AND IDENTITIES



REFERENCES

Gries, P. H., Zhang, Q., Masui, Y., & Lee, Y. W. (2009). Historical beliefs and the perception of threat in Northeast Asia: colonialism, the tributary system, and China-Japan-Korea relations in the twenty-first century. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 9, 245–265. <http://doi.org/10.1093/irap/cn028>

International Christian University, Service Learning Center. (2015). Retrieved June 14, 2013, from http://web.icu.ac.jp/slc/index_e.html

Kikuchi, K. (2013). *Higashi ajia rekishi kyōkasho mondai no kōzu: nihon chūgoku taiwan kankoku oyobi zainichi chōsenjin gakkō* [Structure of history textbook issue in East Asia: Japan/China/Taiwan/Korea and Zainichi Korean Schools]. Kyoto: Hōritsu Bunkasha.

Kōkō no nihonshi hisshū ka wo kentō Monkaso chūkyōshin ni shimon e [Discussing the possibility of making Japanese history a compulsory subject- MEXT minister consults with the Central Education Council]. (2014, May 4). *Nikkei Shim-bun*. Retrieved from http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASDG0701D_X00C14A1CR0000/

Liu, J., Mitani, H., & Yang, D. (2006). *Kokkyo wo koeru rekishi ninshiki: nicchū taiwa no kokoromi* [History Recognition across the borders: Approaches to dialogue between Japan and China]. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai.

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Sciences and Technology (MEXT). (2015). *Dainisho kakukyōka dainisetsu shakai: Mombukagakushō* [Chapter 2 each subjects Section 2 Social Sciences: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Sciences and Technology]. Retrieved May 21, 2015, from http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/shotou/new-cs/youryou/syo/sya.htm#5gakunen

Oaku, Y. (2013). *Evaluation Report: 2013 ICU-Nanjing Service-Learning Special Program*. Tokyo, Japan: Service Learning Center, International Christian University.

Oaku, Y. (2014, May 15). *Breaking the Cycle of Hatred: Exploring Possibilities for Mutual Understanding and Reconciliation Through Peace Education in Northeast Asia* (Master's thesis). International Christian University, Tokyo.

Politicians and Textbooks. (2014, January 13). *The New York Times*. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/opinion/politicians-and-textbooks.html

Shin, G.-W., & Sneider, D. C. (2013). *History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories*. Routledge Contemporary Asia.

Sneider, D. (2012). *Divided Memories: History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia*. Retrieved May 22, 2015, from <http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00703/>

South Korea: Instructional Systems. (2015). Retrieved May 21, 2015, from <http://www.ncee.org/programs-affiliates/center-on-international-education-benchmarking/top-performing-countries/south-korea-overview/south-korea-instructional-systems/>

Takeuchi, H. (2011). *Heiwa kyōiku wo toinaosu: jise-dai e no hihanteki keishō* [Re-questioning peace education: critical inheritance to next generation]. Kyoto: Hōritsu Bunkasha.

Wang, Z. (2008). National Humiliation, History Education, and Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China. *International Studies Quarterly*, (52), 783–806.

CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES FOR REGIONAL PEACE BUILDING AND DIALOGUE IN NORTHEAST ASIA: THE EXPERIENCES OF PEACE BOAT AND THE GPPAC*

Meri JOYCE

The Northeast Asia region remains characterized by Cold War era political interactions. The region is, at times, charged with fierce rhetoric amid fears of military escalation, and lacks institutional mechanisms for peace and security. Tensions in the region are heightened by the absence of sustained dialogue or indeed relations between countries, repeated military aggressions, and insufficient action taken towards sincere reconciliation.

Within this context, civil society initiatives for regional dialogue and peacebuilding play a significant role in building relations and creating the space for confidence-building measures and progress.

PEACE BOAT: A FLOATING VENUE FOR CROSS-BORDER DIALOGUE

Peace Boat¹ is a Japan-based international non-governmental organization that works to promote peace, human rights and sustainability. It seeks to create awareness and action based on effecting positive social and political change in the world through the primary activity of organizing global educational programs onboard a chartered passenger ship that travels the world on peace voyages. The ship creates a neutral, mobile space and enables people to engage across borders in dialogue and mutual cooperation at sea and in the ports visited throughout the journey.

Peace Boat started in 1983 as a response to government censorship regarding Japan's past military aggression in the Asia-Pacific. As protests were erupting throughout East Asia over changes in Japanese history textbooks, a group of Japanese university students decided to charter a ship and visit neighboring countries with the aim of

learning first-hand about the war from those who experienced it and initiating people-to-people exchange.

From its roots in such grassroots diplomacy, the organization has grown into one of Japan's largest civil society organizations. Peace Boat now conducts three global and one Asian regional voyage each year, with more than 50,000 people having taken part in 90 voyages throughout its 32-year history. While it now also engages in issues including sustainable development and environmental protection, East Asian peace and reconciliation remains at the core of its programs, both onboard the ship and its campaigns and advocacy in Japan and regionally.

BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA: THE PEACE AND GREEN BOAT

A key example of this is the Peace and Green Boat, a 1-2 week journey through East Asia conducted on an annual basis since 2005. Organized in collaboration with Korea's largest environmental NGO, the Green Foundation, this voyage aims to build new bridges between Japan and Korea, and a peaceful, sustainable future for East Asia.

Peace and Green Boat typically brings together 500 participants from Japan and 500 from Korea to explore the region together, thus forming a unique opportunity for direct interactions, dialogue and building bridges – so needed in a region characterized by stereotypes, historical divides and tense relations.

This kind of citizens' diplomacy also enables concrete actions to deepen understanding and demonstrate cooperative alternatives for the region. This was embodied, for example, by Peace and Green Boat docking at the port of Nagasaki on August 9, 2015, the 70th anniversary of the atomic bombing of the city. On this day, hundreds of Japanese and Korean citizens together attended

*Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict in Northeast Asia

¹
Peace Boat Homepage: <http://peaceboat.org/english/>

the memorial ceremony, participated in study programs on the history of forced labor and Japan's colonization of Korea, and heard testimony from both Korean and Japanese Hibakusha, survivors of the atomic bombings. The day culminated in the announcement of the "Japan-Korea Citizens' Statement on the Occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the End of World War II – For a Nuclear-Free, War-Free and Sustainable East Asia",² at a high-profile event onboard the ship attended by former Prime Ministers of both Korea and Japan and the Mayor of Nagasaki.

**CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORKING FOR PEACEBUILDING:
THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR THE PREVENTION OF ARMED
CONFLICT IN NORTHEAST ASIA**

Another key initiative for regional civil society dialogue is the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC).³ A member-led network of civil society organizations active in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding across the world, GPPAC is structured around fifteen regional networks, each working based on their own priorities and agenda. Peace Boat is a founding member of GPPAC and host of the Northeast Asia Regional Secretariat, utilizing its extensive network of partners developed through its voyages.

The GPPAC process in Northeast Asia is a pioneering initiative, particularly in its goals to forge and strengthen cross-border ties between civil society organizations and to improve communication channels with governments not traditionally responsive to civil society initiatives in the field of peace and security. The Northeast Asian region is home to over one-quarter of the world's population, and several potentially explosive armed conflicts. With the remaining Cold War era political structures, the development of regional networks founded on civil society structures has been severely inhibited in the region. The evolution of a Northeast Asian conflict prevention community is therefore a significant means in itself to promote a culture of prevention.

Officially launched at the United Nations University in Tokyo in 2005, GPPAC Northeast Asia is directed by a Regional Steering

Group which is comprised of a broad range of organizations and experts from the sub-regional focal points of Beijing, Hong Kong, Kyoto, Seoul, Shanghai, Taipei, Tokyo, Ulaanbaatar and Vladivostok, with partners also in Pyongyang. Where other regional GPPAC networks have "national" focal points, GPPAC Northeast Asia very deliberately determined that its focal points should be city based, opening space for participation by representatives throughout the entire region, which would be limited should "national" representations or identities be enforced.

A consensus-based approach has determined priorities for regional action, including resolution of the crisis of the Korean Peninsula, facilitation of dialogue regarding territorial disputes, addressing the increasing militarism and nationalism in the region, fostering historical understanding and reconciliation, and promoting and implementing peace education.

Years of consistent efforts towards confidence building, concrete joint activities and information sharing have led the network to become a main point of entry and channel for communication and cooperation on regional peace and security-related issues, with open and equal participation by representatives throughout the entire region. This has included regular meetings in all parts of the region, including at Mt Kumgang in the DPRK; a joint campaign to preserve and promote Article 9, the peace clause of the Japanese Constitution⁴; workshops on textbook revision and peace education with Northeast Asian and European experts, co-organized with the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research; and involvement in the launch of the Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute (NARPI).

Through a gradual approach of relationship building and communication, participants from Pyongyang have also regularly joined GPPAC activities since 2011, including regional steering group meetings, learning exchanges at the GPPAC Global Secretariat in the Hague, and discussions regarding civil society responses to critical events in the region. This has included, for example, the organization of a seminar in Pyongyang in June 2015, introducing concepts of peacebuilding and exploring the capacities of Dialogue, Mediation and Track Two diplomacy as a tool for peacebuilding in Northeast Asia.⁵

2

Japan-Korea Citizens' Statement on the Occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the End of World War II – For a Nuclear-Free, War-Free and Sustainable East Asia: English: <http://peaceboat.org/english/?page=view&nr=38&type=23&menu=62> Korean: http://peaceboat.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/peacegreen_KoreaJapanJointStatement20150809_KRN.pdf Japanese: http://peaceboat.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/peacegreen_KoreaJapanJointStatement20150809_JPN.pdf

3

GPPAC Homepage: <http://www.gppac.net>

4

See the Global Article 9 Campaign homepage: <http://article-9.org/en/index.html>

5

Exploring capacities of Dialogue and Mediation as a peacebuilding tool for Northeast Asia, GPPAC, June 2015. http://www.gppac.net/news/-/asset_publisher/fHv91YcOz0Cl/content/exploring-capacities-of-dialogue-and-mediation-as-a-peacebuilding-tool-for-northeast-asia/

**THE ULAANBAATAR PROCESS:
CIVIL SOCIETY DIALOGUE FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN
NORTHEAST ASIA**

This is now coming together in the priority activity of the region, launched in June 2015: the Ulaanbaatar Process. The Ulaanbaatar Process is a civil society dialogue for peace and stability in Northeast Asia, seeking to strengthen the role of civil society as a complement to governmental dialogue processes, towards the development of an institutionalized regional peace and security mechanism for Northeast Asia. Building upon the experience of GPPAC in dialogue and mediation processes in other parts of the world, this process brings together a combination of GPPAC Northeast Asia members and delegates from partner civil society organizations from member states of the Six Party Talks and Mongolia for a regular series of face-to-face meetings and discussions.

In the initial years of 2015-16, the Ulaanbaatar Process will particularly address the main themes of issues pertaining to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, and the establishment of a Northeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. It will also address the cross-cutting issues of the role of civil society in Northeast Asian security and peace dialogue, and gender mainstreaming in Northeast Asia.

The emerging strategic role of Mongolia within the Northeast Asian context is central to the Ulaanbaatar Process. Mongolia is a state with internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free status that benefits from political security assurances of the five nuclear weapon states. It also maintains friendly diplomatic relations with all the states of the Six Party Talks and other states of the region. Hence it is well-positioned to play a significant and unique role as provider of political space and venue as well as a possible mediator for regional dialogue. Crucially, the Ulaanbaatar Process creates space for civil society perspectives from across the region, including both the DPRK and the ROK, to be heard in the same forum.

WHERE TO FROM HERE? THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

As governmental processes remain deadlocked and tensions in the region high, and trends such as hate speech and discrimination persist amongst the general public, the role of civil society in building mutual understanding and opening space for dialogue towards a peaceful future is becoming more and more crucial.

Annual three-way summits between Japan, Korea and China have been suspended since May 2012, and Japan's failure to acknowledge responsibility for its wartime actions continues to prove an obstacle

to talks between leaders of Japan and its neighbors. The Six Party Talks, the closest alternative to an institutional mechanism for regional peace and security, were at times perceived to have been the best available tool for peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue in Northeast Asia. Various rounds have achieved some results, demonstrating that progress in regional engagement is possible. Yet the suspension of the Talks since 2009 and increasing calls for a hard-line response have left little room for the resumption of dialogue on a governmental level.

On the level of the general public, too, relations between citizens of the region remain tense. Public opinion polls conducted in 2014 and 2015 by Japanese think-tank The Genron NPO and the East Asia Institute have repeatedly shown that a large majority (70-90%) of the population in Japan, China and Korea have unfavorable impressions of the other countries and expressed concern about the current status of relations in the region, recognizing the need for improvement.

In such a situation, civil society initiatives can together consider a common recognition of history, creative approaches to reconciliation, and future-oriented dialogue which have the potential to overcome political tensions and negative public sentiments. The capacity of independent civil society to address sensitive issues, through ongoing communication and concrete cooperation, can potentially pave the way for a unique contribution to peace and stability for the Northeast Asian region.



Meri JOYCE is the international coordinator and interpreter of Peace Boat, a Japan-based international non-governmental and non-profit organization that works to promote peace, human rights, equal and sustainable development and respect for the environment. Peace Boat seeks to create awareness and action based on effecting positive social and political change in the world. Meri Joyce maintains partnerships and communication with NGOs, civil society organizations and communities in Japan, Northeast Asia, and around the world. She coordinates conference organization, international policy and campaign advocacy in fields of peacebuilding, conflict prevention, nuclear disarmament and nuclear phase-out. Moreover she is engaged as the Northeast Asia Regional Liaison Officer at Global partnership for the prevention of armed conflict (GPPAC) and a steering committee member of Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding institute (NARPI).

JULY 17 TO 27, 2015 – TOKYO AND SEOUL

Exchange Program for Regional Integration
in East Asia and Europe

EPRIE 2015

NATIONS
AND
IDENTITIES

TOKYO / JAPAN

FRIDAY, JULY 17

Meeting and Welcome

HAN Nataly Jung-Hwa and Dr. Rita ZOBEL

Seminar introduction

aims/self-introduction/motivation

Intercultural training

SATURDAY, JULY 18

Intercultural training**Visit to Women's Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM)**

Guided by Mina WATANABE, WAM

SUNDAY, JULY 19

Intercultural training**Personal Identity – National Identity**Dr. Tobias SÖLDNER, *German Institute for Japanese Studies***Visit to Yasukuni Yushukan Museum**Guided by Dr. NISHIYAMA Akiyoshi, *Kyoritsu Women's University*

MONDAY, JULY 20

Introduction of seminar workshop

(guidelines / tasks / working group formation)

Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia:**New Initiatives and Obstacles**Dr. Gudrun WACKER, *German Institute for International and Security Affairs***Regional Cooperation in Europe:****Asian Perspectives on Europe**Prof. Dr. HABA Kumiko, *Aoyama Gakuin University*

NATIONS AND IDENTITIES

JULY 17 TO 27, 2015 – TOKYO AND SEOUL

TUESDAY, JULY 21

Shifting Nationalism in Global Asia: From State to Society?

Prof. Dr. TAKENAKA Chiharu, *Rikkyo University*

Comparative and Theoretical Analysis of Nationalism - focus on Japan

Prof. Dr. OGUMA Eiji, *Keio University*

Victimhood Nationalism and History Reconciliation

Prof. Dr. LIM Jie-Hyun, *Sogang University*

WEDNESDAY, JULY 22

Visit to Peace Boat NGO

Talk with international coordinator Meri JOYCE, *Peace Boat*

Working Groups

Performance “International Radio Exercise”

CHEN Ching Yao, *Association of Visual Arts in Taiwan*

THURSDAY, JULY 23

Is there a European or an Asian Identity?

And what is European or Asian Identity in the Age of Globalization?

Working Groups

Summary of seminar workshop

Invitation to the Polish Embassy

Discussion on Regional identity in the Age of Globalization?

Welcome

Ambassador Cyryl KOCZACZEWSKI

Is there a European Identity?

H.E. Cyryl KOZACZEWSKI, *Polish Ambassador to Japan*

H.E. Dr. Hans Carl von WERTHERN, *German Ambassador to Japan*

What means a regional identity in the Age of Globalization?

Chair: Dr. Gudrun WACKER, *German Institute for International and Security Affairs*

Discussion with Participants

Farewell Reception

SEOUL / REPUBLIC OF KOREA

FRIDAY, JULY 24

Introduction of Alumni and Participants

SATURDAY, JULY 25

Seminar in cooperation with East Asia Foundation and KIM Dae-Jung Presidential Library and Museum**Reconciliation in East Asia and Europe**Prof. MOON Chung-In, *East Asia Foundation / Yonsei University***Dialog and Exchange Activities of Bosch Foundation**Julian HERMANN, *Robert Bosch Stiftung***Participants of 2015 introduce their program and results****Presentation of previous EPRIE topics and results****EPRIE 2012** Juliane ASO, *German Institute for Japanese Studies***EPRIE 2013** KIM Kyung-Min, *Hankuk University***EPRIE 2014** Lucia CHAUVET, *OECD*

Interlinkage and Q&A

Introduction of research results by alumni (parallel session)**Imperialism and National Identity in Postcolonial Japanese and South Korea Literature**Nadeschda BACHEM, *University of London (EPRIE 2012)***Social Integration Policies of South Korea compared with Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe**SUH Hanna, *Seoul National University (EPRIE 2012)***Gloria victis?****How Poles shape their collective memory and why it can be compared to the Korean experience of war and occupation in the 20th Century**Joana URBANEK, *University of Warsaw (EPRIE 2013)***Negotiating identities and reconciliation between South Korea and Vietnam :****The “Vietnamese comfort women” issue and còn lại Đại Hàn after the Vietnam War 1964-1975**Peter KESSELBURG, *University of Freiburg (EPRIE 2014)*

Joint Dinner on invitation of the East Asia Foundation

Welcome speechGONG Ro-Myeong, *former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1994-96), Chairman of East Asia Foundation*

NATIONS AND IDENTITIES

JULY 17 TO 27, 2015 – TOKYO AND SEOUL

SUNDAY, JULY 26

Introduction of alumni activities

Local coordinators and arrangement of next alumni meetings in each region/country/city

EPRIE 2016 and alumni meeting

brainstorming topics, speakers, and possible visits

Exhibition: 50 years of basic relations between Japan and Korea

Guided by PARK Han Yong, *The Center for Justice and Truth*

Visit to National Museum of Contemporary History

Guided by PARK Han Yong, *The Center for Justice and Truth*

Walk to Insadong

Visit to Insadong Street, Bukcheon, Samcheong-dong

Farewell Dinner in Seoul at Jiri-san (Insa-dong 14 gil)

MONDAY, JULY 27

Participants: Evaluation and feedback

Nataly Jung-Hwa HAN and Rita ZOBEL

Alumni: Historical walking tour in Jeong-dong and around

Guided by PARK Han Yong, *The Center for Justice and Truth*

Joint Evaluation of Alumni Meeting and Further Activities

Joint Farewell Lunch at hotel

ORGANIZER



KOREA VERBAND

Contact: EPRIE, c/o KOREA VERBAND
Rostocker Str. 33, 10553 Berlin / Germany
Telephone: (0049) 30 39 83 72 98
www.eprie.net, info@eprie.net

COOPERATION WITH

Robert Bosch Stiftung

SUPPORTED BY



FURTHER SUPPORT FOR ALUMNI SEMINAR IN SEOUL



동아시아재단
East Asia Foundation



민족문화연구소

The Center for Justice and Truth,
Republic of Korea

Exchange Program for Regional Integration
in East Asia and Europe

EPRIE 2015

NATIONS AND IDENTITIES



INTERNATIONAL RADIO EXERCISE

A VIDEO PRODUCTION BY CHEN CHING YAO

HAN Nataly Jung-Hwa & Rita ZOBEL



(2012-2014 Single Channel Video, Color. Sound, Japan, Korea, Taiwan: á 3'30)

The work “International Radio Exercise” (2012) alludes to the commonplace East Asian phenomenon of radio gymnastics which demonstrates the attempt of Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese societies to imprint hierarchically authorized patterns of behavior not only on the consciousness but also on the body. Through repeated exercises, sequences of movement are inscribed into bodily memory so as to be integrated into a collective subconscious that constitutes national conformism. It is no coincidence that the same kind of radio gymnastics is practiced in all three countries, since it is a relic from the days of the Japanese colonization of East Asia. Frequently, the similarity between the three countries in their social norms, societal organization and conspicuous economic success in the second half of the 20th century is explained with reference to their shared Confucian traditions. Radio gymnastics, however, were borrowed by the Japanese élites from the culture of National

Socialist Germany, so that the current-day national collectivism of disciplined East Asian society is rooted rather in the totalitarian practices of the more recent past.

The Taiwanese artist Chen Chin Yao was invited to the EPRIE seminar to introduce this work to the participants in Tokyo. “Everyone will remember the days when he or she was in elementary school. You couldn’t stop yourself doing the moves with your hands and legs when you heard a specific tune. Thanks to prolonged practice, the series of movements had become part of your memory. In other words, anyone who grew up here was educated within a national collectivism, which was deliberately implanted in the subconscious. This is above all a colonial inheritance: Japan introduced such gymnastics in its colonies so as to discipline the colonized along Japanese lines.”



In his works, the impact of foreign cultures on Taiwan is a major factor. Today, the mass media dissemination of US pop culture, evident since the mid-20th century, is being increasingly modified, supplemented or even replaced by influences from Taiwan's neighbors, Japan and South Korea. Regional shifts in the currents that affect national cultures are taking place within overarching global trends: as all capitalist societies in East Asia, Taiwan is wholly dominated by the life-style norms of consumerism, which leave their mark on every facet of life. Their mainstream visual features provide rich material for Chen Ching-Yao's artistic work.

Translated from German by Richard Humphrey



Born in 1976, CHEN Ching Yao is a member of the first generation in Taiwan to have the opportunity to enjoy the freedoms of the post-1987 liberalization and of not just attacking social taboos head-on, but rather of dissolving them in a playful manner. He graduated from the Taipei National Institute of the Arts.

In 2001, Chen won the Taipei Prize with his work Bubble Task Force, which marked the beginning of his long-term exploration of subculture, the politics of image, and other related issues. He has held solo exhibitions in Korea, New York, Taipei, and many other places since 2002. His work includes extremely superficial placements and impersonation of others and relates to the questions of how one identifies oneself and how one looks at the others.

MEMORANDUM

by EPRIE Participants, 2015

NATIONS + IDENTITIES + (MUCH MORE) = EPRIE 2015

Eleven Days in July offered us a most memorable experience and unique opportunity for dialogue at the Exchange Program for Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe (EPRIE) 2015. This year, 19 young professionals from China, South Korea, Japan, France, Germany and Poland joined the program to discuss regional cooperation in a globalizing world in the context of nation and identity. Given the program venues in Tokyo and Seoul, our main regional focus was East Asia, with some reflections on the current challenges in Europe. The neighboring countries in this region share a common historical line but see history, in particular of World War II and preceding decades, from different perspectives. Consequently, our brainstorming and conversations at EPRIE were diverse and enriched our various views.

During the program, we had an opportunity visit sites closely related to matters of East Asian history and politics which were intensely discussed, including museums in Japan and South Korea that presented conflicting historical narratives. These differing interpretations of a common history contributed greatly to both inputs and outcomes of our own discourse among the participants. We also met with an artist whose work showed a practical dimension of the more abstract ideas we discussed.

EPRIE 2015 started with several intercultural training sessions. Through these activities, we quickly became familiar with each other and experienced first-hand identity-related concepts at the core of the program. Following these introductory sessions, seminars by relevant experts from East Asia and Europe shed light on the status quo of regional relations in East Asia. After grasping the main concepts of the topic and current situation of the nations involved, we split into groups with different academic backgrounds, careers and nationalities to share our own ideas on nation, nationalism, and national identity in a globalizing world.

A crucial part of the EPRIE experience has been our interaction with the experts, which made the exchange within our group even more meaningful. We would like to express our gratitude to all these academics and practitioners who shared their insights and thoughts

with us. Their presentations covered a wide range of issues, including collective memory, reconciliation, victimhood, and regional cooperation. They provided substantial input for discussions among us and helped sharpen our understanding of the complexity of East Asia as well as commonalities with and differences to the situation in Europe.

REFLECTING ON EAST ASIA = OUR STARTING POINT

We found that East Asia today can be understood in terms of several aspects, the difficult historical heritage being one of the most prominent. As close neighbors, China, Korea and Japan share a long history of cultural, economic and diplomatic exchanges as well as a number of recent conflicts, the most traumatic being World War II. Japanese wartime aggression and colonial rule, including the forced prostitution of so-called “comfort women” and later the enshrinement of Japanese war criminals in Yasukuni Shrine, have provided major points of contention in the framing of East Asian history of the 20th century.

Many Japanese, including high-level officials and prominent politicians, tend to view themselves as victims of the war, given the widespread bombing of their homeland, their own soldiers who gave their lives on the battlefields, and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This view conflicts with the widespread representations in Korea and China that their people are the only victims, while Japan was the perpetrator. In the case of Korea, in particular, such a notion of victimhood resonates throughout the peninsula’s history. The discrepancy in historical narratives constitutes a major obstacle to mutual understanding in East Asia.

Recent changes in the regional balance of powers have seen China as an economically and militarily rising global power and South Korea as an increasingly strong advocate of its national interest. This more assertive stance of both has brought a new situation that is still evolving and thus makes it difficult for the countries to find their respective footing in their relations with each other. Such a stance is reflected in the increasingly fierce territorial disputes over several islands in the region. Moreover, Chinese, Korean and Japanese governments have been trying, quite effectively at times, to exploit



nationalistic feelings among their own populations, sometimes as a means to assert their position towards one another, more often as a way to overcome unrelated domestic challenges, and to gain support from the public, thus adding a further layer of complexity to the tense regional situation.

These are some general, non-exhaustive and non-conclusive observations that served us as a stepping stone to reflect upon solutions to overcome this intricate and conflict-prone situation.

PROMOTING REGIONAL COOPERATION = OUR FOCUS

There is an essential need to build cooperation through trust and to lay a foundation for sustainable peace and prosperity in East Asia. Overcoming differences through the pursuit of shared goals may contribute to the development of a common vision built for the future of the region. The more the countries accumulate such practice, the more they can establish a solid framework for multidimensional cooperation. From a long-term perspective, it remains an important objective that the regional framework becomes resilient enough to deal with issues beyond trade and economy, as seen in the experience of European integration after World War II.

The starting point for trust-building is mutual dialogue. This dialogue should go beyond expert networks, and embrace a broader transnational perspective in which a wider range of civil society actors can engage. It may cover issues such as:

Recognition of diversity within each state: Nationalistic speech and acts of hostility originate from an assumption that a state is an entity united by a single value set and homogeneous views. In contrast, modern society is composed of people with diverse opinions and beliefs. Recognizing the multidimensional character of any society is key to improve regional relationships.

Promotion of social exchanges: In order to cultivate mutual trust and develop shared norms between China, Korea and Japan, social exchanges need to be intensified, especially among young people. As we have experienced at EPRIE, these kinds of exchange provide an excellent opportunity to strengthen mutual understanding and foster future-oriented personal connections. More such exchange programs and projects aiming at facilitating communication channels should be organized and supported by both the private and public sectors.



Establishment of a tension management system, especially for territorial disputes: History demonstrates that territorial issues often lead to armed conflict. Disputed territory is currently one of the grave concerns of the region, in particular, claims on the status of Takeshima/Dokdo and Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. A joint effort to settle territorial disputes should be made on the basis of norms shared at the regional level. East Asia needs an institutionalized mechanism to jointly and effectively manage any escalation of tensions at an early stage. Civil society actors can be instrumental in advocating for the establishment of such a system.

WHAT REMAINS = OUR RESPONSIBILITY

Ultimately, we believe that the people of the East Asian nations share a responsibility to shape the destiny of their own region. There is no need to take the status quo for granted. Active citizenship may not come naturally, but needs to be actively supported. It requires overcoming nationalistic mindsets and fostering critical thinking about history and contemporary politics. Existing plural civil society should be encouraged to act as an agent of change.

As a younger generation, we embrace responsibility towards past memory as much as those who came before us. We recognize the importance of sharing perceptions among people in East Asia. There is a lack of opportunities and incentives to bring together those who are ready to listen to and discuss with their neighbors. We need to raise awareness and establish networks among people who share common interests, even if initially they only share curiosity about each other, and encourage organizations that are working towards these same goals.

EPRIE 2015 has enabled us to build new friendships, personal connections and networks across our home countries' borders and regions. In this spirit, we shall strive for ever-deeper regional exchange and cross-national collaboration.

Tokyo and Seoul
July 2015

MEMORANDUM

in German

NATIONEN + IDENTITÄTEN + (MEHR) = EPRIE 2015

Das „Exchange Program for Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe“ (EPRIE) ermöglichte uns im Juli 2015 elf Tage lang eine unvergessliche Erfahrung und einzigartige Gelegenheit zum Dialog. In diesem Jahr nahmen 19 Nachwuchskräfte aus China, Südkorea, Japan, Frankreich, Deutschland und Polen am Programm teil. Gemeinsam diskutierten wir über regionale Zusammenarbeit im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, aus dem Blickwinkel von Nation und Identität. Angesichts der diesjährigen Veranstaltungsorte Tokio und Seoul lag unser regionaler Schwerpunkt auf Ostasien, ergänzt um Überlegungen zu aktuellen Herausforderungen in Europa. Die ostasiatischen Regionalnachbarn blicken auf eine gemeinsame Geschichte zurück, nehmen aber insbesondere die Zeit des Zweiten Weltkriegs und die vorangegangenen Jahrzehnte unterschiedlich wahr. Entsprechend vielfältig gestalteten sich unsere Gespräche und bereicherten unsere jeweiligen Perspektiven umso mehr.

Während des Programms hatten wir Gelegenheit zum Besuch von Orten, die eng mit Streitfragen der regionalen Geschichte und Politik verbunden sind, unter anderem Museen in Japan und Südkorea, die widerstreitende historische Narrative darstellten. Diese unterschiedlichen Interpretationen einer gemeinsamen Geschichte hatten einen starken Einfluss auf unseren Diskurs und dessen Ergebnisse. Ein Zusammentreffen mit einem Aktionskünstler, in dessen Werk abstrakte Ideen eine greifbare Dimension annahmen, rundeten unsere Diskussion ab.

Den Auftakt von EPRIE 2015 bildete ein intensives interkulturelles Training. Durch diese Aktivitäten wurden wir schnell miteinander vertraut und die Konzepte von Identität, die im Mittelpunkt des Programms standen, unmittelbar sichtbar. Im Anschluss an diese Einführungsveranstaltungen brachten uns anerkannte Experten aus Ostasien und Europa den Status Quo der Regionalbeziehungen in Ostasien näher. Nachdem wir uns mit den wichtigsten Aspekten und der gegenwärtigen Lage in den verschiedenen Staaten beschäftigt hatten, teilten wir uns in Arbeitsgruppen auf, in denen sich jeweils unterschiedliche fachliche Hintergründe, berufliche Erfahrungen und Nationalitäten fanden. Dort vertieften wir unseren Gedankenaustausch über Nationen, Nationalismus und nationale Identität in einer globalisierten Weltordnung.

Ein entscheidender Teil unserer EPRIE-Erfahrung war die Interaktion mit den eingeladenen Experten, die wertvolle Anstöße für den Diskurs unter den Teilnehmern gaben. Allen diesen Wissenschaftlern und Praktikern gilt unser Dank, dass sie ihre Erkenntnisse und Gedanken mit uns geteilt haben. Ihre Vorträge deckten ein breites Spektrum von Fragen ab, wie kollektive Erinnerung, Versöhnung, Opferrollen und regionale Zusammenarbeit. Sie lieferten wichtigen Input für unsere eigenen Diskussionen und trugen dazu bei, unser Verständnis der Komplexität Ostasiens sowie der Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zur Situation in Europa zu schärfen.

BETRACHTUNGEN ZU OSTASIEN = UNSER AUSGANGSPUNKT

Wir sind zu dem Schluss gekommen, dass das heutige Ostasien aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln verstanden werden muss, wobei das schwierige historische Erbe einen der wichtigsten Aspekte darstellt. Als enge Nachbarn ist China, Korea und Japan sowohl eine lange Geschichte des kulturellen, wirtschaftlichen und diplomatischen Austauschs gemeinsam als auch eine Reihe jüngerer Konflikte. Das Trauma des Zweiten Weltkriegs wiegt dabei am schwersten. Japanische Kriegsführung und Kolonialherrschaft, einschließlich der Zwangsprostitution sogenannter „Trostfrauen“ und der späteren Einschreitung japanischer Kriegsverbrecher im Yasukuni-Schrein, stellen ein großes Streitpotential für die Geschichtsschreibung des 20. Jahrhunderts in Ostasien dar.

Japaner, darunter hochrangige Amtsträger und prominente Politiker, neigen häufig dazu, sich selbst angesichts der großflächigen Bombardierung ihrer Heimat, der eigenen Soldaten, die ihr Leben auf den Schlachtfeldern des Zweiten Weltkriegs ließen, und der Atombomben auf Hiroshima und Nagasaki vorrangig als Opfer zu sehen. Diese Sichtweise steht im Widerspruch zur weit verbreiteten Darstellung in Korea und China, wonach deren Völkern die alleinige Opferrolle zukomme, Japan in erster Linie Täter gewesen sei. Besonders im Fall von Südkorea hat das Verständnis als Opfer die Geschichte der Halbinsel geprägt. Diese Diskrepanz in historischen Erzählungen ist ein bedeutsames Hindernis für das gegenseitige Verständnis in Ostasien.

Jüngste Veränderungen im regionalen Kräftegleichgewicht werfen ein Licht auf China als wirtschaftlich und militärisch aufstrebender globaler Akteur und Südkorea als zunehmend lautstärkerer Verfechter

seiner nationalen Interessen. Die selbstbewusste Haltung der beiden Staaten hat zu einer neuen Situation geführt, die noch in der Entwicklung steckt. Dies macht es für alle betroffenen Länder schwierig, ihre Beziehungen zueinander zu gestalten. Ein Beispiel dafür sind die eskalierenden Territorialstreitigkeiten um Inseln in der Region.

Zudem bedienen sich chinesische, koreanische und japanische Regierungen immer wieder, und bisweilen sehr effektiv, nationalistischer Strömungen in der eigenen Bevölkerung, um ihre jeweilige Position den anderen gegenüber zu stärken oder, noch häufiger, um von innenpolitischen Problemen abzulenken und sich der Unterstützung der Allgemeinheit zu versichern. Dadurch erhöht sich die Komplexität der angespannten Lage in der Region.

Dies sind einige allgemeine, nicht erschöpfende Beobachtungen, die uns als Ausgangspunkt für unsere Überlegungen zu möglichen Ansätzen zur Überwindung dieser schwierigen und konfliktträchtigen Situation dienen.

FÖRDERUNG DER REGIONALEN ZUSAMMENARBEIT = UNSER FOKUS

Es gibt in Ostasien eine grundsätzliche Notwendigkeit, regionale Zusammenarbeit auf der Basis gegenseitigen Vertrauens aufzubauen und so ein Fundament für nachhaltigen Frieden und Wohlstand zu schaffen. Die Überwindung von Unterschieden durch das Streben nach gemeinsamen Zielen kann zur Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen Vision für die Zukunft der Region beitragen. Je mehr sich die Länder eine solche Praxis aneignen, desto mehr können sie einen soliden Rahmen für multidimensionale Zusammenarbeit etablieren. Langfristig bleibt es ein wichtiges Ziel, dass der dieser regionale Rahmen widerstandsfähig genug wird, damit man sich gemeinsam auch mit Fragen jenseits der Handels- und Wirtschaftsbeziehungen befassen kann, wie im Fall der europäischen Integration nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.



Ausgangspunkt für Vertrauensbildung ist der gegenseitige Dialog. Dieser Dialog sollte über Expertennetzwerke hinausgehen und eine umfassendere transnationale Perspektive suchen, in der sich ein breites Spektrum zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure engagieren kann. Als Themen kommen in Betracht:

Anerkennung der Vielfalt innerhalb der einzelnen Staaten: Nationalistischer Diskurs und feindselige Handlungen entstehen aus der Annahme, dass ein Staat sich über ein streng eingegrenztes Repertoire an Werten und homogenen Ansichten definiert. Im Gegensatz dazu finden sich in der modernen Gesellschaft jedoch Menschen mit unterschiedlichsten Meinungen und Überzeugungen. Der Anerkennung des mehrdimensionalen Charakters jeder Gesellschaft kommt eine Schlüsselrolle bei der Verbesserung regionaler Beziehungen zu.

Förderung sozialen Austauschs: Um das gegenseitige Vertrauen zu pflegen und gemeinsame Normen zwischen China, Korea und Japan zu entwickeln, bedarf es einer Intensivierung zivilgesellschaftlicher Begegnungen, vor allem unter jungen Menschen. Wie uns EPRIE vor Augen geführt hat, bietet diese Art von Austausch eine ausgezeichnete Gelegenheit, gegenseitiges Verständnis zu stärken und zukunftsorientiert persönliche Verbindungen aufzubauen. Aus dem privaten wie öffentlichen Sektor heraus sollten weitere solcher Austauschprogramme und Projekte zum Ausbau von Kommunikationskanälen initiiert und gefördert werden.

Aufbau eines Systems zur Konfliktprävention, insbesondere bei Territorialstreitigkeiten: Die Geschichte zeigt, dass Gebietsfragen häufig zu bewaffneten Konflikten führen. Territorialstreitigkeiten stehen derzeit im Zentrum der regionalen Spannungen in Ostasien, vor allem im Fall von Takeshima/Dokdo und den Senkaku-/Diaoyu-Inseln. Auf der Grundlage regional akzeptierter Normen sollte eine gemeinsame Anstrengung zur Lösung dieser Streitfragen erfolgen. Ostasien braucht einen institutionalisierten Mechanismus, um gemeinsam und effektiv jeder Eskalation von Spannungen in einem frühen Stadium entgegenzuwirken. Akteure der Zivilgesellschaft stellen eine wichtige Stimme beim Einsatz für den Aufbau eines solchen Systems dar.

WAS BLEIBT = UNSERE VERANTWORTUNG

Letztlich glauben wir, dass den Gesellschaften Ostasiens eine gemeinsame Verantwortung zukommt, das Schicksal ihrer Region zu gestalten. Sie brauchen den Status quo nicht als selbstverständlich hinzunehmen. Auch wenn sich aktives Bürgerengagement nicht immer unmittelbar erschließen mag, sollte es aktiv gefördert werden. Dafür sind nationalistische Denkweisen zu überwinden und kritische Reflexion über Geschichte und aktuelle Politik

zu kultivieren. Die bereits bestehende pluralistische Zivilgesellschaft sollte ermutigt werden, als Kraft des Wandels zu handeln.

Als jüngere Generation nehmen wir die Aufgabe des Geschichts- bewusstseins genauso an wie jene, die vor uns kamen. Wir sehen die Bedeutung für die Menschen in Ostasien, sich über ihre unterschied- lichen Wahrnehmungen auszutauschen. Es mangelt an Möglichkei- ten und Anreizen, diejenigen zusammenzubringen, die bereit sind zuzuhören und mit ihren Nachbarn ins Gespräch zu kommen. Wir müssen das allgemeine Bewusstsein schärfen und Netzwerke zwischen Menschen stärken, die gemeinsame Interessen teilen - selbst auch es zunächst nur die Neugier aufeinander ist -, und Organisationen unterstützen, die auf diese Ziele hinarbeiten.

EPRIE 2015 hat uns ermöglicht, neue Freundschaften, persönliche Beziehungen und Netzwerke über die Grenzen und Regionen unse- rer Heimatländer hinaus aufzubauen. In diesem Geiste werden wir uns auch weiterhin um Vertiefung des regionalen Austauschs und länderübergreifende Zusammenarbeit bemühen.

Tokio und Seoul
Juli 2015

MEMORANDUM

in Polish

NARODY + TOŻSAMOŚCI + (znacznie więcej) = EPRIE 2015

Jedenaście lipcowych dni, podczas których odbył się Program Wymi- any dla Integracji Regionalnej w Azji Dalekowschodniej i Europie (EPRIE) 2015 stało się niepowtarzalną przestrzenią dla dialogu oraz gromadzenia niezapomnianych doświadczeń. W tym roku 19 mło- dych specjalistów z Chin, Korei Południowej, Japonii, Francji, Niemiec i Polski spotkało się, aby dyskutować na temat współpracy regionalnej w zglobalizowanym świecie oraz pojęć narodu i tożsamości. Biorąc pod uwagę, że tegoroczna edycja programu odbyła się w Tokio i Seulu, skupialiśmy się głównie na Azji Wschodniej (jednocześnie dzieląc się także refleksjami na temat wyzwań, przed którymi obecnie stoi Europa). Sąsiadujące ze sobą w tym regionie kraje, pomimo ogólnej wspólnej wersji historii, widzą niektóre wydarzenia (szczególnie te z okresu II wojny światowej i poprzedzających ją dekad) w różny sposób. W rezultacie liczne rozmowy przeprowadzone podczas trwania EPRIE wzbogaciły nasze zróżnicowane poglądy.

Podczas programu, mieliśmy okazję gościć w miejscach ściśle zwią- zanych z historią i polityką Azji Wschodniej, w tym w muzeach w Japonii oraz Korei Południowej, które prezentowały różne narracje

historyczne. Te odmienne interpretacje wspólnej historii dodatkowo wzbogaciły dyskusje – ich przebieg i rezultaty – toczące się pomiędzy uczestnikami. Mieliśmy także okazję spotkać się z artystą, którego prace ukazywały bardziej praktyczny wymiar omawianych przez nas abstrakcyjnych idei.

EPRIE 2015 rozpoczęło się serią szkoleń kształtujących kompetencje międzykulturowe, dzięki którym szybko zapoznaliśmy się ze sobą oraz z pojęciami dotyczącymi tożsamości, leżącymi u podstaw szkoły letniej. Po sesji wprowadzającej, wysłuchaliśmy wykładów przepro- wadzonych przez ekspertów z Azji oraz Europy, które rzuciły nowe światło na status quo stosunków w regionie Azji Wschodniej. Po uchwyceniu głównych pojęć związanych z tematem oraz omówieniu obecnej sytuacji omawianych krajów, podzieliliśmy się na grupy składające się z osób różniących się pochodzeniem, wykształceniem i doświadczeniami zawodowymi, w których kontynuowaliśmy nasze dyskusje na tematy takie jak: naród, nacjonalizm czy tożsamość narodowa w dobie globalizacji.

Istotną częścią doświadczenia, jakim było EPRIE, stała się nasza interakcja z ekspertami, która nadała dodatkowego znaczenia całemu przedsięwzięciu. Chcielibyśmy wyrazić naszą wdzięczność dla tych

wszystkich pracowników naukowych oraz praktyków, którzy podzielili się z nami swoimi spostrzeżeniami i przemyśleniami. Ich prezentacje objęły szeroki zakres zagadnień, w tym kwestie pamięci zbiorowej, pojednania, bycia ofiarą (victimhood) i współpracy regionalnej. Stanowiły znaczący wkład do naszych dalszych rozmów oraz poprawiły nasze zrozumienie złożoności spraw w tej części świata, jak i pokazały podobieństwa i różnice w stosunku do sytuacji w Europie.

SPOJRZENIE NA AZJĘ WSCHODNIĄ = NASZ PUNKT WYJŚCIA

Azja Wschodnia może być dziś postrzegana przez pryzmat kilku istotnych aspektów, pośród których niewątpliwie znajdzie się trudne dziedzictwo historyczne. Jako bliscy sąsiedzi, Chiny, Korea i Japonia dzielą długą historię wymiany kulturowej, gospodarczej i dyplomatycznej, jak również szereg konfliktów, z których najbardziej traumatycznymi pozostają wydarzenia z czasów II wojny światowej. Japońska agresja wojenna oraz okres rządów kolonialnych, włączając w to przymusową prostytucję (przypadek tak zwanych comfort women), jak i późniejsze umieszczenie prochów zbrodniarzy wojennych w świątyni Yasukuni, stanowiły główne punkty sporne w opracowywaniu wspólnej historii Azji Wschodniej XX wieku.

Wielu Japończyków, w tym wysokiej rangi urzędników i czołowych polityków, ma tendencje do postrzegania siebie jako ofiar wojny, przywołując rozległe bombardowania, tysiące żołnierzy, którzy oddali swe życie na polu walki oraz bomby atomowe zrzucone na Hiroszimę i Nagasaki. Pogląd ten kłóci się z wizją wojny, jaką mają Koreańczycy i Chińczycy, w której Japonia jednoznacznie występuje w roli zbrodniarza wojennego. Szczególnie w przypadku Korei pojęcie bycia ofiarą rezonuje w całej historii półwyspu. Rozbieżność w narracjach historycznych stanowi główną przeszkodę na drodze do wzajemnego zrozumienia.

Ostatnie zmiany w regionalnej równowadze sił objęły Chiny, wzmacniające swoją pozycję głównego aktora na arenie międzynarodowej oraz pokazały, że Korea Południowa potrafi coraz skuteczniej dbać o swoje interesy narodowe. Te zdecydowane stanowiska obu krajów stworzyły nową sytuację, w której azjatyccy sąsiedzi będą musieli na nowo się odnaleźć. Taki stan rzeczy znajduje też swoje odzwierciedlenie w coraz bardziej zaciętych sporach terytorialnych, dotyczących kilku zespołów wysp.

Ponadto, rządy Chin, Korei i Japonii z dość dużym powodzeniem wykorzystują nacjonalistyczne nastroje społeczne jako drogę do zyskania poparcia opinii publicznej oraz odwrócenia uwagi społeczeństwa od aktualnych wyzwań polityki krajowej.

To tylko niektóre ogólne obserwacje, które pomagały nam wposzukiwaniach rozwiązania tej złożonej sytuacji.

PROMOWANIE WSPÓŁPRACY REGIONALNEJ = NASZ CEL

Istnieje fundamentalna potrzeba budowania współpracy poprzez wzajemne zaufanie, które pozwoli podtrzymać pokój oraz dostatek w Azji Wschodniej. Przewyciężenie różnic dzięki wspólnym celom może przyczynić się również do rozwoju wspólnej wizji przyszłości regionu. Im więcej państw wykaże wolę do stosowania takich praktyk, tym stabilniejsze będą ramy wielowymiarowej współpracy. Stanowi to istotny czynnik w perspektywie długoterminowej, ponieważ umożliwi kooperację w sprawach wykraczających poza handel i gospodarkę, tak jak miało to miejsce w przypadku integracji europejskiej po II wojnie światowej.

Momentem inicjującym proces budowy zaufania jest dialog, który powinien wykraczać poza konsultacje oraz spotkania ekspertów i angażować także rozmaitych przedstawicieli społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Sprawy, które powinny być w ramach niego poruszane mogą dotyczyć:

Poszanowania wewnętrznej różnorodności państw: Źródłem nacjonalizmu i wrogości jest bowiem założenie homogenicznej wizji państwa, charakteryzującej się ściśle określonym i zamkniętym katalogiem wartości. Współczesne społeczeństwo składa się jednak z jednostek o różnych przekonaniach i opiniach. Uznanie takiego wielowymiarowego charakteru zbiorowości jest kluczem do poprawy współpracy regionalnej.

Promowanie wymian kulturowych: W celu wzmocnienia wzajemnego zaufania oraz powstania wspólnych norm pomiędzy społeczeństwem chińskim, koreańskim oraz japońskim, należy zintensyfikować wymiany kulturowe, w szczególności pomiędzy młodymi ludźmi. Jak doświadczyli uczestnicy tegorocznej edycji EPRIE, tego typu praktyki stanowią doskonałą okazję do wzmocnienia wzajemnego zrozumienia oraz bezpośrednich kontaktów międzyludzkich. Takie projekty, służące ustanowieniu i stabilizacji kanałów komunikacji międzykulturowej, powinny być zatem coraz częściej organizowane przy wsparciu zarówno sektora publicznego jak i prywatnego.

Ustanowienia systemu zarządzania napięciem politycznym, w szczególności w odniesieniu do sporów terytorialnych: Jak pokazują wydarzenia z przeszłości, kwestie terytorialne często prowadziły do konfliktu zbrojnego. Obserwując wydarzenia wokół statusu wysp Takeshima/Dokdo oraz Senaku/Diaoyu można jednoznacznie stwierdzić, że problem ten stanowi obecnie jedno z największych wyzwań dla regionu. Zainteresowane strony powinny dokonać wspólnego

wysiłku w celu uregulowania tej kwestii. Azja Wschodnia potrzebuje zinstytucjonalizowanego mechanizmu, który będzie mógł zostać uruchomiony już we wczesnej fazie napięcia. Również w tym wypadku, potencjał uczestników społeczeństwa obywatelskiego powinien zostać wzięty pod uwagę.

CO POZOSTAJE = NASZA ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚĆ

Wierzmy, że mieszkańcy Azji Wschodniej są odpowiedzialni za przyszłość swojego regionu. Aktywne obywatelstwo może nie przychodzić naturalnie, ale powinno być silnie wspierane. Wymaga to przezwyciężenia nacjonalistycznego sposobu myślenia oraz wzmocnienia krytycznego podejścia do historii i współczesnych stosunków między państwami. Konieczna jest także aktywizacja obywateli, którzy mogą odegrać kluczową rolę we wprowadzaniu zmian.

Jako przedstawiciele młodego pokolenia, stajemy się współodpowiedzialni za pamięć o przeszłości w stopniu równym do tego, jakie mieli ci, którzy byli przed nami. Uznajemy za warunek konieczny poznawanie poglądów innych mieszkańców Azji Wschodniej. Wciąż istnieje jednak niedostatek możliwości oraz bodźców, które warunkowałyby sukces takich przedsięwzięć. Musimy zatem podnieść świadomość oraz ustanowić kanały kontaktu pomiędzy ludźmi i organizacjami, dzielącymi podobne zainteresowania, nawet jeżeli punktem wyjścia jest jedynie ciekawość w odniesieniu do drugiej strony.

MEMORANDUM

in Chinese

国家+身份认同+ (更多) = ERPIE 2015

(2015 年“东亚与欧洲区域融合交流项目”)

二〇一五年七月，“东亚与欧洲区域融合交流项目”（以下简称“EPRIE”）为我们提供了一个异常难忘且独特的交流机会。这一年，十九名来自中国、韩国、日本、法国、德国及波兰等六个国家的年轻专业人士参与了在全球化形态下地区融合中的国家与身份问题的讨论。鉴于项目的举行地在东京及首尔，我们讨论的焦点集中在东亚地区，同时也包括对欧洲当前挑战的反思。讨论涉及的国家皆有相交的历史轨迹，但他们看待历史的角度，尤其是二战史及二战战后史却大有不同。在该项目中我们进行了多



Program EPRIE umożliwił nam zawiązanie nowych przyjaźni, kontaktów oraz kanałów komunikacji wykraczających daleko poza granice państw, z których pochodzimy. W tym duchu chcemy dalej dążyć do pogłębiania współpracy regionalnej i międzynarodowej.

Tokio i Seul

Lipiec 2015

种多样的头脑风暴及对话，我们的各种认识也通过深层次的交流不断加深。

在今年的项目中，我们有机会实地参观东亚历史及政治中最富有争议的地方，包括在日本及韩国展示冲突的历史叙述的博物馆。同一历史事件的不同解读对于我们的讨论皆有积极的影响，无论是讨论的内容还是讨论的结果。同时，我们亦与一位艺术家会晤，他的作品从现实的方式展示了对历史事件的抽象思考。

EPRIE 2015 从跨文化培训开始。透过这样的培训，我们很快便互相熟悉，并且亲身感受到项目核心中与身份认同相关的概念。随后，来自东亚及欧洲专家主持的研讨会亦有助于我们了解东亚区域关系的现状。了解了课题的主要概念及这些国家现状后，我们根据不同的学术背景、行业及国家拆分成的不同工作小组，各自分享我们在全球化形态下对国家、民族主义、身份认同的不同见解。



EPRIE 其中一个重要的经验是，我们与专家学者的交流使得我们在讨论组的交流更有意义。在此，非常感谢所有的专家学者以及相关从业人员与我们分享他们独特的见解和不同的意见。他们的分享涵盖了广泛的主题，包括集体的记忆、和解、受害者身份及区域合作。他们的见解启发了我们的诸多讨论，提高我们对东亚地区复杂性以及东亚与欧洲共性和差异性的理解。

东亚的现状=我们的起点

我们认为今天的东亚可以分为多个方面来理解，其中历史的遗留问题是最为重要的。中日韩虽是邻国，在经济、外交和文化上皆有漫长的历史渊源，但也有很多冲突，第二次世界大战所带来的创伤尤为明显。日本的侵略和殖民统治，包括所谓的“慰安妇”及战后供奉日本战犯的靖国神社，是 20 世纪东亚国家关于历史争端的争论焦点。

许多的日本人，包括高级官员以及杰出的政治家，都以日本本土遭到大面积空袭、战亡的士兵们及分别扔在广岛和长崎的两颗原子弹为理由，认为自己才是战争的受害者。这个观点被中国人及韩国人强烈反驳，相反，他们认为自己的民众才是真正的受害者，而日本毋庸置疑是真正的侵略者。在韩国，这一观点可以追溯到整个朝鲜半岛的历史中。这种历史叙述的差异成为了东亚邻国互相理解的最大障碍。

近年来，东亚国家的力量平衡出现了改变。主要是由中国经济和军事力量在全世界的上升及韩国日益强烈地主张其国家利益所导致的。中韩两国更为自信的姿态不仅带来了新的改

变，而且还在继续演变，这甚至使他们更难在相互博弈中找到平和点。这种立场在因岛屿引发的剧烈领土争端上得以体现。此外，中日韩三国政府一直在尝试利用民众的民族主义情绪，有时作为一种针对他国的自我维护手段，更多的时候则作为一种克服其他国内危机、获得公众支持的手段，从而进一步增加了地区局势的复杂性。不可否认的是这些尝试有时候颇为有效。

这些笼统、尚未全面及确凿的观察将作为我们反思的跳板，帮助我们思考如何解决地区间复杂、易发冲突的问题。

推动地区合作=我们的前路

基于互信，建立相互合作，为东亚和平与繁荣奠定基础是极其必要的。追求共同目标以克服分歧或许有助于地区共同愿景的发展。国与国之间的沟通越多，他们越能构建多维合作的坚实框架。从长远来看，如同二战后欧洲一体化所揭示的一样，构建富有弹性的区域合作框架以处理贸易与经济以外的事务仍是东亚地区的一个重要的目标。

相互对话是获取互信的起点。这种对话不应仅局限于学者专家，更应鼓励广泛的公民社会成员参与，以涵盖不同国家的观点。交流应包括以下这些议题：

承认不同国家的多样性：民族主义言论与敌意的行为来自这样一个假设，国家皆是由单一的价值体系及相同观点联合起来的实体。但事实上，现代社会是由持有不同意见和信仰的人构成的。认识社会的多维度是提升区域关系的关键。

促进社会交流：为了促进中日韩三国的互信和发展，民间交流亟待加强，尤其是在年轻人之间。正如我们在EPRIE中所感受到的，这些交流为我们增进彼此的了解及加强未来的人际联系提供了难能可贵的机会。更多旨在加强沟通的交流项目都应受到民间及官方的大力支持。

建立一个领土争端管理系统：历史表明，领土纷争往往导致冲突或战争的发生。目前领土争端是该地区最严峻的问题，尤其是竹岛和钓鱼岛。解决领土纷争，需要东亚各国的共同努力。建立预防机制，在冲突爆发的初期，能有效管理可能发生的危机。这种努力应建立在区域层面共享的规范之上。公民社会亦应倡导这种机制的建立。

剩下的问题=的我们的责任

最后，我们认为东亚各国的公民有责任决定该地区的共同命运。现状并非理所当然。积极的公民参与难以自然产生，但却需要鼓励与支持。这意味着我们需要克服民族主义心态及培养历史和当代政治的批判性思维。现存的多样化公民社会应被继

续鼓励，以成为社会变革的推动者。

作为年轻的一代，我们与前人一样有责任尊重过去的历史。我们也意识到与其他东亚人民分享个人经历的重要性。目前，我们缺乏机会与措施把那些愿意聆听及与邻国公民相互沟通的人们聚集在一起。因此，我们需要提升关注及建立联系，把那些拥有共同兴趣的人们聚在一起，哪怕是开始时他们对彼此仅仅抱有好奇心，我们也应该鼓励更多的机构为达到这样的共同目标而努力。

EPRIE 2015 使我们跨越国界，建立了新的友谊、新的个人联系及网络。为此，我们应乘势而上，继续为深化地区交流和跨国合作而共同努力。

东京与首尔

2015 年7月

MEMORANDUM

in Japanese

覚書

国家／民族 (nation) + アイデンティティー + (その他色々) =
EPRIE 2015

7月に開催されたExchange Program for Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe (EPRIE／東アジア・ヨーロッパ地域統合交流プログラム) 2015の11日間は、私たちに非常に印象深い経験と貴重な対話の機会を与えてくれた。本年のプログラムには、中国、韓国、日本、フランス、ドイツ、ポーランドから19名の若手専門家が参加し、国家／民族 (nation) とアイデンティティーをテーマに、グローバル化する世界における地域内協力について議論した。開催地が東京とソウルであったことから、主に東アジアにその焦点が当てられたが、ヨーロッパ諸国が挑んだ課題解決の経験も参考に議論された。東アジアの隣接する国々は、歴史的な時間軸を共有しているものの、特

に第二次世界大戦以降においては、異なる視点から歴史を捉えている。このような要素から、私たちの EPRIE における相互研鑽と対話は多様なものになり、視野を広げる機会となった。

プログラムでは、議論の焦点となった東アジアの歴史や政治と関係の深い場所を訪れた。その中には韓国と日本の博物館が含まれ、それぞれの戦争に関する「物語・談話 (narrative)」が表れた展示が見られた。共通の歴史に対するこれらの異なる解釈は、参加者間の議論の学びとなり、またアウトプットにも大きな示唆を与えた。また、私たちはそれらのテーマを抽象的に捉え実践的に表現したアーティストとも交流した。

EPRIE 2015 はいくつかの文化間交流から始まった。これらの活動を通じて、私たち参加者は早い段階でお互いをよく理解することができたとともに、プログラムのテーマであるアイデンティティーに関連した概念を体験的に学ぶことができた。このようなプログラムの導入に続き、東アジアやヨーロッパからの専門家によるセミナーでは、東アジアにおける国際関係の現状に焦点が当てられた。同地域における問題の概要や現状について学んだ後、私たちは教育やキャ



リア、国籍等のバックグラウンドの異なる参加者から成るグループに分かれ、グローバル化する世界における国家／民族（nation）、ナショナリズム、ナショナル・アイデンティティーについて意見を交わした。

専門家たちとの交流は EPRIE での経験の重要な要素であり、彼らの参加によってグループ内の話し合いはより意義深いものになった。ここに、私たちに対し洞察や思想を共有してくれた研究者や実務家に感謝の意を表したい。彼らの講義は、記憶、和解、犠牲そして地域内協力など、幅広い内容に及んだ。彼らは私たちの議論に重要な話題を提供し、また彼らの存在が東アジア地域の複雑さや、ヨーロッパにおける状況との共通点、相違点への理解を深める助けとなった。

東アジアに関する熟考＝私たちの出発点

私たちは、今日の東アジアが歴史的遺産の難解さをはじめとする、いくつかの側面から理解できるということを学んだ。隣国同士である中国、韓国、日本は、文化や経済、外交の長い歴史とともに、第二次世界大戦の特に衝撃的な記憶を含む近現代の戦争の歴史を共有している。日本の戦時の侵略と占領は、従軍慰安婦の強制や、靖国神社が戦犯を祀るといった地域的問題を生み、20世紀の東アジア史における軋轢を形作った。

政治家や官僚を含む多くの日本人は、領土における空襲や、戦地で命を失った兵士、広島と長崎における原爆などの記憶から、自国を戦争犠牲者であると認識する傾向がある。このような見方は、韓国や中国に広まる犠牲者意識や、日本が侵略者であったという認識・言論と対立するものである。特に韓国に関しては、犠牲者意識が半島の歴史の土台となっている。このような歴史に関する「物語・談話（narrative）」の違いが、東アジアにおいて相互理解を妨げる主要因となっている。

東アジアにおける最近のパワーバランスの変化は、経済、軍事における中国の台頭や、韓国の国益重視の傾向によって特徴付けられる。両者の断固な姿勢は強まっており、相互尊重の関係を続けるための立ち位置を見いだすことが難しくなっている。このような姿勢は、東アジアにおける島々の領有権争いの加熱に表れている。さらには、中国、韓国、日本の政府は、効果的に国民のナショナリスト的な感情を利用し、自らの立場を相手に対して主張する手段としてきた。さらに、多くの場合において国内の問題から目をそらさせ、国民の支持を得る方法として、そのような国民感情を利用してきた。それによって地域の緊張状態がより複雑なものとなった。

なお、これらは現在の戦争につながりかねない複雑な状況の解決について考えるために、私たちが足がかりとしたことの概要であり、包括的なものでも決定的なものでもない。

地域内協力の促進＝私たちの焦点

東アジアにおいて、信頼に基づく協力関係の構築や、持続可能な平和と繁栄の礎を築くことが強く求められている。共通の目標に到達するため、努力によって違いを乗り越えることは、この地域の未来に対する共通のビジョンを持つことにつながる可能性がある。国々がそのような経験を積み重ねるほど、多角的な協力のためのより堅実な枠組が形成される。長期的な視点で見ると、第二次世界大戦後にヨーロッパの経験からわかるように、貿易や経済の範囲を超える問題に対応できる地域の枠組を作ることが重要である。

信頼醸成の出発点是对話である。このような対話は専門家のネットワークを超えて行われる必要があり、市民社会における様々なアクターが参加できるような、国家の枠組を超えた幅広い視点が求められる。論点として、次のような事柄が考えられる。

各国における多様性の認識：民族主義的な言論や対立は、国家が一つの価値観や同質の見方によってまとまった実体だという前提によって引き起こされる。しかし、現代社会はそれとは対照的に多様な意見や信念を持つ人々によって構成されている。いかなる社会も多元的な特徴を持つという認識が、地域における関係を改善する鍵となる。

交流の促進：中国、韓国、日本の中で相互の信頼を築き、共通の規範を発展させるために、特に若い世代における、交流が求められている。私たちが EPRIE で経験したように、このような交流は相互理解を深め、継続的な個人のつながりの形成を促すための理想的な機会となる。民間部門と公共部門両方により、多くの交流プログラムやコミュニケーション促進を目的とする企画が生み出され、支持されるべきである。

衝突の管理システム構築（特に領土問題）：領土問題がしばしば軍事的な衝突につながるということは、歴史的に明らかである。東アジアにおいて、特に独島／竹島や、釣魚群島／尖閣諸島に関する領有権の主張に見られる領土問題は、今日もっとも関心を集める事柄の一つである。地域レベルで共有された規範に基づき領土問題の解決に協力して努めることが求められる。東アジアには、緊張状態が増大する初期段階において、協力して効果的に（解決のために）取り組むための組織的なメカニズムが必要である。市民社会におけるアクターは、そのようなシステムの創設を訴える重要な役割を果たす可能性がある。

結論＝私たちの責任

究極的に、私たちは、東アジア諸国の人々が東アジアの運命を担っていると確信している。現状が維持されることを当然だと受け止める必要はないのである。活動的な市民は自然に現れるものではなく、積極的に支持される必要がある。それには、ナショナリスティックな考え方に打ち勝ち、歴史や現代政治に対する批判的な思考力を培うことが求められる。今日の多様な市民社会が変化の媒介となることが期待される。

若い世代として、私たちは他の世代と同様に過去の記憶に対する責任を持っている。私たちは、東アジアの人々が見識を共有することが重要だと考える。しかし、現状、隣人の声に耳を傾け、話し合うことを望む人々が集まる機会や、インセンティブが十分にあるとはいえない。私たちがすべきことは、認識を広め、たとえ最初は興味本位であっても利害を共有する人々のネットワークを形成し、同じ目標に向かって取り組む機関を応援することである。

EPRIE 2015 は、新しい友人や個人的なつながり、国境や地域を超えるネットワークをつくる機会を提供してくれた。この精神に基づき、私たちはより深い地域交流と国家間協力の醸成に努めたいと思う。

EPRIE 2015 参加者一同

東京・ソウルにて

2015 年7月



MEMORANDUM

in Korean

안서

국가와 정체성, 그리고... = EPRIE 2015

7월의 열 하루동안 2015년 동아시아와 유럽의 지역 통합을 위한 교환 프로그램 (EPRIE)에서 잊을 수 없는 경험과 아주 특별한 대화를 나눌 수 있는 기회가 우리에게 주어졌다. 올해는 중국, 한국, 일본, 프랑스, 독일 그리고 폴란드에서 온 19명의 차세대 전문가들이 국가와 정체성의 맥락을 바탕으로 이뤄지는 지역 협력에 대해 토론을 하기 위해 모였다. 이 프로그램은 도쿄와 서울에서 열렸다. 우리의 지역적 쟁점은 동아시아였지만 현재 유럽이 직면한 문제들도 다뤘다. 이 지역의 이웃 나라들은 공통된 역사적 맥락을 가지지만 역사, 그 중에서도 특히 2차 세계대전과 지난 10년의 역사를 각각 다른 시각으로 해석하고 있다. 그 결과, 우리가 이 프로그램에서 나눈 사고와 대화는 매우 다양해졌고 또 우리의 다양한 관점은 더욱 풍부해졌다.

이 프로그램을 통해 우리는 여전히 격렬하게 논쟁되고 있는 동아시아의 역사와 정치적 사건들과 연관된 장소들을 방문할 기회를 얻었다. 그 중에는 서로 모순되는 일본과 한국의 역사적 서술들을 보여주는 박물관들도 있었다. 이렇게 공통된 역사에 관한 상이한 해석은 참가자들 가운데서 토론의 시작과 끝을 이루는 데 큰 기여를 했다. 이와 더불어 우리는 우리가 토론한 추상적 관념들을 실제적인 차원에서 보여주는 예술가 또한 만날 수 있었다.

EPRIE 2015는 다양한 문화 소통 연수 프로그램들과 함께 시작됐다. 이런 과정들을 통해 우리는 꽤나 빠르게 친해질 수 있었고, 프로그램의 핵심인 정체성에 관련된 개념들을 직접 경험할 수 있었다. 이런 개최 프로그램들을 필두로, 동아시아와 유럽에서 온 석학들의 세미나는 동아시아 국제 정치의 현황을 잘 이해할 수 있도록 우리에게 길을 밝혀 주었다. 이번 프로그램과 관련된 주요 개념들과 이에 해당되는 나라들이 처한 현황들을 이해 한 후, 우리는 제각기 다른 학문적, 직업적, 그리고 국가적 바탕을 가진 그룹들로 나뉘어 세계화 속에서의 국가, 국가주의, 그리고 국가 정체성에 관한 저마다의 의견을 나누었다.

EPRIE 경험에서 가장 중요했던 부분은 바로 전문가들과 함께 나누는 소통이다. 이것을 바탕으로 그룹 내에서 이뤄진 의견 교환은 더 큰 의미가 있었다. 우리는 이 자리를 빌어 자신의 통찰력과 견해를 기꺼이 나눠주신 모든 석학과 전문가들에게 감사의 마음을 전해드리고 싶다. 이분들의 발표들은 집단 기억, 화해, 피해의식, 그리고 지역 협력 등 광대한 사안들을 포함했다. 또한 이분들은 우리가 나눈 토론에 상당한 기여를 하셨다. 이분들 덕분에 우리는 유럽의 상황과 비교되는 동아시아의 공통점과 차이점, 그리고 동아시아의 복잡한 상황을 예리하게 이해할 수 있었다.

동아시아를 비춰보며... = 우리의 시작점

오늘날의 동아시아는 다양한 관점에서 이해될 수 있다. 가장 중요한 것들 중 하나는 풀기 어려운 역사적 유산을 바탕으로 한 이해이다. 가까운 이웃인 중국, 한국 그리고 일본은 가장 큰 역사적 트라우마를 남긴 세계2차대전을 필두로 한 상당히 많은 갈등 사건들과 함께, 문화적, 경제적, 그리고 외교적 영향을 주고받은 긴 역사를 공유한다. 일본의 침략 전쟁과 제국주의적 질서, 강제적 성매매 “위안부” 문제, 그리고 전후 야스쿠니 신사 전범 문제 등은 20세기 동아시아 역사 프레임 논쟁에서 주요 관점들을 제공했다.

고급 관료들과 저명한 정치가들을 포함한 대다수의 일본인들은 자신들을 전쟁의 희생자로 간주하고 싶어한다. 자신의 고향 여기저기에 폭탄이 투하됐고, 자기 나라의 군인들이 전쟁에서 목숨을 잃었고, 히로시마와 나가사키에 핵폭탄이 떨어졌다는 이유들 때문이다. 이런 생각은 일본이 가해자이며 자신들만이 희생자라는 한국과 중국에 널리 퍼져있는 진술들과 충돌한다. 특히 한국의 경우, 이런 피해의식은 한반도의 역사와 공명한다. 이와 같은 역사적 서사의 불일치가 동아시아 국가들이 서로를 이해하는 데 큰 장애물이 된다.

최근 변화된 지정학적 힘의 균형은 중국을 경제적으로 또 군사적으로 떠오르는 세계의 실세로, 한국은 자국의 이익을 점점 더 강하게 주장하는 국가로 바라보고 있다. 이처럼 두 나라의 확신에 찬 입장은 지금 현재에도 진화하는 새로운 상황을 가져왔고, 이로 인해 이해 당사국들이 서로와의 관계 속에서 각자의 기반을 찾는 것을 더 어렵게 만들고 있다. 그러한 입장차이는 점점 더 치열하게 진행되는 동아시아 지역의 여러 섬들에 대한 영토 분쟁에 반영 돼 있다. 이에 더 나아가 중국, 한국 그리고 일본 정부는 자국민들의 국가주의적 감상을 이용하려고 애쓰고 있다. 삼국의 정부들은 상대방에 반하는 자신의 입장을 표명하기 위해, 더 빈번하게는 삼국과 관련 없

는 자국의 국내 문제들을 해결하기 위해, 그리고 대중의 지지를 얻기 위해 이를 이용하고, 결과적으로 이미 첨예한 지역 상황을 한 층 더 복잡하게 만든다.

이것들은 보편적이고 비완전하며 비결론적인 우리들의 관찰 결과들로, 우리가 복잡하고 충돌하기 쉬운 현황을 극복할 수 있도록 하는 해결책들을 사유하는 데 디딤돌이 되어주었다.

지역적 협력을 촉진하며... = 우리의 쟁점.

동아시아에서 신뢰를 통한 협력을 구축하고 지속적인 평화와 번성을 위한 토대를 마련하는 것은 필수적이다. 공유된 목표들을 추구하고함으로써 다른 점들을 극복하는 일은 동아시아의 미래를 위한 공통된 목표를 발전시키는 데 기여할 수 있을 것이다. 해당 국가들이 이런 연습을 더 많이 하면 할수록, 그들은 다양한 차원의 협력을 위한 견고한 프레임을 더 많이 만들 수 있을 것이다. 더 멀리 보자면, 이는 세계2차대전 이후 유럽 통합의 모습에서 보여진 것처럼 지역적 프레임이 무역과 경제 그 이상의 화두들을 다루는 데 굴하지 않도록 하는 중대한 목표를 남길 것이다.

신뢰를 구축하기 위한 시작점은 상호 대답이다. 이 대답은 전문가들만의 네트워크 차원 이상으로 이뤄져야 하고, 더 방대한 시민 사회 구성원들이 참여할 수 있는 드넓은 초국가적인 견해를 수용해야 한다. 이는 다음과 같은 쟁점들을 다룰 것이다:

개별 국가 내에서의 다양성 인식: 국가주의적 발언과 적대적인 행동은 한 나라가 단 하나의 가치와 단일한 관점들로 구성되어 있는 하나의 집합체라고 추정하는 데서 발생한다. 이와 반대로, 현대 사회는 다양한 의견과 신념들을 가진 사람들로 구성되어 있다. 여러 사회의 다차원적 모습을 인식하는 것은 지역적 관계들을 발전시키는 데에 필요한 열쇠이다.

사회적 교류 촉진: 상호 신뢰를 구축하고 중국, 한국, 그리고 일본 사이의 공유된 규범들을 발전시키기 위해서는, 특히나 젊은 세대 간의 사회적 교류가 더 활발이 이뤄져야 한다. 우리가 EPRI에서 경험한 바로는, 이러한 문화 교류 프로그램이 상호 이해를 강화하고 미래지향적인 인간 관계를 형성하는 데 최적한 기회를 준다. 커뮤니케이션 채널을 촉진하는 데 적을 둔 이러한 교류 프로그램과 프로젝트들이 민간뿐만 아니라 공공 기관들에 의해 조직 되고 지원되어야 한다.

특히 영토 분쟁을 대비한 분쟁 조절 시스템의 설립: 역사는 영토 분쟁이 종종 군사적 충돌을 야기한다는 점을 증명한다. 현재 영토 분쟁은 해당 지역의 중대한 관심사들 중 하나인데, 특히 다케시마/독도 그리고 센카쿠/다오위 섬에 대한 분쟁 상황이 심각하다. 영토 분쟁을 해결하기 위한 상호 노력은 지역적 단계에서 공유된 기준들을 바탕으로 이뤄져야 한다. 동아시아는 초기 단계에서 이러한 긴장의 고조가 협력적이고 효과적으로 조절될 수 있는 제도화된 기제가 필요하다. 시민사회의 운동가들이 이런 시스템 정착을 옹호하는 데 역할을 다할 수 있다.

그리고 그 후... = 우리의 책임

궁극적으로, 우리는 동아시아 국민들이 그들 자신이 살고 있는 지역의 운명을 스스로 만들기 위해 책임을 나눌 것이라 믿는다. 현재의 상황을 당연한 것으로 여길 필요는 없다. 능동적인 시민의식은 자연스럽게 오는 것이 아니라, 적극적으로 지지되어야 한다. 이것은 국가 주의적인 생각을 극복하는 것과 역사와 현대 정치에 대해 비판적인 의식을 고무하는 것을 필요로 한다. 기존의 복합 시민 사회는 변화의 요체로서 작용할 수 있도록 고무되어야 한다.

차세대로서 우리는, 지난 세대가 가졌던 것만큼의 과거 기억에 대한 책임을 수용한다. 우리는 동아시아 사람들이 통찰력을 나누는 것이 중요함을 안다. 현재로서는 그들 이웃의 이야기를 듣고 토론을 할 준비가 되어 있는 사람들을 만나게 할 기회나 장려가 적다. 그저 처음에는 서로에 대한 호기심에서 출발했다 하더라도, 우리는 공통된 관심사를 공유하는 사람들에 대한 관심을 높이고 이들에 관한 네트워크를 구성해야 한다. 그리고 같은 목표를 향해 나아가는 단체들을 더 격려해야 한다.

EPRIE 2015는 우리 모국의 국경과 지역을 넘어 새로운 우정을 쌓고, 인연을 넓히고, 네트워크를 만들게 해 주었다. 이러한 정신으로, 우리는 더 깊은 지역 교류 프로그램과 국가를 넘어선 협력을 위해 노력해야 할 것이다.

도쿄와 서울에서

2015년 7월

BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN EAST ASIA AND EUROPE — THE EPRIE ALUMNI ASSOCIATION

Yann PRELL

Regional integration starts with the interaction of people from neighboring countries. Their relationship is the corner stone for further cooperation between their countries. Mutual understanding, trust, and friendship form preconditions for future agreements and institutions on a supra-national level.

EPRIE gathers young professionals and students who are concerned with issues between their country and its neighbors and want to foster the process of regional integration. The participants interact and deepen their knowledge on the two sub-regions, East Asia and Europe, and relevant regional cooperation. They exchange ideas, engage in building trust, and challenge themselves and their perspectives. At the end of the program each one of them leaves as a disseminator for regional integration and mutual understanding in their respective region.

As cross-border cooperation proves to be essential for closer regional integration, former participants not only engage in their own country, but build their very own, supra-national organization, the EPRIE Alumni Association. It was founded in 2012 and aims to improve the cooperation in Europe and East Asia and between both regions by promoting the professional and personal exchange. Although its name might suggest that membership is limited to former EPRIE participants or speakers, the association is open to everybody interested or working on regional integration in Europe and East Asia.

The numerous members from Europe (France, Germany, and Poland) and East Asia (China, Korea and Japan) contribute to the alumni association's activities with their regional expertise and their various backgrounds in Area Studies, as well as History, Social, and Communication Sciences. As the number of members is growing every year, the members especially focus on stronger knowledge exchange and networking to build closer ties between East Asia and Europe. The alumni association is headed by five volunteers and cooperates closely with the annual EPRIE program. It organizes seminars and

talks in collaboration with the EPRIE program and holds regular meetings in each region. Beyond those meetings, the members network and share their knowledge and ideas in various forms. For example, many members wrote articles or essays for the Korea Forum EPRIE Spezial. Being in its fledgling stages, the next steps for the association involve a stronger professionalization in the coming years, an increase in the number of members and the development of own projects.

If you are interested in the EPRIE Alumni Association and their activities, please contact us. We are happy to provide you with further information.

www.eprie.net/alumni



Yann Werner PRELL participated in EPRIE 2013 and is member of the EPRIE alumni association. He works for Korea Verband and has supported EPRIE as a project assistant since 2014.

LANGUAGE, CONCEPT OF NATION AND DIVERSITY — THE EPRIE EXCHANGE PROGRAM AS A WAY TO FOSTER INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE

Katarzyna ZIELONY

Imagine a very diverse and mixed group of people meeting in one place, not knowing each other, full of excitement but also fears (biases, stereotypes or presumptions), afraid of the otherness, yet determined to build an integrated team in order to work, brainstorm and travel together – all this to achieve a better understanding, come up with ideas and recommendations concerning regional integration and cooperation. Common ideas should be the result of the synergy and potential that were activated step by step over the course of the program, thanks to the principles of intercultural competence. Having had a chance to be a part of EPRIE, I can easily say that it is indeed a great lesson on what intercultural competence means. In this article I would like to show why it is so crucial, especially in reference to this year's topic, the concept of nations, to develop intercultural competence. First intercultural¹ will be explained and some paradoxes presented with reference to the concepts of nations. Next, the role of language will be depicted and commented on. Then, a conclusion will be drawn on how thinking patterns depend on the language and concepts people are exposed to. Finally the role of exchange programs will be underlined with regard to the development of intercultural competence.

EPRIE AS AN INTERCULTURAL EXCHANGE

EPRIE stands for Exchange Program for Regional Integration in East Asia and in Europe, a program that brings people from different corners of the world together to share their ideas, get closer to each other and become open to diversity. As a participant you have a great opportunity to live a truly intercultural experience and become more aware and richer by understanding what diversity and intercultural

communication really are. As Capurro (2007) stated, human reason is genuinely plural and people constitute a common world on the basis of exchange practices. He also underlines the key role of permanent critical and intercultural exchange in the formulation of universal principles. So EPRIE can be a perfect opportunity to discover the otherness in the self.

INTERCULTURAL STUDIES PARADIGM BASED ON A NATIONAL CONCEPT AND A CULTURAL TRAP

Interculturality, according to Hansen, has been one of the most popular subjects in cultural studies recently. What exactly is meant by the notion? Hansen refers to Bitterli and his four types of interculturality: "culture touch, culture contact, culture conflict and culture integration" (Bitterli 1976 by Hansen 2000:317). Interculturality, embracing those four elements, includes dealing with national cultures and their members, understood as dealing with the active or spiritual togetherness of those cultures. Hansen underlines the fact that a culture theory must not be limited to national cultures or other ethnic constructions or structures. Moreover, he stresses the difficulty of setting limits on interculturality that is connected with 'otherness' on the one hand, and that cannot be perceived through collective or national borders on the other (Hansen 2000:317). "Intercultural communication deals with difficulties and possibilities in comprehension among cultures" (Hansen 2009:189).

The point in doing intercultural research is not to focus solely on differences as they may blur the issue. In the words of the researchers Breidenbach and Zukriegl, intercultural communication means an attempt to deal with cultural differences. However the attempt is bound to threaten (the same as Huntington's culture image is bound to), to absolutize the differences and as a result to establish them (Breidenbach/Zukriegl 2005:21). "Again, immigrants have no right to individuality, they are treated not as human beings but as collective cultures" (Terkessidis 1995 by Breidenbach/Zukriegl 2005:23). The

1
In the literature more notions are used with regard to intercultural studies. The author uses interculturality as a representative one, referring to research areas. The author does not mean political concepts or programs developed to deal with diversity such as multiculturalism, interculturalism or transculturalism, see more in: Nicklas, H./ Mueller, B./ Kordes, H. (edt.) (2006) Interkulturell denken und handeln. Bonn: BpB

premise of interculturality is to evoke awareness about the unknown and otherness in ourselves. As Kristeva underlines: “we are strangers to ourselves” (Kristeva by Mueller-Funk 2005:9). To be able to communicate with others, one has to be aware of its own peculiarities. To repeat after Paul Celan (Celan, ed. Joris 2005:34) “I am you when I am I”. Moreover, only when being driven by authenticity, and not exclusively by descent (origin), can one allow cultural transfer. The fact of how deeply one is capable of acquisition of otherness is also important, whereby the assessment of new cultures has to be free from questioning about their origins (Breidenbach/Zukrigl 2005:206). The goal of interculturality is on the one hand awareness that one’s behavior cannot be a norm or a lens through which to perceive the world, and awareness of what is unknown and peculiar within the individual on the other (Breidenbach/Zukrigl 2005:211). Cultural or language ignorance creates walls that are strengthened by allowing and accepting preconceived models from media and entertainment (Wolf 2007). It is very easy to limit one’s perception e.g. through mental patterns, frames made out of preconceived structures etc. It is the fact that frames, once entrenched, are hard to dispel (Lakoff 2003). In reference to descent, Beck gives an example of the so called “dialog of origin” to illustrate a territorial ontology of identity “according to which every person has one homeland, where he or she comes from and ultimately belongs. Accordingly conclusions can be drawn from the color of a person’s skin about language, passport, about the person themselves” (Beck 2007:34). Beck underlines the fact that this “where-do-you-come-from-originally” is part of the way a lot of Europeans see themselves even nowadays in times of migration flows (Beck 2007: 33,34).

-May I ask, where you come from?
 -From Stockholm.
 -No, I mean, where do you come from originally?
 -Yes, from Stockholm.
 -Ok, but where do your parents come from?
 -My mother comes from Stockholm.
 -But where does your father come from?
 -My father was American.
 -Aha...

One’s birthplace is probably one of the most common identity markers, the question arises: Is it really the birthplace or rather all the factors that makes it become familiar and determining? Here is how the Swiss Bichsel (1997) describes his home area: “Here, I feel at home. It is hard for me to imagine that someone could feel themselves to be at home in a similar way as a Swiss person is in Switzerland. I feel homesick; but certainly it is not homesickness for Switzerland, it is only homesickness for what is familiar” (Bichsel 1997 by Kaikkonen 2005:90). Home as a place of living where

people are rooted is a value that makes a great part of national identity. That value, once changed, leads to uprooting and loss of identity. The question is: Can identity be lost? To respond negatively, a new paradigm is needed in which identity is a life-long process of creating networks of associations, familiar references, people, places, memories, things, and so on. This network of elements of identity is continuously shifting, changing, restructuring, spinning and expanding, whereas the thinking patterns and pace of changing attitudes seem to be rather stable and fixed. A good strategy to avoid being caught in a cultural trap made out of mental structures is the continuous verification and rethinking necessary to break free from the ties of rigid definitions. Figuratively one needs to have ‘melting horizons’ to allow other visions and concepts and thus be able to rethink one’s own mental structures. Only then one can appreciate otherness as enrichment. The first step to achieve this is proposed by Beck-Gernsheim, instead of asking, “Where do you come from?”, simply start by asking, “Are you new here?” (Beck-Gernsheim 2007). Why? Simply because focusing on origin is equivalent to a monocultural view and the tendency not to name its own ‘identity’, rather absolutizing it as universal.

BEING IN-BETWEEN AND THE MORE-THAN-ONE-WORLD FEELING (Bodrožić 2008: 67-69)

In times of paradigm shift characterized by globalization and mobility, one should speak about a ‘patchwork identity’ or ‘multiple identity’ rather than about identity perceived as something stable, rooted in particular values. As Beck-Gernsheim has noted, “all people have a patchwork identity, even those belonging to the majority society. Taking this statement for granted the Afro-German, Turkish migrants in France and Indians in the UK are not a ‘deviation’ any more” (Beck-Gernsheim 2007:112).

LANGUAGE AS A MEDIUM TO REVEAL THINKING PATTERNS - PARADOXES, LABELLING AND STIGMATIZATION

Beck compares language to a mirror that reflects Europe’s migration policies. “Guest workers, deportation, asylum seekers – that is the horizon of language, values and action against which Europe’s dealings with immigrants take place and are reflected” (Beck 2007:34). In this sense language reveals paradoxes, for example, in dealing with diversity within political systems or nation states. When talking about minorities, often keywords are used which in principle should not appear in the migration context, as they refer to a single perspective. The perspective usually shows only a narrow, monocultural, mononational view of the major society and is based on a definition of identity as something stable, closed and bound to various less relevant factors.

The following table is intended to illustrate the associations and their lack of adequacy.

Culture, identity and ethnicity seen as closed structures are not current or acceptable any more. According to Appiah/Gates:

the dynamics of race and ethnicity are also altered. On the one hand, both matter as a source of oppression. On the other hand, as globalization and economic change blur traditional racial and ethnic boundaries, race and ethnicity increasingly intersect with other identity markers, related to religion, nationality, gender, and language in stimulating social struggle. (Appiah/Gates 1995 by Warschauer/De Florio-Hansen 2003:2)

In this sense interculturality perceived through the lens of hegemonic structures is nothing but a threat. In times of globalization a new approach is needed toward identity, ethnicity and culture. According to Capurro, speaking about cultures means dealing, as the UNESCO Declaration stresses, with fuzzy and contingent sets of life styles, value systems, and beliefs that are themselves the product of hybridization (Capurro 2007).

However there is a lack of suitable notions to describe these abstract phenomena. Cultural researchers still use old notions and old tools (Bolten by Haas 2009). Most researchers were socialized during a previous paradigm. There is a contradiction between the pace of global changes and insistence of mental patterns, e.g. the cultural metaphor of homogenous closed circles still has not been replaced by an open network (Bolten by Haas 2009). A similar problem can be faced when dealing with mental patterns of ethnicity. Beck writes about the idea of the ethnic nation and explains the problematic perception of identity. He also pinpoints how national structures make thinking of a diverse Europe, which is already fact, impossible:

(...) you have an identity you get from your parents and which cannot be changed by option or learning – and reapplying it at the level of Europe. It is about conceiving national and cultural identities as inherently and mutually exclusive: that you can't have two of them in the same logical space. (...) If identities are mutually exclusive, Europe is an impossible project. (Beck 2007:34,35)

HOW TO RETHINK AND REDEFINE NOTIONS – WHAT CAN SERVE AS A MODEL?

Whenever two or more languages come into contact, they influence each other (Appel/Muysken 1987 by Kuiken 2009:123).

Language can be used as a natural medium to express identity and underline its continuous movement and development. “Language has always played an important role in the formation and expression of identity. The role of language and dialect in identity construction is becoming even more central in the post-modern era, as other traditional markers of identity are being destabilized” (Warschauer/De Florio-Hansen 2003:1). New language varieties can thus be perceived as a cultural manifest and a contribution to cultural transfer, e.g. street languages, language varieties, ethnolects/dialects and finally exophonic literature (writing by non-native speakers), obviously they are a natural way to express identity, because both language and identity are about choices:

Language-as-identity also intersects well with the nature of subjectivity in today's world. Identity in the post-modern era has been found to be multiple, dynamic, and conflictual, based not on a permanent sense of self but rather the choices that individuals make in different circumstances over time. Language, though deeply rooted in personal and social history, allows a greater flexibility than race and ethnicity, with a person able to consciously or unconsciously express dual identities by the linguistic choices they make even in a single sentence (e.g., through code-switching (...)). Through choices of language and dialect, people constantly make and remake who they are. A Yugoslav becomes a Croatian, a Soviet becomes a Lithuanian, and an American emphasizes his African linguistic and cultural heritage. (Warschauer/De Florio-Hansen 2003:4)

Biography writing, allows analyzing ‘patchwork identities’ (Bodrožić 2008) and exploring a ‘more-than-one-world-feeling’ (Bodrožić 2008) or understanding a ‘polyphonic person’ (Kristeva 2007:7). The following poem shows the integrity in diversity where the other is a constitutive and indispensable part of the self, for as Kristeva underlines: “Foreignness is affixed to our original identity, like a more or less permanent second skin” (Kristeva 2007:8).

*English is a foreign anguish
I am not African. Africa is in me, but I cannot return.
I am not Taina. Taino is in me, but there is no way back.
I am not European. Europe lives in me, but I have no home there.
I am new. History made me.
My first language was Spanglish.
I was born at the crossroads and I am whole.*

Aurora Levin Morales, “Californian-Puertorican-Jewess poetess” (Morales cited by Beck-Gernsheim 2007:114-115)

EXAMPLES OF KEYWORDS THAT DO NOT FIT THE MIGRATION CONTEXT	EXPLANATION AND ASSOCIATIONS
Rootlessness Heimatlosigkeit Stateless	Territory of the nation/ place of birth determines homeland, the notion implies confinement to a place. The place becomes automatically a main part of culture/ identity and is thus a sort of oracle
Rootlessness/uprooting Entwurzlung	Implies, as above, a human being is compared with a plant that is able to live only in a particular area.
Alien/Foreigner/Ausländer	Place of birth again as oracle
Children of foreigners/children of guest workers Ausländerkinder, Gastarbeiterkinder	Labeling that can lead to stigmatization/ victimization, children are being negatively assessed
Illegal Immigrants Illegale Immigranten	Legal/ illegal – implies right to stay in a land/ territory. Here again there is national thinking along with assessment. A question arises: Can a human being be illegal?

TO ESCAPE IDEOLOGIES OR TO ACCEPT THEIR PROLIFERATION

Habitats (Lebenswelten) are constructed and negotiated through language in the process of communication (Bolten 2011:41). Assuming that our life, along with the environment we live in is made out of numerous, small ideologies that try to anchor us in one or another construct and make us immune to any oncoming change, it seems impossible to escape ideologies - meaning structures, projects, ‘-isms’ and so forth. However modernity aims at diversity, so the question is: how to cope with relativism on the one hand and fundamentalism on the other (see: Berger and Zijdeveld 2010:22-36). There is nothing for it but to make choices and continuously verify and rethink the hitherto reality along with its decisions and opinions, as well as the language used. Probably, instead of thinking about escaping ideologies or choices it is better to accept them in order to learn how to cope with them and not to allow one ideology to dominate. Maybe it is worth accepting that given notions are notions we get used to so much that we probably abuse them (using them so automatically that we do not really reflect on their meanings and the messages they transmit). The notions used on a daily basis in both routine communication and public debates need updating and constant refreshment. All in all they were developed some time ago and thus may have altered, like a river that flows and changes but is still called a river, or like people, who are identified by names their whole lives through but obviously are not the same (cf. Chomsky²).

²

All the citations or references are taken from the movie directed by Michael Gondry: *Is a man who is tall happy?*

The ability to use stable names for constantly changing things enables people to develop the capacity of continuous and abstract thinking. Chomsky calls this phenomenon ‘psychic continuity’.

“PSYCHIC CONTINUITY”, MEMORY AND CHANGE

Having developed a skill called ‘psychic continuity’, people are able to continue thinking about something they learned about in a particular, to a certain extent, constant way. Maybe it is psychic continuity along with memory that is responsible for the pictures, stereotypes, preconceived notions people collect in their minds, shaping and developing their capacity of perception. However, this skill can also be disturbing, particularly when one is not conscious of how it works. The role of psychic continuity is a matter of speculation and discussion. Perhaps psychic continuity links and mediates between memory and change, which seem to be in opposition. Using one’s capacity for psychic continuity, one has to remember that it is all about trying to depict changes and motion. That is why deconstructing and rethinking become crucial and indispensable in the process of verification of thinking structures.

HOW TO COMMUNICATE AND HOW TALK ABOUT HISTORY – INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE AS A SOLUTION

The world’s history is a mosaic of diverse stories, those told, colorful and well visible, and those untold, forgotten or made taboo, which are the missing parts, but also those overemphasized, covering others and dominating the vision. Every human being is a part of

the mosaic, and that is why it is so important to connect and keep balance among people, among their stories. This balanced interplay is only possible when the participants listen and respect one another, letting other voices be heard, even if unpleasant or disturbing. Here is where communication starts, or rather the exchange of ideas, sharing opinions and rethinking own views.

Communication is first of all associated with language, therefore, if language is constitutive for communication, then it has to be understood in a far wider sense than only a purely linguistic one. It helps structuring, categorizing and ordering, very often it determines the way people understand and perceive the world.

THINKING WITHIN LANGUAGE

In a purely linguistic sense, thinking within language includes only words, phrases and written or oral texts. It embraces only one out of the many ways of 'the so-called externalizations of thoughts' which may happen (see Chomsky). Chomsky points out that the fundamental function of language is merely the externalization of thoughts in spoken or written form. Whereas the importance of other ways, like for example touch, body language, visual signs, and so on, is frequently underestimated, especially in relation to language. Bearing this in mind, we should be suspicious about language and its dominant tendency, as it may also contribute to the formation of illusions, myths, imaginary constructs, or even stable structures that hinder active participation in society. Language, as already mentioned, can be a natural and positive ability or tool, an identity marker and ambassador of diversity. However, it can also be an indicator of oppressive structures and a tool for maintaining them, used to manipulate people, distort and hide reality. Examples can be found in history, political systems, political debates or any other structures. Actually, it is not a problem to blame language for being a destructive tool. It is easier than blaming perceptive abilities and thinking structures that sometimes rely too heavily on language, and its use without verification or even a 'quick check'.

MAKING HISTORY AND TALKING ABOUT HISTORY

The way one thinks and talks about the past strongly shapes one's ability to perceive the present. It is also here (in talking about the past and about experiences in particular) where people start using certain notions, very often forgetting what aspects they exclude or include, and why. The context is gone, whereas preconceived notions remain, and literally there is nothing other than a concrete wall built in human minds, narrowing down their horizons and their capacity to understand. If one continues without any reflection in this manner, and with time even add a few more conceptual 'bricks'

(notions used automatically, very often so called empty signifiers, meaning everything and nothing), then, after a while one cannot see the world, but rather a wall, or whatever has been constructed. That is why it is so important to be aware of the language one is exposed to. There is nothing wrong with categorizing or structuring the reality one lives in – as long as it is a way to understand and not a means to judge and build ideologies upon. It seems that a good way to avoid the limiting influence of the categories one creates and lives in is to learn to verify, to question oneself and one's world, to learn to play with the 'bricks'.

REMEMBERING THE CHANGE OF PERSPECTIVE

So how are we to talk about history without being one sided or subjective? The only way is to accept the impossibility of being objective and have the awareness that other perspectives are necessary, as they are a part of history as well. We have to be subjective without pretending to be objective. We should not try to represent all members of the nation, but rather listen to even the smallest group, to minorities, in order to maintain a balance between imposing and listening, speaking and listening. The more voices we hear, the stronger the awareness and possibilities for dialogue.

Talking about history is still talking about how one understands it, and it is always about one perspective, either victim or perpetrator or observer. Making history requires a perspective change, from victim to perpetrator, observer to perpetrator, and so on.

In the course of the program and numerous discussions, it was possible to analyze specific cases in which language also played a significant role. Some of them were obvious, others more sophisticated.

LESSONS LEARNED

Here are some cases that clearly show how exchange programs like EPRIE foster intercultural competence: Merely having an international group of people from different backgrounds, different nationalities, from East Asia and Europe is in itself a perfect environment for developing intercultural competence. First, participants go through sensitization training, thanks to which they learn to be culturally aware. Then they work together and set themselves common goals to achieve. They learn how to be specific and exact and continuously explain their intentions. They communicate on an equal level and learn to respect each other without relying on traditionally created hierarchical structures. They spend time not only discussing and working, but also eating and travelling together. They manage differences and otherness and learn to treat them as an enrichment, and not as hindering factors. Finally, they make friends and build

networks for future cooperation, which is best practice for those working in international affairs and diplomacy.

Participants get a lot of input from the many dedicated visits, thought-provoking discussion sessions, lectures and workshops, as well as guided tours, and above all the encounters. They have an opportunity to evaluate each part and discuss seemingly obvious issues. Through guided tours, participants can focus on city planning and think about the elements of the collective memory of history that were articulated, visible in commemorative plaques, in street names and so on. They can ask what is the task of management of history and collective memory. Is it about maintaining a single homogenous narrative, or about voicing different perspectives? Is it about shaping national thinking patterns and politics, to support one ideology, or is it about allowing multiple narratives, many stories to show the complexity and different colors of reality, to show that objectivity is a never-ending story, needs constant change, verification, allowing different voices, opinions and perspectives?

Visiting a national museum is a lesson on how nation states try to depict history and strengthen collective memory. Analyzing museums along with their guides is a perfect way to show how the collective memory is formed and how the narratives presented in respective museums shape the perception and understanding of the past. Very often they lack multiple narratives and are made to show a softened or very nationalistic vision of history. They are one sided and show an exclusively mono-cultural view. Museums show mostly 'outcomes', but not the context of the conflict. So it is a good way to rethink the role of museums. Is it presenting a 'common' perspective? Is it trying to indoctrinate? Is it to convince? Or maybe it is about enabling understanding, and hence not only about outcomes but also about the mechanisms and processes that led to such outcomes, e.g. explaining in an interactive way what ideology and propaganda are; showing how one can easily fall victim to power relations, and finally how easy it is to become a victim and at the same time a perpetrator. It can show how important it is to keep in mind that even a victim's perspective can be very paralyzing and may easily be an excuse to legitimize unfair treatment or revenge.

Taking a closer look at the working style of city guides enables participants to recognize particular speaking and guiding cultures, along with specific language, and realize how often talking about history is linked to stereotypes, myths and national state programs.

LANGUAGE SENSITIZATION

A good and very obvious example is talking about thorny issues, e.g. the Second World War. Routine talks are usually full of

generalizations and simplifications, using words that no longer refer to the same designates. Poland a hundred years ago was different from its current state, and so on. And precisely because those words are still used in current speech, it is necessary to add specifications that can explain the speakers' intentions and also facilitate understanding among interlocutors. If it is about Germany from the times of WWII, it is enough to add a small indication, a kind of sign that makes you think, Oh, Germany in the past was different? In what sense? It is not only a way to avoid responsibility or being politically correct, it is about setting the discussion and interlocutors within a specific context. How, what, when, who, in what system and so on. Even a prefix can sometimes be good enough to provoke thinking, to search for details, to engage more consciously and to go deeper into the complex structure of the particular historical context. A good example may be prefixes such as 'Nazi' added to Germany or 'Communist' to Poland. Sometimes, instead of prefixes referring to ideologies or political systems, it is worth adding the ruler of the country or something similar. It is all a question of a willingness to be precise.

EXCLUSION VS INCLUSION

Now let's think about how powerful personal pronouns are. Starting an utterance with 'I' is about trying to express personal, individual and subjective feelings. Formulating speech using 'I' one can conclude that the speaker takes responsibility for their words. Using 'you' 'he' 'she' 'they' is about assessing the other, it is about attributing positive or negative features, it is about categorizing and labeling, also about generalization and misunderstanding. 'We' is inclusive in the sense that it includes the group members the speaker belongs to. However, it is also exclusive as it excludes non-group members. This is also the case for national structures and the concept of nation. Each nation per se is exclusive as it imagines itself as a community of certain members that share a common understanding, culture, or heritage and traditions. They are connected by birth place, the language they use, and many other characteristics that belong to the concept of nation.

Language manipulation is omnipresent, starting with small, daily talks and finishing with political debates. When there are reasons to be proud, 'we' and 'I' are used, but as soon as there are complicated situations that nobody wants to feel responsible for, impersonal sentences are formed or the passive voice is used, so as to avoid naming the subject and agents involved. Also comparison is used to deprecate or add more value, for instance, 'we ... but they'. This is visible and contributes strongly to the construction of stereotypes. This can be observed in how our images about others are constructed. They consist of preconceived notions and generalizations

and simplifications. They often rely on single experiences and are based on misunderstandings.

CONCLUSION

To make intercultural communication possible, there is a need for constant verification and a paradigm shift. The shift is closely related to changes of attitudes and perception of numerous issues such as, for example, perceiving culture, identity and ethnicity. It also means a completely new approach to given structures and phenomena that should be updated and redefined on a regular basis. The paradigm shift does not mean a complete denial of what has been categorized, defined or even achieved so far, it means rather rethinking. The only problem that goes along with these indispensable changes is the fact that they depend on the awareness and consciousness of each human being. The very basic condition to allow and understand the need of paradigm shift is bound to the development of intercultural competence. Intercultural competence, as Bolten claims, is, among others, the readiness to change ways of thinking, to tolerate uncertainty and ambiguity, to be open and flexible, as well as to have a good command of empathy. Besides, as Bolten underlines, intercultural competence is a set of competencies that complement

each other, e.g. sharing frank opinions and being open to criticism, and so on. To sum up, it is a transition from cultural unawareness to cultural awareness (Bolten 2012:166-168). One can develop intercultural competence through interaction and encounters, so the more exchanges and opportunities for discussion, the more brainstorming, interplay and openness, the easier communication, integration and cooperation become.



Katarzyna ZIELONY is a PhD student at the Department of Intercultural Communication, Institute of Applied Linguistics, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland. Currently she is living in Lens, France, where she works at the Polish Institute. She also teaches Polish at the Artois University in Arras and carries out her research on Intercultural Communication. She participated in EPRIE 2014.

REFERENCES:

- Beck, U. (2007) *Understanding the Real Europe: A Cosmopolitan Vision*. In: *Diversity and Culture, Collection Penser l'Europe*, Paris: CULTURESFRANCE, 22-53.
- Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2007) *Wir und die Anderen*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Berger, P./Zijderveld, A. (2009) *Pochwała wątpliwości. Jak mieć przekonania i nie stać się fanatykiem*. Kraków: Vis-à-vis-Etiuda.
- Breidenbach, J./Zukrigl, I. (2000) *Tanz der Kulturen. Kulturelle Identität in einer globalisierten Welt*. Reinbek: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Bodrožić, M. (2008) *Die Sprachländer des Dazwischen*. In: Pörksen, U./Busch, B. (ed.) (2008): *Eingezogen in die Sprache, angekommen in der Literatur*. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 67-75.
- Bolten, J. (2011) *Interkulturelle Kompetenz*. Erfurt: LZT.
- Movie: *Is the Man Who Is Tall Happy? An Animated Conversation with Noam Chomsky* (2013) directed by Michel Gondry.
- Capurro, R. (2007) *Intercultural Information Ethics*. In: Capurro, R./Frühbauer, J./Hausmanninger, T. (Eds.): *Localizing the Internet. Ethical Aspects in Intercultural Perspective*. ICIE Series Vol. 4, Munich: Fink 2007, 21-38.
- Celan, P./Joris, P. (ed.) (2005) *Selections*. Berkley: University of California Press.
- Haas, H. (2009) *Das interkulturelle Paradigma*. Schriften der Forschungsstelle Grundlagen Kulturwissenschaft. Band 2. Verlag Karl Stutz.
- Hansen, K. P. (2000) *Kultur und Kulturwissenschaft. Eine Einführung*. Tübingen und Basel: A. Francke Verlag.
- Kaikkonen, P. (2005) *Multilingual and multicultural identity – a challenge even for language teaching*. In: Smeds, J./Kohonen, V. (2005) *Multicultural communities, multilingual practice: Festschrift für Annikki Koskensalo zum 60. Geburtstag = Monikulttuuriset yhteisöt, monikielinen käytäntö*. Turku: University of Turku Publishing, 89-100.
- Kristeva, J. (2007) "My motto is diversity". In: *Diversity and Culture, Collection Penser l'Europe*, Paris: CULTURESFRANCE, 6-23.
- Kuiken, F. (2009) *Multilingual Amsterdam*. In: Nell, L./Rath, J. (Edt.): *Ethnic Amsterdam. Immigrants and Urban Change in the Twentieth Century*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 123-144.
- Lakoff, G./Johnson, M. (1988) *Metafory w naszym życiu*. Warszawa: PIW.
- Müller-Funk, W. (2005) *Niemand zu Hause. Essays zu Kultur, Globalisierung und neuer Ökonomie*. Wien: Czernin Verlag.
- Nicklas, H./Mueller, B./Kordes, H. (ed.) (2006) *Interkulturell denken und handeln*. Bonn: BpB.
- Warschauer, M./De Florio-Hansen, I. (2003) *Multilingualism, identity, and the Internet*. In: A. Hu/I. De Florio-Hansen (Eds), *Multiple identity and multilingualism*. Tübingen: Stauffenburg, (155-179).
- Wolf, A. ed. (1997) *Neue Grenzen. Rassismus am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Wien: Sonderzahl Verlag, 99-124.

GLORIA VICTIS¹. HOW POLES SHAPE THEIR COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND WHY IT CAN BE COMPARED TO THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE OF WAR AND OCCUPATION IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Joanna URBANEK & Romain SU

Korea and Poland are two of the most distant countries in the world – you need a minimum 17 hours to reach Seoul from Warsaw. There is no direct flight to travel the distance of 7751 km. It is thus very surprising how the cultures of memory in these countries resemble one another.

Both of them faced war and occupation in the 20th century (Korea by Japan and Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union). While Korea used to be colonised by China and Japan, in the 18th century Poland experienced partitions between Russia, Prussia and Austro-Hungary, and lacked independence for 123 years (1795-1918). Some intellectuals interpret this as an era that shaped the Polish postcolonial complex (eg. Cavengah, 2003).

The states, with their public institutions and NGOs in both countries, not only recall the memory of historical events, but also relate to selected themes which have a major impact on the public discussion and on how citizens perceive their national history. Due to their difficult history, Korea and Poland have developed similar strategies of (hi)storytelling which underline the meaning of suffering, damage perpetrated by occupiers, and victimhood. This culture of memory goes far beyond historical disputes – it affects the present, being used in political discourse, and it is an important factor in creating national identity.

It is important to underline that both in Korea and Poland the narrative of being victimized over the course of 19th and 20th century history is one of the key elements of the self-identification of the nation. An example of this discourse is the idea of Poland as the Christ of Europe, a messianic doctrine developed and promoted in

the 1820s by Adam Mickiewicz, one of the most significant Polish poets. Mickiewicz argued that the fate of the Polish nation was to be crucified, metaphorically speaking, by neighbouring countries and give thanks for God's intervention. The idea of the suffering nation, without a deeply mystical context, has been present constantly in the Polish culture and has led to greater attention being paid to defeats than victories. As far as the Korean context is concerned, scholars (eg. Boo-wong, 1988) argue that the years of Chinese domination and 36-year Japanese occupation contributed to the development of the phenomenon of Han (한) in the Korean culture. Han is often described as a collective feeling of pain, sorrow and bitterness, isolation and constant oppression due to the pressure and past invasions by the foreign powers. It is also important that both the Polish idea of suffering and Korean Han paradoxically result in active attitudes towards the oppressive situation – by the glorification of military and civil resistance against invaders on the one hand and hard work by the whole nation to make up for lost time on the other.

The consequence of such an interpretation of the past is what can be named the paradigm of the single victim: In its practices of memory, any impulses to recall examples of being not a victim, but rather a perpetrator or bystander, meet with vigorous protests. An example of such a way of thinking could be seen during vivid discussions about two books: "So far from a Bamboo Grove" by Yoko Kawashima Watkins (first edition in 1986) in Korea and "Neighbours" by Jan Tomasz Gross (Polish edition in 2000) in Poland.

"So Far from the Bamboo Grove" is a semi-autobiographical novel. It takes place in the last days of World War II. An eleven-year-old Japanese girl, daughter of a Japanese officer in occupied Korea, must leave her home with her family to escape south to Seoul, then to Pusan to return to Japan. For a long time, the book was on the state's recommended reading list for the sixth-grade English curriculum in the USA. Scandal struck in 2006 when the Korean community in America pointed out that the story by Watkins focused on the

1

Expression coined by Polish novelist Eliza Orzeszkowa from Latin *vae victis* ("woe to the conquered") in her apologia for defeated Polish insurgents against Russian domination in 1863.

suffering of Japanese occupiers and neglected the truth about the years of exploitation of the Korean territory. A Korean version of the book, entitled *Yoko Story*, was published in 2005, however banned soon after. Following protests, also from the Korean authorities, more and more schools in the USA decided to remove it from the reading list.

A study “Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland” was published in 2000 by a Polish-born American sociologist, Jan Tomasz Gross, who examined the massacre of Jews in 1941 in Jedwabne, a village in German-occupied Poland, perpetrated by their Polish neighbours. Gross’s statement that Poles were not only victims, but in some cases also actively took part in wartime killing, generated many protests in Poland. Even though the official investigation of a state institution, the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (2000–2003), confirmed that the massacre was carried out by Polish hands, some milieus accused Gross of black propaganda against the Polish nation. One argument often raised was that by shedding light on difficult Polish-Jewish relations during WWII, he intended to place Poles in the same light as the German Nazis. The examples of “So Far from the Bamboo Grove” and “Neighbors” depict how difficult it may be to accept more complex views of troubling events during war and occupation in the societies who developed strong narrations about their victimhood in that time. One of the major issues in the debate about the collective memory of war, occupation and colonial past is the question of apology as an important factor of reconciliation. It is important to point out that in Poland discussion about apology from Germany has never reached the same level of importance as in Korea, which considers Japan’s dealing with the past as far from unequivocal: one example is visits by prominent Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine. Such a visit by Prime Minister Abe in December 2013 was seen by Korea as a white-washing of war crimes.

As Lily Gardner Feldman put it during the EPRIE 2014 program, in Polish-German relations the chief method for (...) acceptance of the past did not always involve formal apologies sanctioned by cabinets or parliaments in advance, but rather were often statements of regret either by individual leaders or in treaties or agreements. This path was, thus, long and complicated. During the first decades after the war, the Federal Republic of Germany went to the effort of reconstructing its economy, yet many officials, even those with a troublesome Nazi past, did not face justice. When the generation of 1968 grew up, the question of responsibility for war crimes became more prominent in the public debate. Yet in 1969, only 34% of Germans from the FRG recognised the need for reconciliation with Poland (Wolff-Powęska, 2011).

The idea of the renewal of relations between Poles and Germans was taken on by religious leaders in Poland. “The Pastoral Letter of the Polish Bishops to their German Brothers” was sent on 18 November 1965 by Polish bishops of the Roman Catholic Church to their German counterparts. They declared: We forgive and ask for forgiveness. The letter drew a strong reaction from the Communist authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland, who unleashed anti-German and anti-Catholic hysteria. Indeed, for the Communists in power, anti-German feelings were an instrument which helped them consolidate their legitimacy in the Polish society. Meanwhile, 41 German bishops warmly answered the Polish letter on December 5th, 1965, but without declarations about the most difficult issues in Polish-German relations in that time, like the post-war borders of Poland, not recognised by the FRG.

The next important step in the reconciliation process took place during the historic visit of Chancellor Willy Brandt to Poland in 1970. At that time, he paid tribute to Polish national heroes (and among them the victims of WWII) by putting flowers on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw – the most important monument of national remembrance. Then he did something more surprising. While visiting the grounds of a former Jewish ghetto organized in Warsaw by the Germans in 1940–1943, he knelt by the Monument to the Ghetto Heroes. Later, he explained his gesture: Under the weight of recent history, I did what people do when words fail them. In this way I commemorated millions of murdered people.

This act of humility is one of the unfulfilled claims of Korea, in particular with regard to the issue of comfort women. As one of them, 84-year-old Park Ok-seon said: We’re all very old. We’re dying each year, one by one. Historically speaking the war might have stopped, but for us it’s still going on, it never ended. We want the Japanese Emperor to come here, kneel before us and apologise sincerely. [But] I think the Japanese are just waiting for us to die.

An important step in the reconciliation process is to provide compensation for war damages and victims. Both in Poland and Korea, this issue was complicated by the fact these countries were not fully sovereign at the end of the war and often had to accept solutions negotiated above their heads by occupying powers – the Soviet Union and the United States. This delayed the search for a settlement until 1953 in Poland and 1965 in South Korea. Yet these agreements are until today still a subject of controversy, periodically re-opened by media and public opinion in both countries.

In contrast to previous conflicts, the growing importance paid to human rights after World War II opened the way for private claims from individual victims of occupational regimes.

This further complicates the issue of compensation and responsibility. For instance, after Korean demands, Japan set up a fund fuelled by private donors in order to pay damages to ex-comfort women, however Korea deemed this gesture insufficient as it did not involve recognition of state responsibility.

In Poland, the first attempts to tackle the problem came from the civil society, especially from Catholic and Evangelical clergymen. At the state level, an agreement passed in 1973 made the FRG transfer a lump sum of 100 million marks for the victims of pseudo-medical experiments conducted during the Nazi occupation, however no comprehensive settlement could be found.

At the end of the Cold War, new compromises were reached: In 1992, the Foundation for Polish-German Reconciliation was established as a result of the Polish-German agreement in order to ensure efficient humanitarian aid to Polish victims of the Nazi-occupation. Yet, that did not mean that the German state took official responsibility. In the late 90s, German industry faced a great number of lawsuits from former WWII forced labourers. The companies decided to start negotiations with the German government to establish a system of compensation: It gave birth in 2000 to the foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future”. Its aims – reconciliation and education – resembled those declared by the Japanese “Asian Women’s Fund” (existing between 1994 and 2007) created for ex-comfort women, but with a broader range of activities.

The “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” Foundation’s capital of DEM 10.1 billion (EUR 5.2 billion) was provided in equal amounts by 6,500 German companies to the German Industry Foundation Initiative and the German Federal Government. As far as the Korean example is concerned, most compensation provided by the “Asian Women’s Fund” came from private donations, deemed “charity funds” by the Koreans since they were expecting proper “state compensation”. Consequently, only a small number of Korean ex-comfort women accepted the money, and most of them boycotted the initiative.

Beyond actions undertaken by states or private organisations, a question remains as to dominant views on the past in societies. In Poland, one of the manifestations of this divergence appeared two years ago when German television broadcast the mini-series *Unsere Mütter, unsere Väter*. The story turned out to be a great success among German viewers who were shown a morally comforting version of their grandfathers’ behaviour on the Eastern Front during WWII, meaning occupied Poland. Historians on the both sides of the Oder stressed the factual errors contained in the plot, but for many Polish commentators, even more outrageous was the stereotypical way

in which Poles and the Polish resistance movement were depicted. Interestingly enough, the persistence of associations in Poland between Germany and the Second World War doesn’t prevent the improvement of mutual perceptions between these neighbours. The Polish Institute of Public Affairs and German Konrad Adenauer Stiftung regularly carry out public opinion surveys on the matter and come to the conclusion that year after year, the sympathy of Poles for Germans rises while the number of Polish respondents declaring anti-German feelings falls. However, the top-of-the-mind associations cited by most Polish participants towards their Western neighbours are those connected to WWII and occupation (Łada, 2013). This tends to show that a difficult past, still vivid in people’s memory, can exist side by side with present positive relations.

The same cannot be said of Japan and South Korea, whose relations remain poisoned by historical disputes and territorial conflicts. These points are at the top of the list of reasons why Japanese and South Koreans have a negative opinion about each other. It is interesting that the past status of invader or invaded country plays no role in the results of the survey, as historical issues are mentioned in the same proportion (74% of respondents) in Japan and South Korea (The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, 2015).

One can also see that the next reason for negative impressions given by those interviewed is the “bad will expressed by the politicians” of the other country regarding their own country. This can lead us to the conclusion that while political leadership is not a sufficient condition for the success of the reconciliation process, it is nonetheless a necessary ingredient of it.



Joanna URBANEK, historian, is a PhD candidate at the University of Warsaw. She participated in EPRIE 2013 and took part in the alumni meeting 2015.



*SU Romain is editor-in-chief of the *Courrier de Pologne* (www.courrierpologne.fr), a French language magazine dedicated to Poland. He participated in EPRIE 2014.*

LITERATURE:

Boo-wong Y., *Korean Pentecostalism: Its History and Theology*, New York 1988.

Cavenagh C., *Postkolonialna Polska. Biała plama na mapie współczesnych teorii*, *Teksty Drugie* 2003, 2/3, p. 60-71.

The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, *The 3rd Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll (2015) Analysis Report on Comparative Data*, Web. 6 Nov. 2015 <http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/forum_1505_en.pdf>.

Gross, J. T., *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland*, Princeton 2001.

Łada, A., *Barometr Polska-Niemcy 2015, Polacy o polsko-niemieckim partnerstwie we wspólnej Europie*, Instytut Spraw Publicznych and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Web. 6 Nov. 2015 <<http://www.isp.org.pl/uploads/pdf/1627891449.pdf>>.

Ruchniewicz K., *Polskie zabiegi o odszkodowania niemieckie w latach 1944/45-1975*, Wrocław 2007.

Watkins Kawashima Y., *So Far from the Bamboo Grove*, New York 1986.

Wigura K., *Wina narodów. Przebaczenie jako strategia prowadzenia polityki*, Gdańsk-Warszawa 2011.

Williamson L., *Comfort women: South Korea's survivors of Japanese brothels*, *BBC News Magazine*, 29 May 2013. Web. 6 Nov. 2015 <<http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22680705>>.

Wolff-Powęska A., *Pamięć – brzemię i uwolnienie. Niemcy wobec nazistowskiej przeszłości (1945-2010)*, Ponań 2011.

NEGOTIATING IDENTITIES AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND VIETNAM: THE "VIETNAMESE COMFORT WOMEN" ISSUE

Peter KESSELBURG

When we discuss the issue of “comfort women” in the Korean-Japanese context of the post-WWII environment, the roles of perpetrator and perpetrated are clearly assigned and the form of protest and denial seems almost ritualized on both sides of the aisle. This discourse stretches almost so far that one could argue that the discourse itself is deeply ingrained into the post-war identities of the South Korean and Japanese states as a reason for mutual incompatibility in terms of acknowledging the guilt of the perpetrator and the shame of the perpetrated in a moral and societal way.

However, if we assume that those roles could be reversed or altered to the extent that the perpetrated nation also had to deal with a similar war crime committed by its own military forces in third-party country, how would this fact change the direction of the discourse between those two countries?

This essay aims at outlining the “comfort-women” issue between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of Korea in

the post-Vietnam-war environment and to shed light on the war crimes committed by the ROK army forces, in particular those of the Capital Mechanized Infantry Division nicknamed “Tiger” and the Second Marine Brigade nicknamed “Blue Dragon”. Its content will focus on the reasons for the ROK armed forces to join in the Vietnam War, the massacres and large-scale mass killings mainly in Quảng Ngãi and Quảng Nam provinces and on the enslavement of young Vietnamese girls and women for sexual purposes by ROK troops and their consequent offspring named “Lại Đại Hàn” by the Vietnamese rural and urban communities. The existence of bi-racial children (South Korean father/Vietnamese mother) also poses some problems within the construction of their own identities in a familial context since the personal identities in Vietnam are more tied to the social standing of an individual in the context of the greater extended family as a basal social structure.

During the Second Indochina War, which lasted from 1955 to 1975, the U.S. Army asked allies in East Asia and Oceania to join in the

war as supplementary battalions in order to actively engage with already established or establishing Communist interest groups all across Southeast Asia. It is safe to say that the war functioned as a proxy war between the Capitalist Bloc led by the United States of America and the Communist Bloc led by the Soviet Union. Vietnam itself was divided into two differently constituted states in the north and south, which mirrored similar governmental partitions in communist and capitalist states like the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on German soil and the DPRK and ROK on the Korean peninsula alongside the 38th parallel since the armistice of 1953. Each of those states vehemently opposed the recognition of its communist or socialist counterpart under the pretext of adhering to the concept of a united and indivisible statehood which should define the national character. The same point of view was applicable to the relationship between the capitalist Republic of Vietnam (Việt Nam Cộng Hòa), represented by Ngô Đình Diệm, and the socialist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa), which was headed by chairman Hồ Chí Minh until his passing in 1969 and the forces of the Việt Minh, better known as Việt Cộng in Western historiography.

But why did the ROK military engage in the Vietnam War in the first place? Glenn Baek provides some insight into this matter, citing the fact that the U.S. deemed South Korea unworthy for further aid because of being “(1) a poor country with few resources and skills; (2) saddled with maintaining a bloated military of 600,000 men; (3) endemically corrupt and (4) an ally that took slight at perceived U.S. failure to accord it full equality” (Baek 2013: 149). This depiction of South Korean internal politics proved to be highly problematic for the Park Administration from 1961 because the threat of losing foreign assistance could result in civil unrest, greater economical problems and finally in ousting the administration itself.

Either way, Park Chung-Hee had to find a suitable decision and travelled to Washington in order to propose military assistance for fighting the communist regimes in Southeast Asia, especially against the well-trained Việt Minh guerilla forces in Northern Vietnam. He marketed his nation as “a firm anti-communist nation” and having millions of troops trained in that kind of warfare. He added that taking military assistance from his government would prove the “unity of action among the nations of the Free World” (Baek 2013: 150). However, the prospect of acceptance of his proposal was more than bleak, and the Lyndon B. Johnson Administration started to actively diminish its aid to South Korea. This resulted in “back-door diplomacy” between the Park Administration and the South Vietnamese Ngô Administration in order to form a strong coalition among the two capitalist nations on military terms. In May 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson had to acknowledge the fact that his army needed

military assistance coming from the “Free World” in order to gain traction on the ground due to the unfolding Vietnamese civil war.

A total of 312,853 ROK soldiers were deployed by the Park administration to Southern Vietnam starting from September 22, 1964 and subsequently during the period 1965 to 1972 (Kwon 2006, p. 43) in order to support the U.S. American and South Vietnamese armed forces in their fight against Northern Vietnam. In 1965, the Capital Infantry Division (“Tiger”) and the Second Marine Brigade (“Blue Dragon”) were dispatched to Southern Vietnam (Baek 2013: 154). Like their American counterparts, these brigades were heavily involved in the mass killings of civilians, mainly in Quang Ngai and Quang Nam provinces, in the thirteen large-scale killings and massacres in Ha My and My Lai, and incidents in Thuy Bo, Phong Nhat, and Phong Nhi of Quang Nam; Vinh Hoa of Quang Ngai; five villages in the Ba Dinh province; and many more (Kwon 2006: 30–31). A lot of those massacres took place during the Lunar year of the Monkey in 1968.

In 2000, Kim Ki-Tae (김기태), retired former commander of the Seventh Company, Second Battalion of the Second Marine Brigade (“Blue Dragon”) gave an interview to the left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun in which he openly talked about the war crimes he and his fellow troops had committed during their deployment in Vietnam. He recounted the killing of twenty-nine unarmed Vietnamese youth in Quảng Ngãi province he oversaw as a 39 year old lieutenant on November 14, 1966 (Armstrong 2001: 529). After being caught by ROK soldiers, the Việt Cộng youth were tied together with a strong rope and the commander and his fellow troops discussed their options to deal with their prisoners of war. According to military protocol, they should have been handed over to the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) for further investigation.

However, Kim and his troops feared that their prisoners could escape, regroup and cause more trouble to his battalion in the future. Consequently, they found a bomb crater left by an American F4 aircraft, and the fate of the POWs was decided on the spot: They were dragged to the crater and thrown into the hole. The ROK soldiers took all the grenades out of their pockets, unlocked and threw them into the crater, waiting for the subsequent explosion. Whoever was still alive or audibly breathing within earshot, got shot by rifles and other weaponry in order to silence potential witnesses of the “Operation Dragon Eye” carried out by the First, Second and Third Battalions of the Second Marine Brigade to wipe out Việt Cộng guerilla fighters in Central Vietnam (Armstrong 2001: 529–530). His testimony would only pave the way for more South Korean veterans actively speaking about their time in the Vietnam War and the brutalities committed against the Vietnamese people.

Which effects did those mass killings have on the Vietnamese people in general? In traditional Vietnamese mourning customs, the “death at home” (chết nhà) is always preferable to the “death on the streets” (chết đường) because it denotes a closeness to the family and the ancestors revered at home. The “death on the streets” implies a violent and sudden death in a distant place, far away from home – where one could die peacefully surrounded and taken care of by his/her next of kin. Passing away at home also entitles the bereaved to add the deceased to the ancestral shrine, to commemorate him or her according to the mourning customs, and to know that the soul doesn’t have to wander around eternally without any place to call home. Someone who is taken away from this world by brutality and sudden violence on the fields or abroad is condemned to an afterlife as a wandering, restless soul who has no means to be reconnected to his or her ancestral shrine or living place. Even in ancient and recent times, Confucian scholars like the 18th century eminent Nguyễn Du composed verses like “Calling all wandering souls” (Văn Tế Thập Loại Chúng Sinh) to commemorate the misery of those having to die abroad. The shortened version here is used for mourning rituals in northern Quảng Nam region (Kwon 2008: 86-88):

“Those who died while working away from home,
Those who perished in distant battlefields,
Your family knows not where you are, what you do,
We call upon you to come to us.
You are wandering in the dark.
You are frightened by the cry of a rooster.
We call upon you to come and receive our offering”

It is important to take into account that the Vietnamese language differentiates between an inclusive We (chung ta) and an exclusive We (chung tôi) for determining the degree of closeness or distance between two or more people. People who had to “die on the streets” are treated in a less inclusive manner by society because their whereabouts are often unknown, and they seem to be cursed for eternity.

If we take now the massacre committed by lieutenant Kim Ki-Tae and his fellow battalion members, it becomes apparent that they conducted the most vile and heinous crime against the Vietnamese youth because their souls weren’t unable to return home and were confined until present day to his bomb crater from where their ghosts have to wander, calling to their relatives for relief. I personally think that this circumstance has to be taken seriously by Koreans when they travel to Vietnam for business or just for leisure activities, because the traditional culture remains quite strong and lively despite economical modernizations in the Đổi Mới period and cultural influences from advanced globalization.



ROK soldiers were known to be extremely cold-blooded and efficient in liquidating enemy combatants and local villagers. The ROK 2nd Marine Brigade, nicknamed “Blue Dragons”, earned the following war slogan “xé xác Rồng Xanh, phanh thây Mãnh Hổ” (Tear the dead body of the Blue Dragon [and] rip open the Tiger’s corpse” (Kwon 2006, p. 47) among Vietnamese Việt Minh guerilla fighters because of their involvement in the massacres of Phong Nhi and Phong Nhat and the degree of the atrocities they committed. Given that the ROK troops exhibited a very high degree of brutality against their adversaries on the ground, one could legitimately ask for the reasons for such an inclination towards atrocities and bloody savaging of enemies.

The South Korean soldiers were often mentally scarred by their experiences during the Korean War, which saw a lot of Korean casualties during U.S. bombing raids on Korean soil. Chinese and North Korean platoons actively committed war crimes against Korean civilians, mostly women, children and the elderly population, as these were easy targets. The ROK soldiers involved in the cruelties in Vietnam were boys themselves during the Korean War. Additionally, they were taught in school that the lives of communists in general were less worthy than those of the “Free World”, so they could easily refer to the Việt Cộng guerilla fighters as some sort of subhuman species which must be efficiently terminated by all available means. The second approach to understand this kind of brutality lies in the experience of the commanding generals during the uprising movements in Manshû-koku (満州国) in the 1940s. One has to take into account that Park Chung-Hee himself was trained in the Imperial Japanese Military and that they actively proposed to the U.S. government the deployment of highly trained military personnel to Southeast Asia to fight scattered guerilla forces. Thirdly, the war environment was heavily influenced by difficult interstitial positions of Koreans in a war with such glaring racial divides. Some 20 years prior to that time, U.S. troops were fighting North Korean troops with boots on Korean soil and tended to use very racist language to



refer to their enemies. In their slang, Korean soldiers were “kooks”, a shortened nickname for the Korean term “Hangook” (한국) for “Korea”. In Vietnam, Korean troops had to fight alongside American troops, but the racist swearwords remained the same.

Yet in this case, “kook” referred to the Vietnamese guerilla warriors instead of the allied Korean troops, which must have sometimes caused confusion among the participating Korean soldiers (Armstrong 2001: 534–535). It is also very likely that the different skin color of the Vietnamese population and especially captured guerilla fighters played a key role in determining their fate on the Korean side. Considering that pale skin in Korea is deemed of higher social value than darker or copper-colored skin, the likelihood of condescending and commanding behavior by Korean soldiers towards guerilla fighters and Vietnamese women was not uncommon. This problem leads us to the second largest issue besides the war crimes and small and large-scale massacres conducted by the ROK troops on Vietnamese soil: sexual enslavement.

Within this war context, those ROK marine battalions set up “special comfort units” (특수위안대 t'uksu wiandae) (Di 2015) and forcibly recruited local Vietnamese women for sexual services. One woman recounted during interviews conducted by Japan president Yoon Mi-Hyang of the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery (KCWDMSS) that “[t]hey’d put one person at a time in the trench, keep [her] there all day and night and just rape [her] again and again” which resulted in a severe traumatic experience and caused those raped women to develop a deeply felt hate towards South Koreans until today (Koh, Yoon 2015). Given that the cultural context in Vietnam is very similar to that context in South Korea regarding the demand for purity and chastity among young Vietnamese women, experiencing any kind of sexual aggression could result in an unprecedented amount of guilt and shame towards their own townspeople or people living

in more rural areas within central and Southern Vietnam. A lot of those rapes resulted in pregnancies and the consequent birth of children called còn lại Đại Hàn which translates as “children of mixed blood with a South Korean”. Those children and mothers were often shunned by the local elders and village societies, as the Vietnamese-Korean writer Trần Đại Nhật describes in his short story “All the splinters of life” about his childhood as a còn lại Đại Hàn in a rural village in Southern Vietnam (Trần unknown). He describes his experience by reminiscing about the strange looks he received as a small boy in his village when he passed by a house or somewhere else where the adults gathered to discuss rural matters. Furthermore, he wasn’t perceived as being a “real Vietnamese” due to his heritage and his absent father who had returned to South Korea after the Vietnamese War.

Bearing in mind that the family itself and the connected branches on the maternal and paternal side form the key element of the Vietnamese societal structure, the absence of the father proved to be detrimental to their offspring because they were missing the correct paternal surname and the paternally centered family structure which refers to the relatives of the maternal side as “outside family”. The fathers often returned to South Korea without recognizing their offspring in Vietnam. When their children try to connect to their paternal family, they are often shunned as well (Yu 2013). For these children, now in their Forties and early Fifties, negotiating identities is still very relevant to them since they had to cope with the fact of being both the result of a forced rape and not of “pure” Vietnamese descent like their peers. This common behavioral pattern often leads to severe identity struggles due to the importance of belonging to a family and kinship structures which are very important in South Korea as in Vietnam. Newly formed interest groups of còn lại Đại Hàn have been established in order to bridge those gaps, make their voices and stories heard in both countries, and to have their suffering acknowledged (Web từ thiện Con Lai Đại Hàn 2015).

A similar development is now observed in the South Korean countryside since a lot of lower strata peasant men are now actively seeking “imported” Vietnamese wives to continue their bloodline and to avoid the increasingly better educated South Korean women as viable spouses. The Korean mothers-in-law tend to exhibit a rather harsh treatment of their Vietnamese daughters-in-law due to their lack of proper knowledge about Korean culture and cuisine and especially language. More often, they are scolded by their in-laws because of their copper-colored skin. In Korea, pale skin is the main reference point for female beauty. Their offspring consequently has to deal with these identity issues as well like the còn lại Đại Hàn, but on another level since they were legitimately born and recognized by their father into the paternal family bloodline.

One small step seems to be the inclusion of the sexually assaulted Vietnamese women into the Butterfly Fund founded by the KCW-DMSS in order to help them overcome their hardships financially and morally, even though these women have already reached their sixties and seventies and often live under rather poor conditions in small rural villages all across Southern and Central Vietnam.

More important would be to set up a bilateral dialogue between both states in order to assess the work that has already been done and which issues have to be tackled in the future. The government of Việt Nam is currently very interested in keeping South Korea as one of its key foreign investors in the future and will therefore keep an eye on the historical issues to be resolved in order to secure a smooth path of development.

South Korea instead has to bear its own war crimes in Việt Nam in mind when trying to negotiate with the Japanese about financial and moral compensation for the forced enslavement of the “Ianfu” (慰安婦) during World War II. It is vital to address this bilateral issue between South Korea and Vietnam in order to be able to resolve the same issue between South Korea and Japan.



Peter KESSELBURG holds an MA degree in Sinology, Islamic Sciences and Political Sciences from Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg im Breisgau. Since June 2013, he is pursuing his PhD in Sinology at the Institute for Sinology of the same university in the field of paradiplomatic relationships between southern Chinese, northern Vietnamese and northern Laotian county-level and province-level governments. He has received a post-graduate scholarship from the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation since August 2014. From April to early June 2015, he conducted fieldwork in Hà Nội and the northern provinces Lạng Sơn and Lào Cai in cooperation with the local FES office. He is an alumnus of EPRIE 2014.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Armstrong, Charles K. (2001): *America's Korea, Korea's Vietnam*. In *Critical Asian Studies* Vol. 33 (No. 4), pp. 527–539.

Baek, Glenn (2013): *Park Chung-Hee's Vietnam Odyssey. A Study in Management of the U.S.-R.O.K. Alliance*. In *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* Vol. 25 (No. 3), pp. 147–170.

Di, Lolita (2015): *The Scars of War: Vietnam Comfort Women – Nation of Change*. Available online at <http://www.nationofchange.org/2015/04/09/the-scars-of-war-vietnam-comfort-women/>, checked on 7/4/2015.

Koh, Kyoung-Tae; Yoon, Mi-Hyang (2015): *Vietnamese war victims speak of sexual violence by S. Korean troops for the first time*. Available online at http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/688435.html, checked on 7/4/2015.

Kwon, Heonik (2006): *After the massacre. Commemoration and consolation in Ha My and My Lai*. Berkeley: University of California Press (Asia--local studies/global themes, 14).

Yu, Dong-Kyun (2013): *History Repeats Itself (The Granite Tower)*. Available online at <http://www.thegranitetower.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=586>, checked on 7/4/2015.

Trần, Đại Nhật (unknown): *Những Mảnh Đời Luân Lạc*. Hanoi (Truyện Ngắn, 1). Available online at http://isach.info/story.php?story=nhung_manh_doi_luan_lac__tran_dai_nhat, checked on 7/4/2015.

Web từ thiện Con Lai Đại Hàn (2015): *Đôi lời tâm sự - Web từ thiện Con Lai Đại Hàn*. Available online at <http://laidaihan.net/vi/news/01/DOI-LOI-TAM-SU-17/>, updated on 7/3/2015, checked on 7/4/2015.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL FLOWS OF MONEY: IS THE NATION STATE A PERMANENT SYSTEM OR A TRANSITIONAL PHASE TO HART'S WORLD SOCIETY?

KATSUMATA Yu

Capitalism's historical mission is to bring cheap commodities to the masses and break down the insularity of traditional communities before replaced by a more just society...The task of building a global civil society for the twenty-first century, perhaps even a federal world government is an urgent one (Hart, 2009).

Keith Hart, a leading economic anthropologist of our time, advocates his vision of world society, which is distinct from the nation-state world order under which we currently live. Of course we have not yet seen the world society or the federal world government as a concrete political reality. While I am not completely sure whether this unprecedented world order is really feasible or not, some empirical data suggests that it is more and more difficult to sustain the nation-state system under the current globalized economy. In this essay, firstly, I will explain how the nation-state became the dominant world order. I would like to avoid the argument that globalization has simply eroded the nation-state, because often nation-states and capitalism work in tandem, not in opposition. Therefore, I explain how the nation-state and capitalism have functioned with each other from their inception. Then I argue the possible limits of nation states, in particular focusing on an analysis of the global flows of money.

Before going into our main discussion, let us briefly define some key terms. While often interchangeably used, it is crucial to differentiate between a nation, nationalism and a nation-state. A nation is a group of people based on shared commonalities. Nationalism is a political principle that holds that the political and national unit should be congruent (Gellner, p1, 2000). A state is a human community that (successfully) claims monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber, p78, 2009). A nation-state is a version of a state based on nationalism.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NATION-STATE AND CAPITALISM

Firstly, let us explore the history of our political order: the nation-state and its relationship with capitalism. Historically the nation-state emerged as the prevalent political order through industrialization and a series of political revolutions from the 17th to 20th centuries. Before industrialized society came about, people lived in feudalistic agrarian societies.

The agrarian society was ordered by differentiation between classes. For instance, there were only a few people who could read and write. They were typically born into an elite status and were therefore conferred political power. This relatively small group governed society. Their rule was justified by publically presenting their special characteristics such as royal blood. In this form of society, human relations were vertically formed between the dominant and subordinate classes. Building horizontal relationships beyond one's immediate community was rare. Thus, there was little possibility to spread nationalism, which is a political principle shared among a mass of people who do not know each other personally.

However, capitalism started to prevail around the 17th century in European countries, and it triggered massive social and political transformations. Through industrialization, people started to choose various occupations. They began moving out of their villages into the cities. As a result, people were fractured from their traditional communities.

The fluid industrial society (capitalism) required people to speak a common language and to possess advanced literary and mathematical skills. Their occupations required them to communicate with others beyond their native communities through a common language.

Thus, people were educated in order to attain these homogeneous standardized skills and a common language. This large, national-scale educational project could only be achieved by a state and was a key aspect in the cultural homogenization of society.

Gellner (2000) argues that nationalism emerged through the process of cultural homogenization initiated by states. States have power to levy taxes and use this money to found modern educational systems that are highly conducive to the development capitalism.

In history, other fundamental conditions existed that were enforced by states for the growth of capitalism. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue that in order to secure the free movement of labor forces, people had to be freed from a rigid class hierarchy. The traditional class system prevented people from entering new industries. Thus the rigid hierarchy had to be abolished. Also, the free investments of capital within the territory of the state had to be secured at all costs by abolishing the feudal system. In the feudal system, land ownership was determined by traditional social relations between masters and servants. It hindered the free flow of capital.

It was the state that reformulated its domestic territory into the culturally homogenous nation state that is conducive to capitalism and capitalist production. The development of the nation state and capitalism has been inseparably connected, not in opposition.

Nevertheless, some scholars contend that the nation-state and capitalism are independent, separable entities. They often argue that a state operates in a way to appease inequalities created by the free market through public investments and social security schemes. However, they fail to account for the conditions that led capitalism to become the dominant economic system. The development of capitalism presupposed the power of states. It was more than asserting that the state protected private property. It was the state that reformulated national territory into a homogeneous space for capitalism to develop.

The relationship between capitalism and nation-states explains why a nation-state model became the dominant political system in today's world order: the nation-states successfully integrated the efficient capitalistic production system into the territory of the state. In terms of economic and military power, these European states were hugely successful in the 19th and 20th century, as the history of imperialism and colonialism has shown us. The nation-states have become the dominant political principle in today's world.

IS THE NATION STATE ETERNAL?

Now I would like to go back to Keith Hart's vision for the "just society"

at the beginning of this essay. Is the nation-state system the permanent political system for our world? Under the present global economic trend, capitalism slows down the speed of long-term economic growth. If this is the case, is it possible to maintain the nation-state's sound government budget balance? As globalization has shifted capitalism, contemporary nation-states are increasingly facing numerous problems in their maintenance. That includes migrations, separation movements, economic inequality, popularized democracy, sovereign debt crises, uncontrollable flows of capital beyond nation-state boundaries and more. Considering these issues and the instability of the current formation of the nation-states, perhaps, our political system is not a "just one" for the increasingly globalized economy, as Hart maintains.

As the capitalist economy was the key force for the inception of the nation state, I believe that the capitalist economy is also the key force in the possible erosion of the nation-states. Given the present challenges in the world, in the rest of this essay I would like to analyze the limits of the nation-state model, particularly examining the global flows of money. How have the relationships between nation-states and capitalism changed as the technology of globalization has shifted? In other words, as global capitalism changed and morphed, how did nation states respond? Are nation-states sustainable and the ideal and/or permanent societal structure under global capitalism?

In the 19th century, the nation-state and capitalism worked together. However, after a series of evolutionary events, the late 20th century produced a global capitalism detached from the spatial boundary of the nation-state.

In the modern world there are roughly two basic flows of money: taxation by states and profits by businesses or private enterprises. States gain wealth through taxes because states have legitimized physical force as an institution for redistribution. On the other hand, businesses accumulate profits as they operate in the market, selling their tangible or intangible commodities (I have abstracted other monetary flows such as inheritance, gifts, or charity for the sake of simplicity).

As mentioned in the history of nation-states, the state functioned to produce the fundamental conditions for businesses or private enterprises to operate in the market. The state helped capitalistic production to flourish. However, this nation, state and capitalism trinity is seemingly hitting its limits now.

The decline of the state's capacity to maintain sound government-budget balance is observable in advanced nations. In other words, money bypasses states as it flows lawlessly into tax havens by multi-national

corporations. The global economy is characterized by this lawless, unrestricted flow of money. Multi-national corporations and rich individuals transfer their money into tax havens to minimize the portion of their wealth which is taken by nation-state taxes. Tax havens are states or territories where tax rates are set at a very low percentage. These countries are often small in terms of territory, possess small populations and use their tax system as a competitive advantage, competing with bigger states.

Monetary transactions also occur beyond the surveillance of state institutions through shadow banking and hedge funds, due to the liberalization of global financial markets. The flows of money are literally uncontrollable for the state institution, as money bypasses central banks and the fractional reserve system. Securitization (banks selling securities made out of their risk assets such as mortgages for low-income customers in the case of the Lehman shock in 2008) and shadow banking (financial activities not subject to regulatory oversight hedge funds, for instance, have fewer restrictions since they are categorized as private players) are typical examples. The invention of private monies, such as derivatives, accelerated this process. Moreover, the development of monetary forms such as Bitcoin, air mileage and Amazon points that are not issued by central banks has become more and more prevalent. IT companies have detached monetary circuits from bank-state networks to their virtual monetary circuit through payment services such as PayPal and Google Wallet. Therefore, it is becoming harder and harder for the state to monopolize the production and administration of money. Dodd (p.213 2014) suggests that there widening is a gap between our psychological impression of money, which is still state centered, and the reality of its governance, whereby the state is increasingly less able to monopolize the management of money.

These empirical trends suggest that money progressively eludes nation-states. However, the nation-states' model of taxation and redistribution is still based on the 19th century when today's globalized capitalism did not yet exist. The nation-states are managed by bureaucracy and domestic politics. They try to regulate money through central banks and fiscal policy, and the strength and efficiency of these models of management are quickly becoming outdated.

What is complex in this issue is that we cannot simplistically say global monetary flows simply erode the power of the nation-state, as if monetary flows completely transcend states. As I argued in the first part of this essay, capitalist economy and the nation-state have had an inseparable and symbiotic relationship from its inception. In the case of the Euro debt crisis, public and private institutions have entered mutually detrimental cycles of economic codependency. In this sense, disintegration of state-oriented flows of money is not characterized as transcendence but convolution (Dodd, p216, 2014).

What is clear for now in today's world is the fundamental deficit in our political platform and democratic monetary regulation system. In the global economy, money flows freely and lawlessly, but there is no legal framework for transnational flows of money because there is no transnational entity to regulate monetary flows. This unmatched condition makes it extremely difficult to maintain a basis for distributive justice or political legitimacy in nation-states.

Looking at the global flows of money, I came to the conclusion that the nation-state model is not sustainable given the spatial mismatch between the global economy and the nation-state. Since the inception of capitalism, the nation-state and capitalism have supported each other, successfully integrating the efficient production system of capitalism into the territorial space of the nation-state. However, since the late 20th century, some basic conditions have changed. States lost the control of money mainly due to the liberalization of global financial markets and the digital communication revolution. States have been experiencing increasing difficulty to sustain sound government-budget balance and the capacity for the administration of money or their financial bases. Is the nation state melting down? Probably yes. Globalized capitalism is starting to function beyond nation-states because nation-states have not been able to keep up with the technologies of globalized capitalism.

History tells us that political systems are not permanent because they have transformed as history enters into different phases. The world economy is clearly more integrated than decades ago, while we still maintain fragmented political processes. Distributive justice is unlikely to be achieved under present conditions. So what are the relationships between nation-states and capitalism now? Has the relationship between nation-states and capitalism changed or weakened? This is an open question. I don't think there is a complete disappearance of the relationship between capitalist economy, nation and states, but I believe it is clear that the global economy operates beyond the nation-states in their current form.



KATSUMATA YU is a sociologist in Japan. He earned his MS in Contemporary Social Thought from the London School of Economics and Political Science and his MA from Columbia University. His research interests include economic sociology and social theory. He is a participant of EPRIE 2014.

REFERENCES

Gellner, Ernest (2000). *Nations and Nationalism*. In Japanese translation by Setsu Katou. Tokyo. Iwanami Shoten.

Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari (1994) *A Thousand and Plateaus*, In Japanese translation by Kunikazu Uno et al. Tokyo. KwadesyobouShinsya.

Dodd, Nigel (2014) *The Social Life of Money*. Princeton University Press.

Hart, Keith (2009). *Money in the Making of World Society*. A chapter in C. Hann and K. Hart (eds) *In Market and Society: The Great Transformation Today*, Cambridge University Press.

Weber, Max (2009). *Politics as a Vocation*. In *From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology*. New York. Routledge.

REPORT FROM THE ALUMNI MEETING

Marta JAWORSKA

INTRODUCTION

The 2015 EPRIE program was held in Tokyo and Seoul from the 17th to the 27th of July. Twenty-one participants from six countries took part in the program. The main topic this year was Nations and Identities. While this year's participants discussed the main topics, met with the ambassadors of Germany and Poland, visited important Museums and landmarks in Tokyo, on the 23rd of July fifteen alumni who participated in EPRIE in 2012, 2013 and 2014 arrived in Seoul. The main purpose of the 2015 EPRIE alumni meeting in Seoul was to get together and discuss the topics of nationality and identity, thus closing a two-year lead topic of the EPRIE program (2014 and 2015) The group discussed further action to promote the EPRIE Alumni Association, develop further activities and meet the new participants of EPRIE 2015 to encourage them to join the Alumni Association, listen to their ideas and exchange experiences and thoughts.

ON ALUMNI PARTICIPANTS

The alumni who arrived in Seoul represented the 5 countries that participate in EPRIE: Germany, France, Poland, Japan and South Korea. Most participants were from South Korea as the meeting was held in their home country, and it was the easiest for them to attend (seven). Four alumni came from Germany, two from Poland and one each from Japan and France. Since 2014 delegates from China have also participated in EPRIE, however unfortunately none of last year's representatives from China could attend.

As the EPRIE program is held every year alternating between Asia and Europe, so too is the alumni meeting. This presents a great opportunity for those alumni who cannot travel to another continent, for whatever reason, to attend. What is more, because most participants conduct their research on topics connecting Asia and Europe, they travel around and some of them manage to take a break from their work and come up for the meeting (as it happened some of the alumni this year had managed to do so). From my perspective as a participant from EPRIE 2014 (meeting with alumni was organized in Berlin), I did not meet some of the alumni last year. This opportunity presented itself during the meeting in Seoul, and even though we met for the first time, participation in the EPRIE program as well as common topics of interest including the topic for the program created a bond between all of us, a relationship which could turn into a sort of an identity marker in order to distinguish us from the rest of the Koreans whom we met during our stay in Seoul. The feeling of togetherness continued throughout the entire stay in Korea and was enhanced when the participants of EPRIE 2015 joined us in Seoul.

All of the Alumni from the three past years of EPRIE were set to meet on the 23rd of July. The main organizers of the transfers, attractions and restaurants were Jeewon Chang and Jiwon Oh. A huge help in organizing tours and joint meeting with participants in Kim Dea-Jung Presidential Library and Museum was Chun Young Park. Also, the vice-president of the Alumni Association Yann Werner Prell, created an atmosphere where all of the alumni and participants could feel welcome and speak their minds.

ON DISCUSSION

On the 24th of July the alumni met at Kyung Hee University where we discussed the main topics from the EPRIE program on nations, identities, nationalism and history issues in text books and their presentations at the museums and in scholars' ideas. We were welcomed by Professor Yu Chungwan, President of Humanities College, who gave a short presentation on the issue of colonialism in South-East Asia and its effects on Korea-Japan relations nowadays. During the alumni meeting, some of the students from the university also participated in the discussion.

After a short introduction by Julianne Aso on EPRIE and EPRIE alumni activities, we listened to a presentation prepared by Katsumata Yu on Stories on neighboring nations. In his presentation, Yu outlined the historical issues and how they reflect on the current situation both in politics and areas of academic research between Japan and Korea. He elaborated on his own thought on the matter, based on writings on nationalism and communities by Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Anthony D. Smith and above all the two most important books on Japanese origin – *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*. Further discussion revealed some different perspectives between Korean representatives and those who have knowledge of Korean history as well as those knowledgeable about Japanese history. Once again, as we discussed during EPRIE 2014 in Halle on a joint text book initiative, it was clear that before an understanding between Japan and Korea could be reached regarding the concept of common history, it is essential that those two nations first complete their reconciliation process.

The next main discussion was held on the 25th of July at the Kim Dae-Jung Presidential Library and Museum. It was a joint meeting of alumni and EPRIE 2015 participants, preluded by a welcoming speech by Professor Moon Chung-In from Yonsei University. Professor Moon talked about the process of reconciliation and how it occurred in Europe, mostly between Germany and Poland, and how it should take place between Japan and Korea, using examples of contemporary issues like comfort women, Yasukuni Shrine and the question of apology from the Japanese government. Most of the participants in this meeting agreed that reconciliation between Japan and Korea, unfortunately, will take a long time.

The next part of the discussion included a presentation by Julian Hermann from the Robert Bosch Stiftung who talked about the origins of the Foundation and its general aims and departments nowadays. After a short break, participants of EPRIE 2015 presented what they learned, saw and discussed in Tokyo on nations and identities. The alumni from 2012 (Julianne Aso), 2013

(Kim Kyung-Min) and 2014 (Lucia Chauvet) explained what had taken place each year, as well as what the Alumni Association had done in between workshops. However the main event of this day, which was followed by a heated discussion and comments from the participants, were four presentations by alumni on their research, connected to the topics of each year's EPRIE program.

The first spokeswoman was Nadeschda Bachem from University of London who briefly introduced her research on Imperialism and National Identity in Postcolonial Japanese and South Korean Literature. She focused primarily on post-war literature, giving many examples, and she received some interesting questions from the participants regarding the representation of nationalism in literature. The second spokeswoman was Hanna Suh from Seoul National University. Her personal background brought her interesting research ideas on Social Integration Policies of South Korea compared with Civic Integration for Immigrants in Western Europe.

The third spokesman was Peter Kesselburg from University of Freiburg who presented his findings, mainly from literature and field research, on the issue of comfort women in Vietnam. The paper entitled *Negotiating Identities and Reconciliation between South Korea and Vietnam: The "Vietnamese comfort women" issue and con lai Đại Hàn after the Vietnam War 1964 – 1975* reopened the main discussion on comfort women in Korea and Vietnam and similarities and differences in the Korean, Vietnamese and Japanese governments' positions on the subject. The fourth and last spokeswoman was Joanna Urbanek from University of Warsaw who showed everyone examples of different ways of shaping a collective memory from her own research and applied it to the Korean case of talking about history. Her presentation *Gloria victis? How Poles shape their collective memory and why it can be compared to the Korean experience of war and occupation in the 20th century?* showed parallels between war experiences among Poles and Koreans and the resulting trauma as well as contemporary political, demographic, and economical issues.

These presentations and further discussion amongst participants, alumni and the guests demonstrated that sharing experiences and research gave the newest participants, and future alumni, an opportunity to get to know the alumni better. Moreover, the exchange of ideas and thoughts during the Q&A session as well as social conversations brought everyone closer together, allowing them to grow and develop their own opinions.

ON THE ALUMNI ASSOCIATION

The EPRIE Alumni Association was created after the first EPRIE

program in 2012 by the participants who wanted to continue getting together both in Europe and Asia, locally in each country and yearly during the EPRIE meeting and develop new ways to grow together scientifically and try to make a practical difference in terms of cooperation between – the now 6 – countries. During the meeting in Seoul, we discussed new ways to achieve more intense and visual cooperation since we work and live in various countries on two continents.

Until now, the Association has both a website (jointly with EPRIE) and a facebook page. Alumni also meet during local meetings in their countries, although these meetings are more informal in nature. What the alumni who were present at the meeting in Seoul came up with can be summarized in a few points.

First of all, we all agreed that the local meetings need to have a coordinator. One alumnus from each country should gather information and be a contact person, with the headquarters in Berlin all the time. This coordinator for the country should be informed about local meetings, help organize them and write annual reports on the meetings.

The second matter regarded the atmosphere of local meetings. We did not insist on changing them to formal affairs, however we do wish to focus on matters broadly related to topics from EPRIE, as well our own topics of interest and scientific work. This idea is based on the networking notion behind EPRIE as well as the plan to create a separate website/blog on the Association, including co-organizing international and interdisciplinary conferences. The local meetings should provide an opportunity to discuss these matters and report them on the website.

Thirdly, the idea of creating a separate platform from the EPRIE website arose. Its character would be dual: one side would report on what is happening with the alumni and the respective field of study represented by the alumni. This would have more of a blog/informative character, including the comments section below every entry. There should be few alumni who would administrate the website in order to check the content and the comments section. The second part of this website would be a place where alumni – first and foremost – and later other scholars could publish their articles. The goal is to create an online, open source and free journal with an ISSN number which could be published three to four times a year, with special issues on specific topics on humanities, politics and economics studies. We would like the articles to be reviewed by respective professors in the field and we would like to put out our call for papers not only amongst the alumni in their countries and at their universities, but also worldwide, for example on the H-net website.

The main purpose of the alumni meeting was achieved in Seoul. At this moment, we are all trying to fulfill and process the ideas that were brought up and to work harder in terms of semi-formalizing the local meetings in each country. The alumni network and getting to know most of the alumni from different years of EPRIE allowed us to grow. Hopefully, by 2016 the EPRIE Alumni Association will have more members and will be able to establish better activities and promotion.

SUMMARY

The EPRIE alumni meeting in Seoul in July 2015 was a wonderful opportunity to meet each other again and to meet new people, the prospective alumni. I am convinced that the exchange of knowledge, ideas and experiences was fruitful for everyone and that our work will only be better in the future. This report focused mostly on the scientific, formal side of the meeting, however we were able to socialize with each other and visit some of the most beautiful places in Seoul. The official tour of the museums was led by the Korean guide, Park Han-Yong from The Center for Historical Truth and Justice who presented some interesting facts and thoughts about Korean history and traditions. There were also unofficial tours with our Korean friends. I believe that this opportunity to get to know Korean culture and history gave us a better understanding of the difficulties surrounding the reconciliation process between Japan and Korea, especially for those alumni and participants who have never studied Korean culture. What's more, in my opinion the alumni meeting in the larger group, apart from the local meetings, managed to bring the members closer together socially as well as in terms of future work together in the association.



Marta JAWORSKA is a PhD student at the University of Gdansk, Department of History in Poland. She is a graduate of cultural anthropology and archaeology at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, specializing in the Japanese culture, particularly traditional customs and rituals, funeral rites and the cult of the dead. Currently she is preparing a dissertation connecting the issue of nationalism in Japan and its markers visible in cultivating traditions. She participated in EPRIE 2014 and took part in the alumni meeting in Seoul.

EDITORIAL OFFICE

Korea Forum
c/o Korea-Verband e.V.
Rostocker Str. 33
10553 Berlin / Germany

Tel: +49 (0)30 3980 5984
Fax: +49 (0)30 3980 5986
redaktion@koreaverband.de

PUBLISHER

Korea Kommunikations- und
Forschungszentrum, KOREA VERBAND

www.koreaverband.de

The KOREA VERBAND is a registered association
(Vereinsregister AG Charlottenburg
VR 26710 B.)

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Han Nataly Jung-Hwa – V.i.S.d.P.

MANAGING EDITORS

Mathias Räther
Dr. Rita Zobel

LAYOUT AND TYPESETTING

Choe Dong-Ha

ENGLISH PROOFREADING AND TRANSLATIONS

Suzanne von Engelhardt

PROOFREADING

Mathias Räther
Dr. Rita Zobel

PHOTOS

Photos from the EPRIE-seminar are taken by
Nils Clauss in Seoul.

PRINTING

Druckerei Conrad GmbH, Berlin

KOREA FORUM SPECIAL - EPRIE III, AUTUMN 2015, PERIODICAL NO

ISSN 0944-8373
available: www.eprie.net/publication

MAGAZINE SUBSCRIPTIONS, INDIVIDUAL ORDERS, PREVIOUS EDITIONS:

abo@koreaverband.de

ABOUT EPRIE

EPRIE is a dialogue intensive seminar program
held annually on 10-12 days in Europe and East
Asia alternately. It includes political talks, visits
to institutions, round trips...

EPRIE aims to promote and improve contact
between people of neighboring states, whose
relations have been troubled in history.
It intends to develop personal contacts, to build
a long lasting network, to stimulate and foster
the development of further cooperation.

EPRIE was founded in 2012 by the two
organizers Han Nataly Jung-Hwa and Rita
Zobel. It is mainly supported by Robert Bosch
Stiftung and the Japan office of Friedrich-Ebert
Foundation.

ABOUT KOREA VERBAND

The KOREA VERBAND is a politically
independent forum providing information
and promoting cooperation among people
who are interested in the history, culture, and
politics of Korea. This platform will appeal to
all individuals who wish to engage with or find
out about current developments on the Korean
peninsula.

The KOREA VERBAND seeks and promotes
collaboration on national and international
levels with other non-governmental
organizations and initiatives as well as experts
on Korea in the arenas of science, journalism,
politics, labor unions, churches, environment,
women's rights, arts and culture.

The KOREA VERBAND was founded in 1990
and is a member of the foundation Stiftung
Asienhaus. Since 2008 the Korea Verband has
been based in Berlin.

AUTHOR INFORMATION

The articles in KOREA FORUM SPECIAL
represent the opinions of the authors. These
opinions do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Editorial Office or those of
the Publisher. We have made all efforts to
respect the copyrights and rights of use of all
material from third parties. Should any errors
have occurred in specific instances, please
contact the Editorial Office.

Reprints and any other form of secondary
usage requires the prior consent of the
Publisher. As a rule, we welcome further
dissemination. Please contact us with your
request.

In East Asia the surname precedes the first name.
In our publication we respect this convention.

THIS PUBLICATION IS SUPPORTED BY

Robert Bosch Stiftung



**KOREA FORUM IS AVAILABLE
AT THESE LOCATIONS IN
BERLIN, GERMANY**

oh*21

Oranienstr. 21
10999 Berlin - Kreuzberg

Chatwins - Bücher rund ums Reisen

Goltzstraße 40,
10871 Berlin - Schöneberg

Haus der Kulturen der Welt - Buchladen

John-Forste-Allee 10
10557 Berlin - Mitte

Korea Verband

Rostocker Str. 33
10553 Berlin - Moabit

Korean Book Service

Helmut Hetzer Internetbuchhandlung
www.koreanbook.de

Buchladen zur schwankenden Weltkugel

Kastanienallee 85
10435 Berlin - Prenzlauer Berg



Ausgabe 1+2/2011
Fokus: Pflicht und Verweigerung
- Militär in Südkorea
Doppelheft € 15



Ausgabe 1+2/2012
Fokus: Migration als Kurzzeit-
tation oder Bleiberecht
Doppelheft € 15



Ausgabe 1+2/2013
Fokus: 50 Jahre Migration aus
Südkorea nach Deutschland
Doppelheft € 15



Ausgabe 1+2/2014
Fokus: Gesellschaftliche
Veränderungen in Nordkorea
Doppelheft € 15

Since 1991 KOREA FORUM is one of the few publications in the German-speaking countries, which is especially concerned with Korea and East Asia. It illuminates a wide spectrum of topics from the Korean Peninsula including politics, international relations and society, in addition to history, art and literature. The magazine serves readers that are interested in the development of the Korean states in a global setting.

KOREA FORUM SPECIAL published since 2013, consolidates our understanding of relevant themes presented at seminars and conferences like the *Exchange Program for Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe* – EPRIE.

The KOREA FORUM can be purchased for €15 for each double issue, excluding shipping. Members of the KOREA VERBAND and subscribers receive the magazine with free delivery.

MEMORANDUM

by 2015 EPRIE Participants, 2015

NATIONS + IDENTITIES + (MUCH MORE) = EPRIE 2015

Eleven Days in July offered us a most memorable experience and unique opportunity for dialogue at the Exchange Program for Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe (EPRIE) 2015. This year, 19 young professionals from China, South Korea, Japan, France, Germany and Poland joined the program to discuss regional cooperation in a globalizing world in the context of nation and identity. Given the program venues in Tokyo and Seoul, our main regional focus was East Asia, with some reflections on the current challenges in Europe. The neighboring countries in this region share a common historical line but see history, in particular of World War II and preceding decades, from different perspectives. Consequently, our brainstorming and conversations at EPRIE were diverse and enriched our various views.

During the program, we had an opportunity visit sites closely related to matters of East Asian history and politics which were intensely discussed, including museums in Japan and South Korea that presented conflicting historical narratives. These differing interpretations of a common history contributed greatly to both inputs and outcomes of our own discourse among the participants. We also met with an artist whose work showed a practical dimension of the more abstract ideas we discussed.

EPRIE 2015 started with several intercultural training sessions. Through these activities, we quickly became familiar with each other and experienced first-hand identity-related concepts at the core of the program. Following these introductory sessions, seminars by relevant experts from East Asia and Europe shed light on the status quo of regional relations in East Asia. After grasping the main concepts of the topic and current situation of the nations involved, we split into groups with different academic backgrounds, careers and nationalities to share our own ideas on nation, nationalism, and national identity in a globalizing world.

A crucial part of the EPRIE experience has been our interaction with the experts, which made the exchange within our group even more meaningful. We would like to express our gratitude to all these academics and practitioners who shared their insights and thoughts with us. Their presentations covered a wide range of issues, including collective memory, reconciliation, victimhood, and regional cooperation. They provided substantial input for discussions among us and helped sharpen our understanding of the complexity of East Asia as well as commonalities with and differences to the situation in Europe.

REFLECTING ON EAST ASIA = OUR STARTING POINT

We found that East Asia today can be understood in terms of several aspects, the difficult historical heritage being one of the most prominent. As close neighbors, China, Korea and Japan share a long history of cultural, economic and diplomatic exchanges as well as a number of recent conflicts, the most traumatic being World War II. Japanese wartime aggression and colonial rule, including the forced prostitution of so-called »comfort women” and later the enshrinement of Japanese war criminals in Yasukuni Shrine, have provided major points of contention in the framing of East Asian history of the 20th century....

KOREA
forum

c/o
KOREA VERBAND
Rostocker Str. 33
10553 Berlin

Tel: +49 (0)30 3980 5984
Fax: +49 (0)30 3980 5986

www.koreaverband.de
redaktion@koreaverband.de